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ABSTRACT 
The main objectives of this dissertation are: 
(1) To analyse the pre and post privatisation and deregulation performance of two United 
Kingdom industries from the transport sector. 
(2) To analyse the earning and employment in these industries prior to deregulation and/or 
privatisation, and to examine what has happened to them after these changes. 
(3) To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in these industries 
compared with what has happened in the rest of the economy. 
(4) To see if there was any evidence of rent sharing prior to privatisation and deregulation. 
If it did exist, did it continue after privatisation and deregulation, or was it substantially 
reduced or eliminated. 
The methodology of the dissertation is eclectic, so it examined these issues from a number of 
different perspectives, and its contribution to knowledge is incremental. 
In regard to the bus and coach industry in the newly competitive period following 
deregulation and privatisation, the major firms emerged almost solely through external rather 
than organic growth. This went against one of the main aims of privatisation, which was to 
create a competitive industry of many small-to-medium sized operations. Privatisation and 
deregulation also failed to stop the decline in passenger numbers, which was another 
objective of the programme. 
In the case of the UK ports, it is extremely difficult to conclude that the changing ownership 
constituted a significant factor in port performance and efficiency. Instead, factors such as 
geographical location and labour market deregulation seems to have had a greater influence 
on efficiency in the ports. That the measure of liberalisation most associated with 
privatisation, and that offered the most in terms of potential gains in efficiency, were those on 
which major concessions had to be made by the Government to win management support for 
the political process of privatisation. If managerial support for privatisation was absent then 
process was unlikely to occur. 
xx 
The underlying success of deregulation and privatisation in these industries has been in 
reducing the power of trade unions to obtain rent for their members, which was one of the 
main, if understated aims of the policy. 
xxi 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Key Objectives and Outline of Dissertation 
1.1.0 Introduction. In this introductory chapter we start by setting out the key objectives and 
an outline of this dissertation. Section 1.2 is an introduction to the Structure, Conduct and 
Performance (SCP) paradigm, which is one of the main tools of analysis used in this work. 
Having completed this introduction to the elements of the SCP paradigm, in Section 1.3 we 
then go on to examine the theory of contestable markets and Section 1.4 then discusses some 
criticisms of the theory. Section 1.5 then undertakes a brief analysis of the American airline 
industry which was used as a model for the deregulation of the United Kingdom bus and 
coach industry. In Section 1.6 we then examine some of the theories and philosophies behind 
regulation and privatisation, and how it was expected to affect trade unions. 
1.1.1 Key Objectives. The main objectives of this dissertation are: 
(1) To analyse the pre and post privatisation and deregulation performance of two United 
Kingdom industries from the transport sector, and to try to test the hypothesis that 
privatisation and deregulation will result in changes in the structure, conduct and 
performance of those industries. 
(2) To analyse the earnings and employment in these industries prior to deregulation and/or 
privatisation, and to examine what has happened to them after these changes. 
(3) To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in these industries 
and to compare these with what has happened in the rest of the economy. 
(4) To assess the existence of rent sharing and non-competitive wage determination prior to 
privatisation and deregulation. If there was rent sharing, did it continue after privatisation 
and deregulation, or was it substantially reduced or eliminated. 
The methodology of the dissertation is eclectic, so it will examine the above issues from a 
number of different perspectives. 
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1.1.2 Outline of the Dissertation. This dissertation is about changes in the product and labour 
markets due to privatisation and deregulation, and the effects of these policies on earnings, 
employment and performance in the relevant industries. It is argued by Haskel (1991) that a 
high level of product market power leads to inefficiency and market failure, and there is a 
debate in the literature that it can allow the existence and persistence of supranormal profits 
ceteris paribus. A reduction in product market power will reduce the scope for inefficiencies 
and reduce or eliminate the potential to earn supranormal profits. It is also argued that 
publicly owned firms can be less efficient than those in the private sector and by putting these 
firms into the private sector they would become more efficient, due in part to the disciplining 
effect of the capital markets. 
There has been a great deal of debate about the success of or failure of deregulation and 
privatisation especially in the UK (Beesley 1997)(Hood 1994) where this has been taken 
further than in any other country. In this dissertation we examine the pre and post 
privatisation performance of two sectors of the UK transport industry. 
In Chapter 2 we evaluate the claim that once the quantity regulatory barrier (see 2.2.2) was 
removed in the bus and coach industry there would be no need for regulation other than the 
general rules laid down by competition and health and safety policy. Once the barrier to entry 
was removed it was believed that the market would have been made contestable (Baumol et 
al 1988). The effects of the change of ownership from the public to the private sector and the 
increase of competition as a result of that change will be analysed. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the case of the port industry which was different due to the presence of 
sunk costs, but where it was still believed that the dominant publicly owned firm would 
become more efficient if it was transferred to the private sector. Also the abolition of the 
National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) would increase productivity in the Scheme Ports' 
(Walton Economic Forecasting Associates 1988) and the effect of the increased productivity 
would also impact on the Non-Scheme Ports as well. This requires an examination to see if 
there were any changes in performance between former Scheme and Non-Scheme Ports 
which have resulted in changes in concentration - based on cargo size and type in the port 
industry from 1984. The analysis will seek to establish if these changes can be explained, 
1 Scheme Ports were those ports included in the NDLS 
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either by increased labour market flexibility due to the abolition of the Scheme or changes in 
the product market. 
However in the UK during the 1980s, while product markets were being deregulated, other 
types of regulation increased. There were two major areas of increased regulation. One area 
related to the trade unions, which is found in Chapter 4 and the other was health and safety. 
The increased regulation of trade unions was based on the belief that the labour market was 
inefficient due in part to the rent-sharing hypothesis in which the actions of strong trade 
unions in non-competitive product markets would raise wages above the competitive level. 
Wages could also be above the competitive level according to the union threat model, as the 
threat of unionisation would force employers with a non-unionised workforce to raise wages 
above the equilibrium level in order to stop unions organising their workforce. Trade union 
power is normally proxied by union density (Disney 1990) or the union mark-up over the 
competitive wage. Changes in trade union density for the industries concerned will be 
calculated using data from the 1984,1990 and 1998 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
(WIRS). By increasing the regulation [weakening] of trade unions it was believed that this 
would reduce their ability to claim a mark-up over the competitive wage. 
There could also be a fall in employment if the union had also raised employment above the 
equilibrium level due to 'labour hoarding' (Booth 1995). Since the 1980s in the UK there has 
been a decrease in union density due in part to general economic factors as well as increased 
labour market regulation. This should have resulted in a reduction of the union mark-up 
according to the rent-sharing hypothesis. 
We go on to investigate the changes in real earnings by occupation for bus drivers and 
dockers. These changes will be compared with what has happened in the economy in 
general, and we will see if there has been a reduction of the union mark-up which may have 
been the result of privatisation and deregulation. 
We then discuss the changes in inequality in the USA (Freeman and Katz 1994), and in the 
UK (Leslie and Pu 1996) since the 1970s. This is to attempt to find out if institutional 
changes to the labour market have resulted in increasing inequality. Then we will compare 
the changes in inequality at the UK national level to the pre and post privatisation and/or 
deregulation changes in inequality in the industries concerned in this dissertation. 
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Finally in Chapter 5 we will discuss the outcomes of the research, going on to debate some of 
the problems encountered during the research, and identifying some possible areas for future 
research. 
1.2 The SCP Paradigm 
1.2.0 Introduction to the SCP Paradigm. The pioneering work for the Structure, Conduct and 
Performance (SCP) paradigm is associated with Edward S Mason. Mason laid the 
foundations of the SCP paradigm and provided the intellectual leadership for a group of 
young scholars including Joe S Bain, Carl Kaysen, James W McKie, Jesse Markham and 
Morris Adelman who developed and extended this approach, and much of the mainstream 
industrial economic literature since then has been based upon this model - see for example 
Ferguson and Ferguson (1994), Martin (1993) and Lipczynski and Wilson (2001). However, 
any use of this model should be made in the context that it has its limitations, especially in 
regard to its neoclassical foundations. The main thrust of its approach is that exogenous basic 
conditions determine market structure and that there is a single direction of causality from 
market structure, through conduct to performance (Reid 1987). 
1.2.1 A Simple Definition of the SCP Paradigm. In its simplest form the SCP paradigm can 
be understood schematically as follows: 
STRUCTURECONDUCT PERFORMANCE 
Extent of Profit Extent of 
concentration maximisation departure from 
under zero Paretian 
conjectural conditions 
variation 
Figure 1.1 The SCP Paradigm 
In this dissertation we use the terms of the paradigm, Structure, Conduct and Performance to 
assist our analysis, but we do not assume direct causality, as the paradigm does in the form 
shown. In this work we use the headings to collect and collate information on the industries 
concerned in this study. 
2 This reflects the output or price adjustments a firm will make following real or expected changes made by its 
rivals. 
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1.2.2 Market Structure. Structure describes the characteristic and composition of the market 
and is assumed to depend upon basic conditions in both the supply and demand in the 
particular market. 
The main aspects of market structure are the degree of seller concentration, which is 
described by the number and size distribution of sellers in the market. The level of buyer 
concentration that is defined in a similar way to seller concentration, and the amount of 
product differentiation amongst the outputs of the various sellers in the market. Conditions 
of entry into the market, the extent to which the established firms are integrated or 
diversified, and any economies of scale that are present in the market, are other aspects of 
market structure. 
The number of firms was regarded as the prime determinant of the degree of competition or 
co-operation amongst firms, which in turn would determine their level of profit. Structure in 
this sense can be defined either by simple concentration indices, or something more elaborate 
involving many characteristics. Empirical correlations were sought between the degree of 
concentration in the industry and its profitability. Structure is assumed to cause but not be 
caused by conduct. 
1.2.3 Conduct. Each firm controls a number of decision variables such as the methods and 
scale of production, advertising, research and development activities and prices etc. How they 
actually make these decisions is more difficult to identify empirically than either structure or 
performance. The process of choosing between alternative levels of these decision variables 
is usually referred to as the behaviour or the conduct of the firm. The focus is on how firms 
set their prices, whether independently or in collusion with other firms in the market. More 
often than not though, conduct is either ignored or assumed to take some single form like 
profit maximisation. 
1.2.4 Performance. As with structure and conduct, performance of a firm or firms can be 
measured in many different ways. A typical list of performance measures or indicators would 
include allocative efficiency, X-inefficiency3, equity, employment creation, technological 
3 X-inefficiency is the gap between the actual and minimum attainable supply cost, and is likely to be present in 
large organisations, which lack effective competition. 
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progress, and the quality of the product. The essential question is whether or not the firm's 
operation enhances economic welfare. 
Although a firm may be productively efficient at the given level of output it may not meet the 
requirements of allocative efficiency. Such a firm would posses a degree of market power 
and it would have some discretion in determining the price at which to sell its output. It 
would be able to raise its prices above marginal cost. "High" or "supranormal" profits are 
assumed to be another sign of market power and poor economic performance. 
1.2.5 Problems with the SCP Approach. Neo-classical theory assumes that in a perfectly 
competitive market an atomistically-sized firm is an 'economically' efficient firm. However, 
empirical observation would tend to identify that some companies have made excess profits 
over the long term. 
But the difficulty in interpreting the cause of excess profits has caused some debate. Demsetz 
(1974), from the Chicago School, argues that profit is, simply put, a sign of efficiency, not an 
abuse of market power. Efficient firms gain market share from less competitive firms and 
exhibit above average profit rates. Thus high levels of concentration may be associated with 
high profits, as a result of good economic performance, not the result of distorting the market, 
eg through collusive behaviour. 
1.2.6 The SCP Paradigm and Problems with Market Structure. The SCP paradigm by 
focusing on the different types of market structure implicitly incorporates the neo-classical 
view that competition implies a certain market structure. This leads to the assumption that 
'good' economic performance can be encouraged by an industrial policy that stresses the 
importance of a competitive market structure. 
Apart from the Demsetz issues it is clear that the number and size distribution of firms in a 
market may change over time. These changes can be brought about by mergers and 
differential rates of growth caused by different responses to technological developments and 
changes in patterns of demand. 'In addition, there may be purely stochastic explanations for 
changes in relative firm sizes: if a fixed number of firms were to face the same probability 
distribution of growth rates (which are independent of past growth rates) then Gilbrat's Law 
(1931) will apply. This states that, even where all firms are initially identical in size, chance 
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application of randomly selected growth rates will eventually produce a size distribution that 
is log normal. In other words, markets will become progressively dominated by fewer firms' 
(Ferguson and Ferguson 1994: 27). 
1.2.7 Concluding Comments on the SCP Paradigm. The SCP paradigm has then various 
criticisms. But it is still a useful framework for gathering and presenting information about 
the way(s) in which markets may operate. 
One particular and important evolutionary development of the paradigm was the theory of 
contestable markets. This suggested that the emphasis on market structure, especially 
Oconcentration, was misplaced. The originators of the theory suggested that this resulted in 
poor policy making. Their arguments, which were based on the experience in liberalising 
certain sectors of the US transport market, had a significant impact on the UK bus and coach 
industry. The theory and criticisms of contestable markets is discussed in the next section. 
1.3 Contestable Markets 
1.3.0 Introduction to Contestable Markets. In this section of this chapter we will discuss the 
theory of contestable markets. We need to do this so that we can understand the arguments 
used by the Conservative Government in the UK for the deregulation and privatisation of the 
bus and coach industry which are discussed in 2.6. Then we consider some of the criticisms 
of the theory of contestable markets. Finally we will discuss what happened in the United 
States airline market, which was taken by some to be one of the models for perfectly 
contestable markets. 
1.3.1 The Background to Contestability Theory. According to Thompson (1990: 17) the 
intellectual pedigree of `contestable market analysis' is not easily classifiable in terms of 
either the neo-classical or neo-Austrian approaches. Although it is formulated in neo-classical 
terms, it can easily be accommodated within the neo-Austrian approach as well. 
In regard to transport policy, contestability has been described by Tolly and Turton (1995: 
333) as the fourth age of transport policy. The theory was developed in the USA and was 
enthusiastically adopted and promoted by the Thatcher administration in the 1984 White 
Paper 'Buses' - see 2.4.8. 
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1.3.2 Contestable Markets and Natural Monopoly. The literature on contestable markets has 
concerned itself in the main with the criteria for natural monopoly. Although it can equally be 
applied to `generated' monopolies. 
According to Baumol et al (1988: 17) an industry is said to be a natural monopoly if, over the 
relevant range of outputs the cost function is subadditive. A cost function is subadditive if it 
costs less to produce the various. outputs with a single firm than by any combination of 
smaller firms. Decreasing marginal costs imply decreasing average costs, and decreasing 
average costs imply subadditivity - see 1.3.8 for discussion on marginal and average cost 
functions. 
In a contestable market, even where an industry is a natural monopoly, uncompetitive 
behaviour in certain circumstances will make the incumbent firm vulnerable to competitive 
incursions. According to Baumol (1987: 230) in such cases, the prohibition of entry is both 
unnecessary and undesirable because, in the presence of acceptable behaviour by the 
incumbent, entry will not occur even if it is undeterred by legal impediments. In fact 
preclusion to entry is undesirable because it robs the market mechanism of its most powerful 
instrument for the achievement of economic efficiency and acceptable behaviour, the threat 
of entry by competitors. 
If this analysis is correct, it follows that natural monopoly does not automatically justify 
recourse to either nationalisation or regulation. Baumol (1987: 230) argues that it has been 
shown that the market mechanism is quite capable of eliciting acceptable performance 
without government intervention [regulation], although no empirical evidence is given to 
support this statement. He then goes on to argue that even where an industry is, to a 
significant degree, not contestable it may be advisable to consider whether there exists 
effective means to impart contestability to the market, before embarking upon such drastic 
steps as the nationalisation or the erection of a complex regulatory mechanism in a market. 
1.3.3 Contestable Markets and Perfect Competition- The concept of a perfectly contestable 
market can be considered an extension of the perfectly competitive market. Contestability 
theory holds that in a perfectly contestable market the threat of competition by potential 
entrants can discipline firms to price their products in a socially efficient manner that yield 
only normal returns (Cairns and Mahabir 1988: 269). All firms producing any given product 
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must select output levels at which the marginal cost of all the firms is equal, ie perfect 
competition. Moreover, these marginal costs must equal the market price of that product, so 
that profits must be zero when there are constant returns to scale. But these results are 
supposed to hold not only for an industry with a large number of firms, but for any 
contestable market in which each good is supplied by two or more firms (Baumol et al 1988: 
xiv). 
Any industry that is perfectly competitive thereby automatically qualifies as perfectly 
contestable. However, the converse is not true. An industry may be perfectly contestable 
without being perfectly competitive (Baumol 1987: 231). 
The concept of a perfectly contestable market was designed to be able of embracing 
industries such as aviation, automobile manufacturing and telecommunications in which a 
vast multiplicity of tiny enterprises is clearly out of the question. The concept of a perfectly 
contestable market is intended to be capable of encompassing such industries, or, more 
specifically, to include this type of industry in those cases where technological and 
institutional circumstances permit the invisible hand of the market to retain its beneficent 
power over the behaviour of the firm' (Baumol 1987: 231). 
1.3.4 Conditions for a Contestable Market. Shepherd (1984: 573) has argued that a perfectly 
contestable market requires three conditions: 
1. Entry is free and without limit 
2. Entry is absolute 
3. Entry is perfectly reversible. Exit is perfectly free at no sacrifice of any cost and sunk 
costs are zero. 
These are pure conditions and the analysis of a perfectly contestable market only holds when 
all these conditions apply. We will now go on to discuss these concepts in greater detail. 
1.3.5 Freedom of Entry and Without Limit. According to Baumol (1987: 243) any perfectly 
competitive industry must, by definition, be free of all barriers to entry and exit, and that is 
the defining attribute of perfect contestability. This means that there are no legal restrictions 
on market entry. The entrant can, without restriction, serve the existing market demands. The 
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perfectly contestable market may or may not be characterised by economies of scale or scope, 
but it has no entry barriers. Economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
monopoly to be the least costly form of productive organisation. 
A perfectly contestable market is one in which a potential entrant will have equal access to all 
the customers in the market and must not be precluded from or penalised for selling their 
product to any or all of the incumbent's customers. They will also face the same market 
demands as those of the incumbent firms. 
The incumbent firm or firms will not be able to respond quickly enough with a reduction in 
price to close off a (shortrun) profit opportunity to the entrant. Because of these conditions an 
entrant may `hit and run' if an opportunity for profit presents itself, with no risk of 
oligopolistic interaction. 
If, however, the incumbent readjusts his price, reducing it to beneath that of the entrant, then 
the new competitor can readily exit from the market without loss of investment due to there 
being no sunk costs. Thus, any attempt by incumbent firms to earn excessive profits will be 
unsuccessful (Cairns and Mahabir 1988: 269). 
1.3.6 Sunk v Fixed Costs. In the theory of a perfect contestable market the absence of sunk 
costs is essential. However, the concept of a sunk cost is easily confused with that of a fixed 
cost. A fixed cost may be defined as a cost that a firm must incur in order to produce and that 
is independent of the number of units of output. Fixed costs may be the major source of 
economies of scale. If fixed costs are not sunk costs, this may constitute the most pertinent 
markets that are contestable despite the presence of economies of scale (Baumol 1987: 232). 
Sunk costs, on the other hand, are costs that (in some short or intermediate run) cannot be 
eliminated, even by total cessation of production. Sunk costs are those investment costs that 
produce a stream of benefits over a long horizon but can never be recouped. Sunk costs are 
not necessarily fixed costs - see Baumol et al 1988: 281. 
If there are no sunk costs, this allows freedom of exit, which means that a firm leaving the 
market is able to salvage its capital costs, minus depreciation (Ferguson and Ferguson 1994: 
18). However, the nature of the entrant's outlay must be such that they can recoup their 
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money quickly and easily in the event his incursion into the industry proves to have been a 
mistake. The absence of sunk costs is clearly tantamount to complete freedom (absolute 
costlessness) of exit and is an effective guarantee to the entrant against errors of foresight 
(Baumol 1987: 231). 
1.3.7 Hit and Run Profit Taking. According to Schwartz (1986: 38) the threat of hit-and-run 
entry is the linchpin of contestabilty theory. The operative force is the threat of entry not 
actual entry. According to him this distinction is often overlooked, but the radical 
implications of contestability theory hinges on the threat of entry. Baumol (1987: 230) has 
also argued that the threat of competitive entry can in many cases impose effective discipline 
upon private firms even when they are unregulated monopolies. However, Schwartz's view is 
slightly different from that of Baumol, who believes that (1987: 234) the threat of entry, even 
if it never materialises, can force the incumbent firm to deny itself all monopoly profits and, 
indeed, in these circumstances entry will not materialise because the incumbent's good 
behaviour eliminates any profit to entry. However, the disciplining effect of potential entrants 
is weaker, less predictable, and less efficient when actual entry - rather than the threat of 
entry - occurs. 
The disciplining effects are critical to private industry, and there is no reason to believe that 
they need to be any less salutary in industries populated by nationalised firms (Baumol 1987: 
230). Above all, contestability analysis endeavours to show the crucial role of unrestricted 
freedom of entry and exit has on the performance of firms in a contestable market -see 2.6.4 
in relation to the bus and coach industry. 
1.3.8 No Inefficiency in a Contestable Market. In a perfectly contestable market waste and 
inefficiency are ruled out. If a potential entrant identifies that it could produce the product at 
a lower cost than the existing firm(s) using the same technology, then it would lure away all 
the existing firm(s) customers. 
Also, if the market structure was inefficient because there were too many firms producing at a 
higher cost than the competitive solution, then it would be possible for either a potential 
entrant with lower costs or an existing firm to expand its output and reduce its costs, bringing 
its prices closer to the competitive solution, and as a result be able to gain market share. They 
could recruit customers from other firms in the market who have lower output and higher 
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costs by undercutting their prices. The firms whose cost base is higher if they remain in the 
market will suffer financial losses. However, due to the absence of sunk costs, they will exit 
from the market and the number of firms will decline until the competitive solution of least- 
cost production is arrived at. 
1.3.9 The Absence of Cross Subsidy. In a perfectly contestable market cross subsidy will not 
occur due to threat of entry. The existence of cross subsidy for a given product, means that a 
potential entrant can acquire a potential pool of incremental profit above that of the 
incumbent. This profit will be achieved by not producing the subsidised product, and so the 
potential entrant can reduce the price of other products, which have been used to subsidise the 
first product. This will result in the potential entrant luring away customers from the 
incumbent, resulting in either the incumbent firm removing the subsidy, and increasing the 
price and reducing the quantity supplied, or withdrawing completely from producing it. 
The only way in which an incumbent can prevent entry is by offering the consumer all the 
benefits they would receive from a supplier operating in a competitive market. 
1.3.10 Contestability and Regulation. It has been argued by Baumol and Willig (1986: 27) 
that it is in the area of regulation that contestability may make its main contribution: not as an 
argument for the elimination of regulation but as a guide for regulation, especially in the 
presence of economies of scale and scope. It offers to consumers in markets with unavoidable 
entry barriers just the same sort of protection from excessive pricing that they would have 
derived from perfect freedom of entry, if such freedom had been possible. 
1.3.11 A Theoretical Benchmark. Contestability theory shifts the attention away from 
structural measures of market power and from the nature of oligopoly interactions towards 
variables that affect the ease of entry and exit. Perfect contestability, the commonly discussed 
case is put forward as a useful theoretical benchmark. It is recognised by Baumol (1987: 232) 
that in 'the real world undoubtedly no industry is perfectly contestable. Some are probably 
fairly close to that state of affairs, requiring only negligible sunk costs, and having only 
minor impediments to one firm's use of another's production techniques or pursuit of its 
customers. ' It is likely that the majority of industries are unlikely to constitute anything like a 
contestable market. According to Schwartz (1986: 37) the key unsettled issues are what is 
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meant by imperfect contestability and whether many actual markets are imperfectly 
contestable. 
1.4 Criticism of the Contestable Market Theory 
1.4.0 Introduction. Almost from the first publication of the theory of contestable markets it 
has been contentious, and in this section we will look at some of the issues raised by critics of 
the theory. 
1.4.1 Contiguous Markets and Surmountable Barriers to Entry. In the theory of contestability, 
one of the main sanctions on a firm making supra-normal profits is the threat of entry. The 
ability to enter assumes that there are no barriers to entry or exit and there are no sunk costs. 
In certain circumstances although entry into a market may not be possible for all firms, it may 
be possible for those in related or contiguous markets - see 2.6.2. For this to happen it 
requires barriers to entry that are surmountable by these firms. 
The disciplining effect on the incumbent of potential entry from a related or contiguous 
market is similar to and may be even more potent than that of the contestable market. The 
threat of entry from these firms could constrain the incumbent firm even more than the threat 
of entry by a new firm which has no prior knowledge of this or similar markets. Entry for an 
established firm into another market is easier than for a new firm entering the market. The 
important factor here is the reserve or excess capacity in the short run that may be shifted to 
producing other types of products. However, Cairns and Mahabir (1987: 272) have proposed 
that potential entry as a disciplining force requires latent excess capacity, latent fungibility4, 
and the ability of firms to alter endogenously the industry product set through their own 
strategies. 
1.4.2 Contestable Markets and Technological Change. A number of economic theories of 
industrial organisation rely on a model which assumes that technology is unchanging. Yet, 
according to Stiglitz (1987: 883) markets in which technological change is important are 
never perfectly competitive. This is because technological change inherently involves 
increasing returns and sunk costs and where the technological change is a result of either 
4 Fungibility means ̀ substitutability' 
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Research and Development or learning by doing, there are likely to be increasing returns to 
scale and a high concentration of market power. Stiglitz (1987: 889) has argued that most 
expenditure on R&D is, by its nature, a sunk cost. The resources spent on a scientist to do 
research cannot be recovered. Once his time is spent, it is spent. Contestability theory is not 
appropriate to industries where technology is important; potential competition ensures neither 
economic efficiency nor zero profits (Stiglitz 1987: 887). 
It is difficult to reconcile this view with that of Baumol who believes that contestability 
theory is able to encompass industries like telecommunications and automobile 
manufacturing where there is large expenditure on research and development. In 
technologically advanced industries, a potential entrant would need to invest in research and 
development (R&D), not only to be viable but also to maintain viability once it is established. 
1.4.3 Freedom of Entry with Imperfect Contestability. Let us now relax the pure condition of 
contestability that entry into the market is absolute, and use the condition of imperfect 
contestability and assume that partial entry into the market by another firm or firms is 
possible. If a potential entrant or entrants believes that they will incur substantial sunk costs if 
it enters the market, this could affect the initial decision to enter that market. This is due to 
the increased risk of the loss of some of its capital if it enters the market and is not successful. 
If it then has to withdraw from that market because its estimates of demand prove to be over- 
optimistic or if the incumbent or incumbents adopt retaliatory actions it will incur losses due 
to the existence of sunk costs. With imperfect contestability the entrant is not guaranteed 
against errors of foresight, the more imperfectly contestable the market the greater the risk - 
see 2.6.4. 
1.4.4 Sunk Costs. Expenditure on sunk costs is also a state variable and this expenditure has 
a critical effect on competition. However, according to Tirole (1988: 308) the notion of fixed 
and sunk costs are idealisations for several reasons. There is a continuum of degrees of 
cornmitment between the two polar cases of short and eternal commitment. With both fixed 
and sunk costs it is assumed that the investment cost cannot be recouped at all during the 
period in which the assets are committed, and it is important to realise that fixed costs are 
always sunk to some extent (Tirole 1988; 307). The distinction between "fixed costs" and 
"sunk costs" is one of degree, not of nature. Fixed costs are sunk only in the short term 
(Tirole 1988; 308). 
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However, the commitment of the assets is not quite an all-or-nothing notion. What is really 
meant by a period of commitment is the period of time over which the costs of being freed 
from the commitment is sufficiently high so that it will not pay to be released. The notion of 
commitment is largely a purely technological one. In practice its success or lack of success in 
the product market may affect the date when a firm resells its assets. While most investments 
are not primarily sunk costs, there is an element of this type of cost in almost every 
investment. 
The use of `sunk costs' normally refers to the `homogeneous product' case (Sutton 1990: 23). 
The more specific the physical asset, the greater the extent to which the investment in assets 
is sunk (Martin 1993: 306). If we initially confine the analysis to physical assets, sunk costs 
are absent when firms use non-specific physical assets. The quality and therefore the 
purchase price of these assets would be easily ascertained by the potential purchaser in the 
event of resale. 
`Otherwise, some of the costs of the physical assets are sunk, and the theory of 
perfectly contestable markets fails' (Martin 1993: 306) 
However, if we extend the analysis to intangible assets - which are involved in every entry 
decision - then a potential entrant will invest in information about the market before they 
make a decision to enter or not to enter. This information is valuable to the firm so long as it 
enters the market, but it cannot be resold (Martin 1993: 306) at anything like the cost of 
producing it if it does not enter the market, so it involves an element of `sunk costs'. Martin 
(1993; 307) has also argued that sunk costs are ubiquitous in the real world. 
According to Baumol (1987: 232) the existence of fixed costs may well be the prime source 
of economies of scale in practice. It is therefore important to ascertain the nature of 
competitive interactions that arise when there are sunk costs. Even if there are small sunk 
costs this can fully cushion the incumbent against encroachment - see Stiglitz (1987: 890-1). 
This contradicts the contestability theory which suggests that, while even with a small degree 
of increasing return to scale there will only be one firm operating in the market, and price 
should be just slightly above marginal cost - the Ramsey price. 
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1.4.5 Sunk Costs and Market Structure. What is fundamental is that sunk costs are, in 
practice, almost always incurred in connection with the long-run decision on entry, 
advertising, and R&D and that the presence of such sunk costs play a primary role in the 
determination of market structure (Sutton 1990: 24). Through their effect on entry, sunk 
costs constrain structure and can create concentration. 
But even in the best of circumstances, plant and equipment have a finite duration and there is 
therefore a natural connection between durability and sunk costs. Contestability theory holds 
that a natural monopolist will set a price equal to average cost and government regulation will 
not be necessary. Stiglitz's analysis shows that this conclusion is not valid if there are durable 
sunk costs - see Stiglitz 1987: 894. Competition, actual or potential, is not necessarily 
sufficient by itself to ensure the efficiency of a natural monopoly. 
If the market is characterised as a `homogeneous-goods' industry in which all the firms offer 
identical products, then the cost of entry will be the cost of acquiring a single plant of the 
minimum efficient scale, net of any `resale value', which any of the plant might have. This is 
the sunk cost of entry into the market and is an irrecoverable element of fixed costs. The level 
of the sunk cost has no role in determining the firm's day-to-day pricing policy after it has 
entered the market (Sutton 1990: 24). The decision to enter the market will be decided by two 
factors and their inter-relationship to each other. The first is the level of the set-up costs, if 
the firm decides to enter the market. 
The second is the intensity of price competition it will face once it has entered the market. 
The more intense the competition the lower the perceived profitability, and as a result fewer 
firms will enter the market. The equilibrium structure reflects the tension between the level 
of set-up costs which must be recovered in order to justify entry ex post and the intensity of 
the price competition following entry. The greater number of firms that enter the market will 
result in an increased number of goods being produced in that market. And according to the 
`normal' rules of supply and demand, this will mean that the price will move towards the 
equilibrium price. The result of lower prices will be reduced profitability and will mean it 
will be less attractive for potential entrants to enter the market (Sutton 1990: 24). 
However, in markets where product differentiation is important, a potential entrant will have 
to invest in advertising or other forms of product promotion. If the firm then left the market it 
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might recover some of its investment as `goodwill' if it managed to place the product with 
another firm. If most of the investment is sunk, and if it did not manage to place the product 
with another firm all the investment in the differentiation of that product would be lost. 
Investment in product differentiation creates an asset for a going concern, but their costs are 
largely sunk. 
Advertising and R&D are examples of 'endogenous sunk costs'. Sutton (1990: 23) has 
argued that by increasing the level of these costs over the 'long run', in developing and 
advertising its products, the firm can increase the consumers' 'willingness to pay' for its 
product relative to its rivals' offerings. In those markets where such increases infixed costs 
(as opposed to variable costs), are effective in raising the consumers' 'willingness to pay', 
there is an in-built tendency in favour of a competitive escalation of expenditures on R&D 
and advertising. The most fundamental consequence of this is that increases in the size of the 
market do not imply a more fragmented structure. On the contrary, as market size increases, 
the return from a given increase in fixed outlays rises, so we tend to see an increased level of 
equilibrium outlays rather than a tendency towards market fragmentation. 
1.4.6 Specific Assets. This refers to assets that most firms posses which can be exploited in 
other activities and industries, for example innovation, labour skills, and brands. Williamson 
(1987: 168) believes that it is asset specificity which brings out the difference between 
transaction cost economics and `contestability theory'. Both approaches to the study of 
economic organisation acknowledge the importance of asset specificity, but they view it from 
opposite ends of the telescope. Thus contestability theory reduces asset specificity to 
insignificance, where hit-and-run entry is easy. 
Transaction cost economics by contrast magnifies the condition of asset specificity. It 
maintains that durable, firm specific assets are widespread, in which cases hit-and-run entry 
is often not feasible. 'Put more formally: "Because non-redeployable specific assets make it 
costly to switch to a new relationship, the market safeguard against opportunism is no longer 
effective. " As a result the market transaction is characterised by expensive haggling and high 
contractual costs which may propel the firms to integrate vertically' (Lipczynski and Wilson 
2001: 278). 
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1.4.7 Fixed Costs and Barriers to Entry. Shepherd (1984: 577) identifies three criticisms 
relating to fixed costs and barriers to entry. 
1. Fixed costs are claimed (or defined) to be irrelevant to entry barriers. But this is only true 
if the entrant can match, identically the incumbent firm's output. But this can only be 
achieved by means of total entry (see below). Otherwise the fixed cost per unit is higher 
for the potential entrant along with a smaller output. In this situation the incumbent can 
maintain a price differential without inducing entry. 
2. Sunk costs are closely and inversely related to time duration. By definition sunk costs are 
larger in the short run than the long run. Sunk costs are most likely to be the highest, and 
to cause entry barriers, in those periods when the incumbent is assumed not to respond to 
entry. 
3. Virtually all production requires specific assets which cannot be transferred or sold 
costlessly. As pointed out earlier, fixed costs and sunk costs commonly overlap. The 
existence of zero sunk costs is therefore a doubtful, counterfactual assumption for a 
general theory. 
1.4.8 The Austrians and Monopoly. According to the Austrian view, a firm - excluding a 
statutory monopoly - may be a monopolist because: 
1. Other firms may not find it worthwhile to compete but they have access to the market if 
they want to. 
2. The monopolist is producing products which other firms have not seen as profitable, or 
whose potential profitability they have belatedly recognised. 
3. They own the entire stock of some resource to produce the product. 
In the first case there is no cause for concern. 
In the second case there is also no cause for concern, provided that a potential competitor or 
competitors can enter the market. Even where a monopoly exists, the monopoly position is 
only temporary, provided that competition can exist, competition will reduce or eliminate the 
`monopoly profit'. In this situation according to the Austrian view `monopoly profits' are 
more accurately described as `entrepreneurial profits', as they result from the successful 
exploitation of an opportunity, which others have not seen. According to Littlechild (1978: 
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34) `it suffices here to establish the emphasis which Austrians place upon freedom of entry as 
a necessary and sufficient condition for competition in the sense of a market process. Even 
"highly" concentrated industries can be explained by the differences in the perception of, and 
speed of reaction to, changes in the underlying market phenomena. These changes set in 
motion a market process which takes time to work: indeed, firms are always in transition. 
Some have learned and grown, some are learning and growing, others have misjudged the 
situation and are shrinking. ' 
For the Austrians it is the third case that causes concern. Other firms that might like to enter 
the market are prevented from doing so, not by the government, but by the company having 
the sole access to the resource. The monopolist by restricting output can increase its price, 
and then earn supranormal profits because of its exclusive ownership of the resource. It is 
only in this last case that the market mechanism does not ensure that resources are distributed 
according to the wishes of the consumer. 
1.4.9 Ultra-Free Entry. Shepherd (1984: 573) has argued that `contestability' is a vague term 
and that it needs to be replaced by a more accurate phrase and he suggests the use of `ultra- 
free entry'. Baumol et al have focused on several aspects of entry, but their result holds only 
for the pure case of perfect contestability or ultra-free entry. Yet, every market to some 
degree is partly vulnerable to entry and is therefore imperfectly contestable. A perfectly 
contestable market - as discussed earlier - means that the entrant will face an immediate and 
absolute result, it will either prevail or not prevail over the incumbent. 
`The premier question is whether the ultra-free entry results apply when entry 
is not ultra-free. The term contestability confuses precisely this issue. '
(Shepherd 1984: 573) 
Shepherd (1984: 576) has argued that contestability (ultra-free entry to use his terminology) 
involves inconsistent assumptions. In assuming that total entry can occur before the 
incumbent responds and that this total entry forces, even a pure monopolist, to set prices at 
efficient levels. If the entrant is small in comparison to the market, then entry may be 
ignored. However, as we have already stated, in a perfectly contestable market entry is 
assumed to be total. That is the entrant would entirely replace and duplicate even a 
monopolist. 
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He [Shepherd] goes on to argue that we are left with three cases of entry: 
1. ultra free entry: with its inconsistent assumptions of total entry and trivial small entry. 
Since one can't have it both ways, the analysts must choose between the other two 
options. 
2. minimal entry: which is trivially small and results in no response from the incumbent. 
3. strong entry: entry on a large scale (up to total entry) but drawing strong resistance from 
the incumbent. 
Both the minimal and strong entry are mixed cases and would not necessarily give a clear cut 
result. 
By implication, the theory of contestable markets, particularly in its perfect form, is largely 
inapplicable to the real world (see Baumol 1987: 232-233). So we have to analyse both 
quantitatively and qualitatively the degree to which the performance of an industry does, or 
can be expected to, reflect the predictions of contestability theory. According to Baumol and 
Willig (1986: 25) this should come as no surprise since most industries can be expected to 
depart in some important respects from the model of perfect contestability, and it will 
therefore generally be necessary in applying the theory to assess the economic significance of 
the deviation, and we do this in Chapter 2. 
1.4.10 The Problem of Endogeneity. Another conceptual problem with the SCP paradigm is 
the assumption that the structural variables impinge on the system from outside, they are 
exogeneous. According to Walman and Jensen (2001: 514) 'The assumed chain of causation 
runs from market structure to market conduct to market performance. This assumption is 
clearly too simple: In the long run, conduct affects structure. Mergers affect concentration, 
the actions of established firms influence the attractiveness of entry, and innovation changes 
available technologies. 
Thus, in the long run, almost all, if not all structural variables are essentially endogenous.... 
At this point, the most that can confidently be said is that economists have recognised the 
problem of endogeneity but have not yet solved it definitively. ' 
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1.4.11 A Final Comment on the SCP Paradigm. As we have established the SCP paradigm 
has then various criticisms. But it is still a useful framework for gathering and presenting 
information about the way(s) in which markets operate. 
One particular and important development that came from the contestability theorist was the 
suggestion that the emphasis on market structure, especially concentration, was misplaced. 
They suggested that this misplaced focus on concentration lead to poor policy making. Their 
arguments had a significant impact in the USA, and subsequently in the UK, especially in the 
bus and coach industry. 
1.5 The United States Airline Market 
1.5.0 Introduction. Given its relevance to British policy making in this section we will 
critically examine the changes that took place in the USA airline market after it started to be 
deregulated in 1977. 
1.5.1 The United States Airline Market and Contestabilit . Deregulation in the USA airline 
market started in 1977 by opening up the air cargo market to competition. In 1978 the Airline 
Deregulation Act initiated a phased removal of fare setting and market entry controls, but 
since 1982, entry has been open to all national carriers that are willing and able to enter. The 
existing carriers have complete freedom to abandon or add routes as they see fit and it is 
argued that contestable market theory has been particularly applicable to the city-pair airline 
markets. However, Shepherd (1984: 584) has argued that the market is not well defined, and 
so the roles of barriers to entry and exit are not clear. The industry covers air traffic in the 
United States, along hundreds of city-pair routes. At one extreme the market could be defined 
as a national market. The other extreme would be to describe each city-pair route as the 
market. Baumol et al (1988) argues that each airline's addition of a route is entry into a new 
market. If this is correct, then contestability may (almost) exist, as established airlines could 
be potential entrants into other routes. Yet as Shepherd (1986: 584) points out many or most 
of these hundreds of city-pair routes are not relevant markets by the standard criteria of 
substitutability. Many are paralleled closely by alternative routes that are close substitutes; 
many are merely intermediate stops in longer routes. 
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1.5.2 City-Pair Airline Markets. It has also been argued by Bailey (1988: xiv) that the city- 
pair airline markets are characterised both by easy entry and exit and significant economies of 
scale. In this situation potential competition was thought to be an adequate policeman to 
ensure competitive behaviour. Even if a route has a single carrier, other carriers who have 
stations at both end-point cities can readily enter if monopoly profits become evident. 
However, according to Shepherd (1986: 584) route changes are part of a multipoint 
competitive strategy in related markets, not simply entry. Even route-addition "entry" does 
not go unchallenged by existing incumbents. In many cases entry has not been "total" and the 
existing carriers have often responded effectively when entry has occurred. 
Bailey (1988: xv) believed that potential (rather than actual) competition by trunk carriers 
had provided an effective competitive check on the pricing behaviour of local service carriers 
in long and medium-haul routes. If prices are set to deter entry why then has entry occurred? 
`Thus the threat of entry does not by itself suffice to keep profits to zero, as 
perfect contestability would require. Moreover, when new entry does occur, 
established carriers do reduce their fares in response, something one would 
expect in a conventional oligopolistic market other than one that is perfectly 
contestable. ' (Baumol and Willig 1986: 25) 
Also Schwartz (1986: 48) has also argued that since deregulation airlines have to respond 
quickly to entrants' price cutting. Such a rapid price response can make the threat of entry 
irrelevant to the incumbents' pricing, rendering the market non-contestable. He goes on to 
argue that the available evidence points to non-contestability, when new entry does occur the 
established carriers reduce their fares in response to such entry. In other words, prices are not 
kept low to deter entry. 
The entry of existing large carriers has also been found to have an especially large impact on 
fares. It is their ability to match an incumbent's reputational advantage that probably 
explained this. In general, the large airlines did not lower fares quickly when faced with entry 
by a low cost airline that promoted itself as a discount carrier. Instead, a two-tier pricing 
system was usually employed, in which lower fares were only available on a fixed number of 
seats. The question here is were these seats subsidised by the more expensive seats? If they 
were this would conflict with the theory of contestable markets, as in a perfectly contestable 
market cross-subsidy is not possible. 
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It also takes time to. establish ground facilities and to build up a customer base, which 
involves taking decisions about the level of prices set and the type of services offered, and as 
a result of these decisions market share is gained or lost. This is a process that accords with 
the mainstream industrial economic analysis. 
However, by also having control over computer reservation systems through which bookings 
are made and the use of loyalty payments to regular travellers, existing firms can create 
barriers to entry which make it almost impossible for new entrants to penetrate the market. 
According to Schwartz (1986: 48) studies undertaken in the mid-1980s, analysing the issue of 
how market structure affected profitability, came to the general conclusion that increases in 
concentration lead to an increase in profitability. 
1.5.3 Hub-And-Spoke Route Structures. According to an Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) report, the most significant result of route deregulation 
has been the development of hub-and-spoke route structures. The economic rationale for hub 
operations arises from the airlines' ability to take advantage of economies of scope (OECD 
1988: 55). The airlines rapidly realised the benefits of these operations where their flight 
hubs are on a limited number of airports and then offer their customers a wide range of 
linking services. The higher load factors resulted in keeping operating costs and fares down. 
But for passengers it has meant that they have to change aircraft and as a result have longer 
door-to-door times (Button 1990: 149). 
1.5.4 No Sunk Costs. It has been argued that airline markets can be contestable because their 
capital costs, while substantial, are not sunk costs. That is, the major portion of the capital - 
the aircraft - can be recovered from any particular market at little or no cost (Bailey 1988: 
xiv) and according to Schwartz (1986: 48) the intrinsic mobility of aeroplanes between routes 
strongly suggests that entry and exit is considerably easier than most industries. However 
Stiglitz (1987: 889) has argued that an airline must advertise to obtain customers; it must 
solve complicated routing problems and this creates an asset for a going concern, and that the 
cost of this is largely sunk. These costs have to be balanced against the multi-million dollar 
investment in an aeroplane, or the heavy sunk costs involved in the construction of an airport. 
1.5.5 Hit and Run Entry. For the competitive check to be effective on local service carriers, 
the carriers must believe that the competitive check is credible. However, Cairns & Mahabir 
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(1988: 271) have challenged this proposition, questioning the ability of carriers to switch 
capacity from their existing market. To be able to do this implies the existence of spare 
capacity, which would be impossible in a perfectly competitive market. They also argue that 
if a carrier shifts capacity away from its existing market, intending to return to the original 
market - after making a hit and run entry in to another market - it may not be able to return to 
its primary market. This is because by shifting some or all of its capacity into the new market 
it will affect the equilibrium in its existing market. The resulting disequilbrium in the market 
will result in increased prices which will increase the profitability of the remaining carriers - 
including a carrier who shifted only part of its capacity into another market. Other possible 
entrants will see the increase in profitability and enter the market and compete away the 
excess profitability. This then would leave no room for the original carrier to return all or part 
of capacity to the original market. This would affect the profitability of the original carrier 
and has been described by Cairns & Mahabir (1988: 271) as a game of musical chairs where 
the number of players (aircraft) equals the number of chairs (city-pair slots). 
Also in a busy airport there may also be a shortage of gates and landing slots, which would 
prevent hit-and-run entry. According to Baumol et al (1986: 24) such a shortage of slots 
prevented Peoples Express from acquiring even a single gate of its own at Denver's Stapleton 
International Airport, so that it was forced instead to lease gates from other carriers during a 
year of flying to that airport. 
1.5.6 Post Deregglation Structure. After deregulation, the industry has become significantly 
more concentrated in the United States. The theory of contestability would not be concerned 
by this, as long as the threat of entry is sufficient to maintain competitive performance. 
According to Button (1990: 150) in the two and a half years after 1985 there were 24 
acquisitions or mergers in the industry compared with only 15 in the 40 years between 1938 
and 1978. In some cases the mergers had resulted in airlines gaining almost total control over 
airports. 
It has been argued by Schwartz (1986: 50) that the airline experience since deregulation 
weighs against perfect contestability, but is inconclusive regarding imperfect contestability. 
In this context imperfectly contestable is taken to mean 'almost contestable. " In 1984 Bailey 
and Baumol (see Schwartz 1986: 49) attempted to argue that although the behaviour in the 
industry resembled that of oligopoly, in the long run the equilibrium result -a situation the 
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industry at that time may not have reached - would be that of a contestable market. They 
reconsidered the situation in the industry, and this led them to adopt a more qualified 
position. 
We now believe that transportation by trucks, barges and even buses may be 
more highly contestable than passenger air transport' (Baumol and Willig 
1986: 24). 
They go on to argue that the post-deregulation experience in the airline industry had revealed 
several elements of the structure of supply that conflicted significantly with the conditions 
necessary for the pure theory of contestability to apply without modification. 
The OECD (1988: 56) believed that the contestable market hypothesis, which states that the 
actual number of competitors is irrelevant, had been generally rejected. This evidence points 
against even imperfect contestability. Schwartz (1986: 49) cites Bailey and Baumol as 
conceding that airline behaviour had resembled that expected from rival oligopolists in 
standard analysis, not from players in a perfectly contestable world. Baumol and Willig 
(1986: 25) also believe that the airline industry does not conform to the perfectly contestable 
model, although airlines are cited as structurally among the most conducive to contestability 
theory. 
1.5.7 A Concluding Comment. It is important to remember that if the pricing behaviour of an 
industry is found to be largely independent of threat of entry, then contestability theory is 
unlikely to be relevant to that industry. Indeed contestability is unlikely to be relevant in the 
most concentrated of industries. 
1.6 Privatisation and Deregulation 
1.6.0 Introduction. In this section we will look at deregulation and privatisation concentrating 
on deregulation, because so much has already been written about privatisation during the 
1980s and '90s. For example, see Bishop et al (1994), Chapman (1990), Foster (1992), 
Henderson (1998), Jackson et al (1994), Kay and Vickers (1988), Saunders and Harris 
(1994), Thompson (1990), Ve1janovski (1987) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988). 
25 
In Chapter 2 we discuss quantity regulation in regard to the bus industry, and in Chapter 4 we 
discuss the regulation of the labour market generally, and with specific reference to the 
NDLS. 
1.6.1 Regulation. In this dissertation regulation is generally used in the narrow traditional 
American usage, which means a specific kind of policy making by governments, designed 
to interfere with the way that public and private sector firms operate in a market by 
enforcing standards or rules. 
This it is claimed can be achieved by a government making and enforcing standards or rules, 
which are designed to bring about a situation, which to a greater or lesser extent emulates the 
perfectly competitive market. The implicit assumption behind this intervention is that there 
was some kind of market failure. However, Hood (1994: 19) has argued that regulation 
ultimately comes from government's traditional role in providing a basis for trading, by 
setting standards and rules for the operation of the market. This would especially apply where 
there was asymmetry of information between the consumer and the producer/supplier. 
The regulatory agencies are charged with devising methods of control that try to prevent the 
abuse of market power while ensuring efficient operation of that market. This type of 
intervention in the private sector of the economy at the microeconomic level by government 
departments and state agencies is part of a broad approach to influence industrial 
performance and is generically known as competition policy. Devine et al (1988: 331) 
believes that this seeks to influence industrial performance indirectly, by maintaining or 
creating a framework within which the pursuit by independent firms of their private interests 
in accordance with market forces results in desirable economic performance. This consists of 
the market structure in which the firms operate, and a set of state-determined rules regulating 
their behaviour. The regulatory structure is designed to reduce or remove the opportunity for 
undesired conduct rather than prohibit it from occurring. Merger policy is an example of 
structural regulation, and policy against anti-competitive behaviour is a form of conduct 
regulation. 
However, even this narrow definition of regulation can have many different forms in the way 
that standards are set and how compliance is obtained, and will not provide a general 
explanation for all regulatory policies. Utton (1986: 14) recognises that regulation in all its 
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forms covers such a wide range of markets and varies so much in form and scope at different 
time periods, that no simple hypothesis could be expected to explain the majority of cases. 
1.6.2 Market Failure and Regulation. Under a familiar albeit limited set of conditions, 
competitive markets ensure resources are allocated efficiently. Where these conditions do not 
apply market failure can be said to exist. Kay and Thompson (1991: 21) have categorised 
these into three groups of circumstances. These are: 
" Competitive solutions may not exist, in circumstances where there is natural monopoly 
and high sunk costs of market entry. 
" Competitive solutions may exist but may not be achieved; incumbent firms may be able 
successfully to deter market entry, encourage the exit, merger, or acquiescence of 
competitors and establish a dominant position. 
" Competitive solutions may exist and be achieved, but the outcome may not be considered 
desirable. This undesirable outcome may arise in particular where externalities exist, 
where information asymmetries between market participants are important, where social 
concerns are considered relevant or where a more efficient arrangement of production 
cannot be sustained in the face of market entry. 
According to Kay and Vickers (1988: 301) the primary rationale for regulation is to remedy 
various kinds of market failure, externalities, asymmetric information and market power 
which are sources of welfare loss. However the existence of market failure on its own [they 
argue] is not a sufficient condition for intervention [regulation]. This is because intervention 
itself carries the twin dangers of regulatory failure and regulatory capture - see below. 
Intervening to correct the market failure it may unintentionally result in suppressing the 
efficiency-enhancing characteristics of the [perfect] market mechanism. In view of this the 
test might be, is competition feasible in the absence of Government intervention? If it is, then 
we should not regulate, and vice versa. 
1.6.3 Market Failure Involvin%z Monopoly. According to Kay and Vickers (1988: 304) it is 
not only a question of is competition desirable, but as we asked in the previous paragraph, 
whether it is feasible without Government intervention. They argue that are there are three 
kinds of market failure involving monopoly and competition, and, correspondingly, three 
types of regulation. These are: 
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1. Regulation to contain the monopoly 
2. Regulation to limit competition 
3. Regulation to promote competition 
The matrix (Table 1.1) shows these cases. 
Is Competition Desirable? 
Is 
Competition 
Yes No 
Feasible? Yes Typical Case Cream Skimmin 
No Dominant Incumbent(s) Prevent Entry Severe Natural 
Monopoly 
Table 1.1. Desirability and feasibility of competition - Source Kay & Vickers 
1988: 304 
The first case is where competition is neither feasible nor desirable, which holds under the 
conditions of severe natural monopoly, although if the natural monopoly conditions are not 
severe, competition may be possible. If the monopoly condition is severe then the only check 
on the firm's behaviour is anti-monopoly regulation. 
The second case is where competition is not desirable, but it is feasible. The key policy 
question here is whether there should be regulatory measures to restrict competition eg 
prohibiting entry. Kay and Vickers (1988: 305) are wary about taking such a step as they 
believe it may be hard to determine whether or not natural monopoly conditions prevail. 
Limiting entry into a market might be due to the possibility of 'cream-skimming', which is 
said to occur when entrants undercut the incumbent's profitable business segments and leave 
it with a loss on the rest of its activities. This might result in the elimination of any cross 
subsidy in an industry, but it could occur when there is no cross subsidy. In this situation it 
could undermine 'the stability of equilibrium and has shades of 'destructive competition' 
(Kay and Vickers 1988: 305). 
The third case is where competition is desirable but in danger of being prevented by the anti- 
competitive behaviour of incumbent firms. One of the most obvious threats in this situation is 
predatory behaviour by price or other means. Conduct regulation aimed at checking the anti- 
competitive behaviour of the dominant firms would be necessary. 
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1.6.4 The Role of Governments. The rationale for state regulations is largely economic, 
based upon a market failure argument and the public interest theory of regulation. However, 
the central issue is whether the regulatory methods are properly targeted on the market failure 
they seek to check. 
In the UK regulation of transport started with the railways in the 1830s out of public safety 
concerns - quality regulation - see Mulley 1983: 2. But the dominance of the railway 
companies in the UK inland transportation market at that time was due to their technical 
superiority over other forms of transport - see Hibbs 1975: 30. 
The regulation of industry in the USA began in 1877, following a Supreme Court decision to 
control the market prices of companies operating elevators in Chicago. In other countries the 
commercial law is based upon the Napoleonic civil code, and the assumption that the right to 
provide a service/product is seen as a privilege at the disposal of the state. Each firm is 
effectively given a franchise, permitting the exploitation for gain of what is in principle a 
public responsibility - see Hibbs 1984: 35. 
The mainstream thinking of Anglo-American economists in the early twentieth century 
assumed that the government's aim in regulation was to promote general economic efficiency 
when faced with market failure. When markets failed, governments as guardians of the public 
interest stepped in to check the growth of monopoly power in particular industries or to 
manage the spillover problems, which the conventional forms of private ownership could not 
easily handle. So in theory, whenever market failure was discovered, there should have been 
an appropriate government response to get the market back to operating as closely as possible 
to the competitive solution. Given the abundance of markets in which the conditions 
necessary for competition are not even approximately met, the potential scope for regulatory 
policies appears to be almost limitless. According to Utton (1986: 13) the instrument of 
regulation may differ, but the government must be prepared to operate in whatever market is 
necessary. If the public interest theory is broadly correct, we should expect to find regulatory 
policies in a wide range of industries: where natural or artificial monopoly is present; where 
external effects dominate; where public good attributes are significant. 
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This evolved into a set of standard 'welfare economics' justifications for regulation 
identifying types of market failure and welfare problems which government would seek to 
correct. 
This perspective was ironic, in several ways. First, to interpret regulation as a 
corrective to market failure implied a functional explanation of government 
behaviour, that is, a vision of government as a dispassionate 'super-capitalist', 
prompted solely by an interest in the long-run viability of the market system 
and better able to spot and correct weaknesses in the market than other actors. 
Such an explanation of public policy is the normal stock-in-trade of Marxist 
political economy - not a branch of social sciences with which mainstream 
economics traditionally has much affinity. A strain of Marxist 'state theory' 
explained policy as a deus ex machina 5, which popped out at the nick of time 
to put the crisis-prone capitalist system back on its feet and get capital 
accumulation going again. What exactly brought the deus out of the machina 
was obscure; the possibility of disastrous mistakes and miscalculations little 
considered; and the style of the argument is deeply teleological6. 
Second, the functional interpretation sat ill with the tradition of Adam Smith, 
who portrayed public regulation as typically error-prone, welfare-minimizing 
and reflecting the entrenched F ower of unrepresentative interests. Why, in a 
world of selfish, 'rent-seeking' private actors, should public officials - of all 
people - be able and willing to act in an altruistic, system-maintaining fashion? 
Was it not more plausible to see government regulation as a product of self- 
interest of politicians and bureaucrats, allied with self-interested groups? ' 
(Hood 1994: 20) 
In reality governments may have many other micro-economic objectives apart from 
correcting market failure. At any one time we should anticipate intervention in many markets 
that only have a tenuous connection with market failure, as we would normally understand it. 
1.6.5 A Realist View of Regulation. Although the study of economic regulation goes back to 
at least the eighteenth-century, no single academic discipline came to 'own' the subject of 
regulation. It was liberal political scientists who first developed a 'realist' view of regulation, 
5 Power, event, that comes in the nick of time to solve a difficulty, providential interposition. 
6 Doctrine of final causes, view that developments are due to the purpose or design that is 
served by them. 
7 Rent seeking is the attempt to exploit a particular form of institutional arrangements which 
has the effect of preventing entry and thus preventing the erosion of economic rent by new 
competition. 
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putting the mobilisation of political power at centre stage and rejecting any teleological or 
functional explanation of policy in terms of the outcome of a play of interests. Observers like 
Marver Bernstein argued that original 'functional' activity by governments could be 
'corrupted' by a process of capture. 'Capture' meant effective control of regulatory agencies by 
the regulated interests, which the agencies were originally set up to oversee. The mice ended 
up in charge of the cheese - see Hood, 1994: 21. 
This capture came about because the initial circumstances - generally protection of the public 
from corporate misdemeanours or incompetence - which brought about the regulation has 
become dulled or blurred over time. The very information asymmetry, which created the need 
for regulation in the first place, makes the regulatory agent dependent on those it regulates, 
while producer lobbies are normally better organised and resourced than those serving the 
consumers interest. 
The reason behind the call for some form of regulation, has in the main been to erect entry 
barriers against competition, which in other industries would be seen as a form of market 
failure. The seminal work on this was by Stigler in 1975. He placed particular emphasis on 
two sources of the coercive power of the state that certain industries might try to use for their 
own advantage. One - which has already been identified - is the creation of barriers to entry, 
which could apply to either entry to an industry or occupation. The second is the power of the 
state to use its taxation to give grants or subsidies to particular groups. 
The idea of regulatory self-interest is more powerful than some orthodox economists believe, 
and the model lends credence to the idea of 'original sin'. This is that the capture of a public 
regulatory agency is not an abnormal situation. It may be the inevitable and permanent 
condition of such an agency. According to Hood (1994: 23) regulation was not diverted or 
captured from an original high purpose. It never served the interests of consumers or other 
vulnerable social groups in the first place, for one simple reason - it was never intended to. 
1.6.6 The Cost of Maintaining Regulation. Regulation is not a costless process and not all the 
costs of regulation will be an obvious item on a firm's balance sheet. According to Utton 
(1986: 24) not only does successful rent seeking allocate to the privileged industry or group 
returns that are unnecessary for the continued supply of the goods or services, but the process 
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of attempting to acquire the necessary regulation and subsequently ensuring that it is 
maintained also uses resources (of consultants, public relations firms, lawyers, advertising 
agents, etc. ), which have a positive opportunity cost and therefore impose welfare losses on 
the rest of society. 
If rent seeking in a particular regulated industry was made pointless, all the resources 
previously devoted to this would be eventually re-allocated to the next most profitable use. 
There are also the costs of regulation itself. According to public interest theory, market 
failure can, in principle, be corrected by low-cost intervention of officials who administer 
policies designed to improve resource allocation and economic welfare. If, however, we 
assume that the officials are likely to pursue their own interests - the same as anybody else - 
while performing their duties, we will arrive at a different assumption. That the officials will 
be attracted to those policies that do most to meet their budget maximising objectives, rather 
than those that may perform the required task more efficiently. So regulation introduced 
basically on a public interest or market failure ground may have a number of indirect or 
hidden costs that the public interest theory has failed to identify. Also, if firms operating in a 
market environment which shields them from competition can become x-inefficient, we can 
also expect a similar result from the regulatory agency, which by its very nature has no strong 
incentive to remain internally efficient. 
1.6.7 Protecting the interests of the Regulated. If the lobbying for regulation is successful 
and the regulator behaves in the way Stigler predicted, in the interest of the regulated, it is 
then in the interest of both parties to keep as low a profile as possible. In such cases the 
industry and its agency will strive to remain as invisible as possible to prevent the 
mobilisation of a counter group to oppose the regulation. However, if it becomes contentious, 
it will be defended by attempts to show that the public benefits by higher safety standards, 
lower incidence of fraud and protection from 'cowboy' operators - see Utton 1986: 21. As we 
shall see in 2.2.2 the introduction of quantity and quality controls in the bus industry by the 
1930 Transport Act was welcomed by the train operators who owned the bus companies. 
The problem is that it is possible for the regulatory officials to become more and more 
identified with the problems of the industry that they control. The regulators also rely on the 
firms in the industry to supply the information that they need to assess the performance of the 
industry or individual firms within the industry. In an industry where regulation is well 
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established, it is possible that the regulatory mechanism will be seen to work in favour of the 
incumbents, rather than to correct market failure and improve resource allocation. 
There may also be a tendency for regulation to take on a momentum of its own and the 
regulator almost inevitably becomes more deeply involved in the affairs of the industry the 
regulator is supposed to regulate. Therefore the scope of regulation may well increase over 
time. 
If there is a divergence of objectives between the principal [Government] and agent 
[regulated firm(s)], this divergence will remain whatever structures or mechanisms of 
regulation are put in place. The agent can be required to observe the regulation, but not to 
adopt its objectives. The pursuit of divergent objectives within the regulatory framework may 
lead to inefficiencies. As we stated earlier the regulatory structure is designed to reduce or 
remove the opportunity for undesired conduct, rather than prohibit it. 
1.6.8 Other Sources of Regplatory Failu . We will now look briefly at other possible causes 
of regulatory failure which are related to information and incentives. Markets economise on 
information, because each participant needs to know only their tastes or costs and the price. 
They are incentive-compatible, because as each individual is following their own interests, 
they are also serving the public interest. 
Conversely, the role of the regulator and the regulated are divergent as it is the task of the 
regulator to devise a structure of incentives, which will ensure that the regulated firms 
achieve the regulator's objective. According to Kay and Thompson (1991: 22) the regulators 
task can usefully be characterised in the principal-agent framework in which one party, the 
6principal', relies on another party, the 'agent', to achieve their objectives, but in which the 
two parties' access to information is asymmetric. Information is both required and, given 
divergent objectives, less likely to be available. 
1.6.9 Escapable and Inescapable Regulatory Failure. Following on from Kay and Thompson 
(1991: 23) we will distinguish between escapable and inescapable regulatory failure. 
These are those failures in the regulatory system brought about by adopting inappropriate 
methods of regulation. These can arise from several causes: regulatory capture; the interest of 
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the regulator in expanding their area of activity, and the interaction between regulatory policy 
and the political process which governs it all, and which can contribute to the incidence of 
escapable failures. 
Kay and Thompson go onto to argue `that the unnecessary suppression of competition is an 
important source - we consider the most important source - of [escapable] regulatory failure' 
(Kay and Thompson 1991: 23). 
By inescapable failure we mean those that follow directly from the economic characteristics 
of the sector being regulated - where, for example, natural monopoly and high sunk costs 
prevent competitive solutions being achieved, and information asymmetries are an inevitable 
consequence of monopoly supply. In this situation regulation is almost inevitable, but it will 
result in an imperfect result. The case for regulation arises especially when consumers are 
poorly informed about product quality, and this asymmetry of information problem motivated 
some of the first instances of government economic regulation 
. 
L. 6.10 Regulation in the 1980s. In the 1980s many OECD countries saw the transformation 
of traditional regulatory regimes in important sectors of their economies, such as the financial 
sector, aviation and telecommunications. It has been argued that this 'evolution of economic 
policies can be seen as the latest chapter in a continuing story which goes back at any rate to 
the mid-18'h century, the hero of which is economic liberalism. Recent events have involved 
a shift, not from left to right, but in the balance between liberalism and interventionism in 
economic systems. Economic reform is a process of liberalisation... In the West, reforms 
have brought with them a shift in emphasis within economies which were market-based 
before and after the event' (Henderson 1998: 18). 
This was described in many cases as deregulation. However, a better description would be re- 
regulation. Regulation was massively extended in some areas, notably safety and pollution - 
see Hood 1994: 19. According to Kay and Vickers (1988: 314) the recent combinations of 
deregulation with re-regulation are less paradoxical if we remember that there are two broad 
types of regulation. 
1. Structural Regulation - which aims to create a situation in which the incentives or 
opportunities for undesirable behaviour are removed. 
34 
2. Conduct Regulation - addresses the behaviour, which would be induced if the undesirable 
incentives existed. 
In a number of cases structural regulation and conduct regulation are alternatives to one 
another. In other cases we may have to use both of them together. 
Structural regulation can take a variety of different forms. Merger policy is an example of 
this, which stops the additional incentive and opportunity for anti-competitive behaviour. 
Conduct regulation aims to address the anti-competitive directly. However, Kay and Vickers 
(1988: 315) question if the authorities are always. sufficiently well informed to detect 
undesirable behaviour. This makes it difficult to detect anti-competitive behaviour and to 
enforce measures intended to combat it. '(It is hard enough to reach an acceptable definition 
of 'predatory behaviour', let alone detect and deter it. ) In the face of asymmetries of 
information, conduct regulation is prone to error and evasion. On those scores, regulation of 
structure has advantages' (Kay and Vickers 1988: 319). 
Kay and Vickers (1988: 315) have also argued that if the definition of structural regulation is 
extended to include the structure of ownership, then the most important recent shift from 
structure to conduct regulation has been the privatisation programme. The wisdom of 
privatisation depends critically upon the effectiveness of such conduct regulation, in 
combination with any regulation of the firm's structure and market structure (Kay and 
Vickers 1988: 316). 
In the United Kingdom conduct regulation was used in the labour market, especially in 
relation to the trade unions to limit the type of actions they could take. These new regulations 
were used by the employers in the legal action surrounding the abolition of the National Dock 
Labour Scheme. 
1.6.11 Conclusions on Regulation. As we have pointed out earlier, regulation can take 
different forms and could be applied across many industries. 
'So a theory of regulation based simply on welfare economics and market 
failure has too narrow a base. It necessarily assumes that the sole objectives of 
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regulation is the maximization of welfare through the optimal allocation of 
resources, regardless of equity, the aspirations of the regulators themselves, or 
the political debt that the party elected to power has to repay' (Utton 1986: 
P19). 
Therefore, we must accept that there will not be a complete explanation of those general 
measures to protect the consumer or to clean up the environment that have become more 
prominent over the last thirty-five years. There is, however, one thing we can be almost 
certain of, and that is that once the regulatory process is initiated there will be strong forces 
arguing for an expansion both in range and complexity. 
1.6.12 Privatisation. In economics, like other disciplines, there are ideas which cause ripples. 
These ideas have short-term popularity and are then forgotten. Then there are ideas that cause 
waves. These bring different or even new schools of thought to the forefront of economic 
thinking for a longer time, but after a while they also fade away. Then there are tides and 
cycles that can last for decades. Privatisation is like a tide, it had its peaks and troughs and 
they did not necessarily occur in the same place and at the same time. 
De-nationalisation or privatisation was not a new 'Thatcherite' concept of the 1980s, it had 
taken place in the 1950s and early 1970s in the UK under Conservative Governments. It had 
also occurred in mainland Europe during the 1950s and 1960s. According to Hood (1994: 45) 
it was the international privatisation wave that began in the late 1970s that caught the 
attention, not these earlier privatisations. 
There had also been a change in the generally accepted view of what constituted viable 
economic and political solutions. The changing 'climate of opinion, which was defined as 'an 
outlook or set of assumptions about policy that is largely taken for granted' exactly captures 
the result of the change in the tide' (Douglas 1989: 401). Thatcherism was a return to 
individualism after a long period of collectivism. This change of climate was not peculiar to 
the UK, it was almost a world-wide movement. In the United States it was called 'Neo- 
Conservatism. There had been much interaction between British Thatcherism and American 
Neo-Conservatism - Milton Friedman and von Mises are only two of several intellectual 
progenitors they had in common (Douglas 1989: 402) - while still forming part of a wider 
New Right Movement. 
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The Mont Pelerin Society was probably the most influential international organisation of the 
New Right. Founded in 1947 by FA von Hayek, it brought together economists, 
philosophers and politicians and political activists of the libertarian tradition. According to 
Douglas (1989: 402) the society indirectly 'through its influence on advisers, it seems to have 
been a powerful force in both Thatcherism and Reaganomics. '
In the UK there were various institutions which tested the path for Thatcherism - the Institute 
of Economic Affairs (IEA), the Centre for Policy Studies, and the Adam Smith Institute. All 
these organisations were internationalists in their outlook. The IEA had contacts with the 
Mont Pelerin Society through Lord Harris, one of the 1EA Founder Presidents. 
1.6.13 The Conservatives and Privatisation. A final report of the Conservative Party's policy 
group on the nationalised industries, which was leaked to the Economist (The Economist 
1978: 21) and was drafted by the radical right-wing MP Nicholas Ridley, considered the 
scope for denationalisation, as it was called then. They believed that it would be easier, and 
more permanent, to fragment industries rather than sell off whole corporations. It concluded 
there was least opportunity for this in the "true utilities" (gas, electricity, railways, water, 
ports and telephones). The greatest opportunities were seen in coal, shipbuilding, docks, 
airports, motor car manufacturing, buses and freight. 
The report contained specific proposals, some of these were: 
" form worker cooperatives at coal pits wherever possible 
" separate ports, and either sell them off or make them into workers cooperatives 
" make each airport independent and either sell it or hand it over to local authorities 
At the time of the report being leaked it had been discussed by the powerful Economic C> 
Reconstruction Group under Sir Geoffrey Howe, and went before a group under Sir Keith 
Joseph, the then Tory industry spokesperson and general political overlord. At the time it was 
thought that the general thinking behind the report had been accepted, but its detailed 
proposals were likely to be modified and these would be reflected in the manifesto only in the 
most general terms. 
37 
However, it did not become party policy, and according to Foster (1992: 108) as the 1979 
election approached the dominant view within the Conservative Party was that it was not 
clear that denationalisation would be a vote-winner with either the electorate or most Tory 
back-bench MPs. According to Kandiah and Seldon (1986: 104) privatisation was a central 
tenet of the Thatcher years, and although the policy was not pursued in earnest until after the 
1983 general election, the EEA was supportive of it. The actual method and means of 
privatisation were never explored by the EEA. The Institute did, however, publish a number 
of pamphlets examining what they thought were the shortcomings of political control over 
electricity, coal, post-offices and telephones. 
1.6.14 Some Objectives of Privatisation and DereRulation. 'Privatisation, as a hallmark of 
Thatchersim, was a natural response to the perceived failure of nationalization in terms of the 
public sector performance. Fast changes in the underlying economic situation and 
technological innovtttions also required a shift in public policy - the economy became less 
controllable... ' (Gupta 2000: 52). 
According to Bishop et al (1994: 1) the three main objectives behind the privatisation 
programme are finance, information and control. 
1. Finance -'the financing of both government and the firm is affected by privatisation. The 
government raises finances in the process of disposing of assets; firms are free to raise 
finance on the capital markets. ' 
2. Information - 'is of relevance in setting prices. Competition ensures that prices are 
consistent with efficient allocation of resources and lowest costs of supply. Even in the 
absence of competition it has been suggested that privatization may allow prices to be 
imposed that encourage greater efficiency of supply. ' 
3. Control - 'Changes of ownership are most directly associated with changes in control. 
Privatization programmes involve a weakening in control exerted by the state and a 
transfer of control to private investors. ' 
Trivatisation is also likely to undermine the power of the trade unions because they are 
typically concentrated in the public sector. Unions may react strongly against privatization, 
not only because of its direct impact on employment, but also because of the apprehension 
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that their political powers and influence might be jeopardized after privatisation and the 
modus vivendi with government upset' (Gupta 2000; 38). 
'In fact, one of the primary motives for adopting a privatization policy in 
advanced capitalist economies has been to curb the power and influence of the 
trade unions' (Gupta 2000; 38). 
During the late 1970s the Conservatives while they were in opposition set out their strategy 
for weakening the power of various unions in the public sector - see The Economist 1978: 2 1. 
However, this strategy included which strikes not to fight. Docks were classified in the 
intermediate group, and public transport was in the least vulnerable group. By adopting a 
gradualist approach to reforming industrial relations laws, they were able to reduce trade 
union power and influence. 'Privatisation has contributed to the rebalancing of control 
. 
between trade unions and management. In the absence of tight external control by capital 
markets, control over pnvatised companies essentially lies with management. Weakening of 
trade union power has allowed management to achieve remarkable reductions in employment 
without provoking disruptive industrial disputes' (Bishop et al 1994: 14). 
This along with the injection of new competitive pressures resulted in a greater concentration 
on efficiency and profitability, moving away from the pluralism of the post-war decades to a 
more unitarist approach. 'It is clear that developments within the economy and labour market 
[like privatisation] had provided employers with a major incentive to re-examine the way that 
workplaces were managed' (Millward et al 2000: 12). 
1.7 Conclusions 
1.7.0 Introduction. In this chapter we have set out the key objectives of this dissertation, 
which are to analyse the pre and post privatisation and deregulation performance of two 
United Kingdom (UK) industries from the transport sector. 
1.7.1 Key Research Areas of the Dissertation. We use the elements of the SCP paradigm to 
test the hypothesis that privatisation and deregulation will result in changes in the structure, 
conduct and performance of those industries. 
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To analyse the earnings and employment in these industries prior to deregulation and or 
privatisation, to examine what has happened to them since deregulation and privatisation, 
and to see if the outcomes fulfil the expectations of the theory, or to provide alternative 
explanations if they exist. 
To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in these industries in 
relation to what has happened in the rest of the economy and to see if there is any evidence 
of rent sharing and the non-competitive model of wage determination prior to privatisation 
and deregulation. Again, this is to see if the outcomes fulfil the expectations of the theory, 
or to provide alternative explanations if they exist. 
1.7.2 Tools of Analysis. In this chapter we have examined the tools of economic analysis 
which will be used in the rest of this dissertation. These are the elements of the SCP 
paradigm, and economic theories relating to contestable markets, regulation and privatisation. 
In the next chapter we examine the changes that have taken place in the bus and coach 
industry both in the United States and the UK as a result of privatisation and deregulation. 
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2 The Bus and Coach Industry: A contestable market? 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 
2.1.0 Introduction. In this chapter we will critically examine some of the many arguments put 
forward for the proposed changes in the bus and coach industry and investigate the extent to 
which the objectives of privatisation have been achieved. If they have not, we will look at the 
some of the possible reasons. 
Section 2.2 will examine the history of the bus and coach industry in the United Kingdom 
until 1980. This is to give an overview of what had happened in the industry and how it had 
been effected by different governments' policy over the years. In section 2.3 we will consider 
what has ............. happened to the USA bus and coach industry. The reason for this is that 
it has been argued by Pucher (1995a: 103) that Great Britain appears to be much further down 
the road to Americanization of its urban transport and land-use patterns than any other 
European country. So we could expect the UK bus and coach industry to show similar 
characteristics and outcomes to those experienced by the American industry. This section will 
also contrast what happened in the industry with some of the arguments for privatisation and 
deregulation which were based in part on the experience in American airline industry. Section 
2.4 will scrutinise the developments in the UK industry since 1980. 
In section 2.5 we critically examine the privatisation process to see what has happened within 
the industry and to see if the objectives set by the Conservative Government have been 
achieved. We also consider the proposition that there may also have been ideological reasons 
for these proposals that fitted into the Conservative Government's wider macroeconomics 
agenda. This agenda included reducing the influence of the state, and other labour market 
institutions such as trade unions, especially if they were perceived to interfere with the 
efficient operation of the market. 
Section 2.6 of the chapter examines the bus market to see if it conforms to one of the 
hypotheses of the Buses White Paper that it was believed that the bus market would be "high 
contestable" or "partially contestable" once the primary barrier of restricted entry was 
removed. 
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The change in market structure, conduct and performance due to the privatisation process is 
considered in section 2.7 of the chapter. The final section of the chapter 2.8 draws some 
general conclusions from the chapter. 
2.1.1 An Overview of the Market. The history of mass transport has been one of changing 
technologies. In most developed countries since the end of the Second World War the decline 
in public transport has been linked with the growth of the motor car. 'From the 1950s to the 
present, mass transit systems have had to deal with the competition of the private automobile. 
Unlike the earlier competitive technologies the auto is not a new form of mass transit. 
Therefore, the private auto is not merely a threat to a particular mode of transit, but a threat to 
the mass transit industry itself' (Windle 1988: 121-122). 
The growth of the motor car along with a shift in population away from city centre, to the 
suburbs (Acton 1980: 26) has resulted in the decline of mass passenger transport systems in 
most developed countries. 
2.2 The UK Experience 
2.2.1 A Historic Review of Regulation. According to Mackie (1983: 45) 'Unlike other public 
services, such as post and telecommunications, electricity and the railways, bus transport is 
not a statutory monopoly. As one of the few British examples - independent television and 
scheduled air transport are others - of a regulated industry, it has operated since 1930 under a 
form of franchising system'. 
In the past there have been three traditional arguments for regulation in inter-urban transport, 
fipriority, protection and public need. The first two were designed to protect existing operators 
from outside competition; in return, and in order to meet the third principle, they had to 
undertake to operate a number of unprofitable routes along with the profitable ones' (Mackie 
1983: 45). 
The third was achieved by the use of cross subsidy, the profitable routes subsidising other 
routes needed by specific groups or geographical location within the given area. In the case of 
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inter-urban transport it was argued - see Bleasdale (1983: 513) - that regulation prevented 
wasteful competition. During the 1970s however this view was increasingly challenged. 
According to Le Fevre (1981: 15) There is an influential school of thought, both here and 
overseas, which argued that there should be a relaxation of the framework of quantity 
licensing and monopoly franchises which have hitherto been regarded as an essential part of 
well regulated city transport. ' 
In 1979 the newly elected Conservative Government denied that competition was wasteful 
and suggested that any losses from the unexploited economies of scale in the bus and coach 
industry would be outweighed by other benefits. The increased competition induced by 
deregulation would force operators to improve their productivity and control their costs. It 
would also compel them to develop products and services more responsive to consumer 
needs, and to improve their marketing of them. By contrast, regulatory mechanisms, despite 
their good intent, end up depriving consumers of choice and feather bedding existing 
operators - see Bleasdale 1983: 513. 
Mackie was one of the many commentators citing market protection and the excessive use of 
cross-subsidies for the poor performance of the industry. He argued 'that the provision of a 
network of services at standard fares has resulted in excessive cross-subsidy: this had led to 
higher prices and lower levels of service on the good routes, while having the opposite effects 
on the thin routes, and so distorts the market' (Mackie 1983: 45). 
2.2.2 The Road Traffic Act 1930. The introduction of 1930 Road Traffic Act according to 
Vickers & Yarrow (1988: 367-368) was motivated by concern about passenger safety and the 
danger of destructive and inefficient competition, and accordingly it provided a regime of 
control over both quality and quantity. 
Davis (1987: 287) showed that the regulation of the bus and coach industry in the United 
Kingdom was placed on a quasi-judicial basis and that the industry was controlled by the 
Traffic Commissioners, who were the appointed guardians of the public interest. 
The regulation of the industry was based on two controls: 
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1. Quality controls, relating in particular to vehicle safety and the competence of drivers 
and conductors 
2. Quantity controls, requiring each route in operation to have a separate licence and 
maintaining control of the overall numbers and type of services offered by the 
operators 
The Commissioners regulated the entry of new firms into the industry or existing firms 
moving into new areas. They were required to grant a licence only if they were positively 
persuaded that the proposed service was in the public interest. The onus of proving that this 
was in the public interest was the responsibility of the potential entrant. The Traffic 
Commissioners 'usually interpreted this to mean that a proposed service was not in the public 
interest if any existing coach companies or British Rail argued that they would lose customers 
to the new service. In other words, new coach services could only be started up, prior to 
deregulation, if they did not compete with any existing services' (Jaffer and Thompson 1986: 
46). 
The 1930 Road Traffic Act also required that all timetabled services had to have a Road 
Service Licence (RSL), which would lay down the conditions of operation, including the 
route, fare and timetable. It was argued by Davis (1987: 287) that the system was 
bureaucratic and was not responsive to change. Also, with the presumption of public interest 
against those seeking to introduce change, innovation would have been further discouraged, 
existing RSL holders on a proposed route were allowed to register objections. It was also 
difficult for new operators to compete with British Rail, this being due to British Rail also 
having the right to object to the introduction of new services or changes to existing ones. It 
was also argued by Thompson & Whitfield (1995: 20) that 'the requirement to hold a RSL 
acted as a barrier to entry by new operators and so gave incumbents an effective monopoly on 
each route. ' This, it could be argued is a clear case of the suppression of the competitive 
solution, and therefore an example of regulatory failure. 
However, once established, the incumbent bus companies were free to exercise their local 
market power in a number of different ways. It was argued by Vickers & Yarrow (1988: 368) 
that there was no pressing need to cut costs, or to reduce inefficiency, or respond to 
consumers' changing preferences with innovative solutions, and there was also ample scope 
for cross-subsidization between routes and between times of day. 
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Also, it was argued by Dodgson (1991: 120) that the consumer did not always gain from the 
potential benefits of regulation. The producer could capture the potential gains of regulation 
called 'regulatory capture', and this was believed to be happening within the bus and coach 
industry at the time. The industry was perceived to be gaining twofold from the coercive 
power of the state. Stigler has identified four powers that could be used by the state, but he 
placed particular emphasis on two - see Utton 1986: 20. Firstly, the power of the state to use 
its taxation first to give subsidies. Secondly, its power to control entry into the industry. 
However, the bus industry, according to Bonavia (1987: 5) was only lightly controlled 
[regulated] through a system of 'Defence Permits' replacing the road service licences 
previously issued under the 1930 Road Traffic Act. 
2.2.3 The 1947 Transport Act. The nationalisation of transport was the most ambitious 
project of the post-war Labour Government. In 1947 the Transport Act established the British 
Transport Commission (BTQ which was to take-over and control a number of transport 
industries. The BTC was made up of a number of executive bodies such as the Road Haulage 
Executive, which were responsible for the various aspects of the Comn-dssion's activities. 
According to Bonavia (1987: 94) 'Although transport integration was a main purpose, 
underlying the creation of the BTC, it was never defined clearly by government spokesmen 
either during the passage of the Act or at other times. Its expected benefits were emphasized; 
but there was complete vagueness about the means by which the goal was to be approached. ' 
Not all of the sectors of the transport industry were immediately nationalised, and the only 
major bus undertakings acquired outright were those owned by the railways - see Devine et al 
1988: 401. There is a certain irony in this, as currently, the privatised bus companies have 
been establishing or purchasing privatised railway companies. 
Also, Devine et al (1988: 439) pointed out that the BTC acquired minority share holdings in a 
number of other bus undertakings from the railways and several were acquired indirectly as a 
result of nationalising electricity undertakings. 
In 1962 the BTC was replaced by five separate boards and in 1966 the newly elected Labour 
Government removed the restrictions on acquisitions placed on the Transport Holding 
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Company (THC). This was the board that was responsible for road haulage 8 and buses. The 
THC purchased the bus companies owned by British Electric Traction Company. This 
acquisition almost completed the nationalisation of major bus operators outside the local 
authority sector. However, the state also held a minority share in Tillings. 
2.2.4 The 1968 Transport Act. The 1968 Transport Act that had been preceded by a series of 
VVWte Papers on various aspects of transport policy represented the most comprehensive 
review of transport policy undertaken by any previous government. As a result of this review 
the bus interests were split into separate companies. 
Under this Act the county council Passenger Transport Executives (PTE) were required to 
meet the passenger transport needs in the English metropolitan counties and in Strathclyde in 
Scotland. 
Before the 1968 Transport Act came into force, buses were expected to run on a commercial 
basis and were not generally subsidised by the state. However, as Bignell & Fortune (1984: 
119) have shown, some municipal systems received small indirect subsidies from the rates, 
but other undertakings made a positive contribution to the rates. In 1965 the urban section of 
the bus industry almost broke even, with capital debt of only E 12 n-dllion upon which it had to 
pay interest. 
However, the industry became increasingly dependent on public support, and its performance 
was reasonably good in the early years, but problems emerged in the 1950s as car ownership 
became more widespread. According to Bignell & Fortune (1984: 119) by 1970 there was a 
revenue deficiency of E2 million on a turnover of E130 million and the capital debt had risen 
to E21 million, requiring a further E2 million to service it. 
According to Mackie and Preston (1996: 21) between 1930 and the early 1970s direct 
subsidies were not on the political or social agenda. operators, whether private, municipal or 
nationalized were required to behave commercially within regulatory constraints. One 
interpretation of the licensing system was that by permitting cross-subsidy, a second-best 
response was produced in the absence of direct subsidies. 
8 BTC denationalised (privatised) road haulage in 1953 except for British Road Services 
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The 1968 Act also effectively created a nationalised industry of the bus and coach industry 
with the establishment of the National Bus Company. It took over a large number of buses 
and coach services that were then in public ownership, and its local bus operations were 
divided into four regional units. 
2.2.5 The 1970s and Financial Targets. Devine et al (1988: 416) argued that from 1970 the 
assessment of financial performance of all nationalised industries was made difficult for 
several reasons. The transport industry in particular was affected, because it was subjected to 
price restraint at the time of increasing general inflation. 
In the period between 1974 and 1979 the government's priority was to eliminate the deficits 
for the nationalised industries and by 1977 this had been achieved in most cases. The 1978 
White Paper -The Nationalised Industries, Cmnd 7131 - set the financial target for the 
National Bus Company to break even after receipt of grants from local authorities for 
unremunerative services - see Devine et al (1988: 418). 
Between 1975 and 1979 the NBC, apart from 1975 when it was still recovering from the 
effect of the Government's counter inflation policy, exceeded its financial target, see Table 
2.1. 
The bus and coach industry continued to receive payments from government that increased 
over time. Dodgson (1991: 120) has shown that by 1982/83 Government payments to the 
industry totalled E911 million at current prices, of which E558 million was for general 
revenue support and E220 million was concessionary fare payments. Income from subsidies 
accounted for 54 per cent of total revenue in London, 45 per cent in the Metropolitan 
counties, 35 per cent for other municipal operators and 24 per cent for the nationalised NBC 
and SBG. 
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Result -19.0 5.8 9.6 29.6 20.0 
Table 2.1 National Bus Company: Financial results 
after interest, grants etc, 1975-79 (im). 
Source: adapted from (Devine et al 1988: 418) 
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2.3 The USA Experience 
2.3.0 Introduction. This part of the chapter will examine the changes that occurred in the 
USA bus and coach industry due to the deregulation of the industry. It will also look at some 
of the arguments for privatisation and deregulation which were based in part on the 
experience in the USA airline industry, and which were diametrically opposed to what was 
actually happening in the USA bus and coach industry. 
2.3.1 The USA Bus and Coach Industry. At the time it was argued that changes in the airline 
industry due to the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act were resulting in fares falling, service 
choice between various destinations increasing, and that safety standards were being 
maintained at pre-deregulation levels - see 1.5 The United States Airline Market. 
At this point it is may be helpful to remember that in America 'public' in public transport 
usually refers to the usage of such modes of transport by the public, and not to the type of 
ownership, operation or subsidisation. Indeed, the basic philosophy in the United States has 
always been that transportation should be provided by private enterprise. 'However, since 
1887 that philosophy has also included economic regulation of entry, rates, and service' 
(Smerk 1981a: 209). 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, public transport dominated urban travel in 
the United States. However, by the late 1950s and early 1960s US public transport was in 
serious trouble in all but the largest cities. This was in part due to the rise in private car 
ownership and the resulting decline in the public transport system in the US, which is well 
documented. 'The correlation between car ownership and income meant that higher income, 
and thus less fare-sensitive, passengers ceased to use buses' (Button 1987: 48). 
Pucher (1995b: 213) has roughly divided public sector involvement in American public 
transport into three periods: 
1. a period of neglect up to 1970 
2. a period of sky-rocketing government subsidies from about 1970 to 1980 
3. a period of consolidation and almost constant subsidy levels from 1980 
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2.3.2 PassenRer Decline. Passenger trips declined by 72% between 1945 and 1972 and 
vehicle miles declined by 40% between 1950 and 1972. Windle (1988: 122) has shown that 
unlinked passenger trips declined from a high of 23.3 billion in 1945 to 6.6 billion in 1972. 
Total vehicle miles operated declined from a high of 3.0 billion in 1950 to 1.8 billion in 1972. 
According to Pucher (1995b: 213) in 1950 only 28 per cent of public transport services in the 
United States was provided by publicly operated and owned firms. The market share of 
public transport services steadily increased and this was due in part to a decline in passenger 
trips. These adverse market conditions resulted in a growing number of transit company 
failures in the 1960s and 1970s. Dodgson (1981: 132) has shown that as a result of these 
failures, the federal government became increasingly involved in the provision of public 
transport. Capital subsidies were often used to buy out private bus operators so that over the 
period from 1960 to 1975 the dominant form of ownership switched from private to public. 
'By 1970, publicly owned systems accounted for 66% of total vehicle miles of service' 
(Pucher 1995b: 213). 
During this period public transport services were only marginally profitable. Many of the 
operators were part of joint utility firms and had received the benefits of cross-subsidisation 
by the profits from land speculation and freight transport. Also as a result of various anti-trust 
rulings, firms were forced to divest their electric and gas utilities. With these divestitures the 
use of cross-subsidise in the non-profitable public transport services became more apparent. 
The non-profitability of the industry continued to increase over time and this was largely due 
to the increase usage of the private car, with the inevitable result of decreasing passenger 
numbers even further. 
2.3.3 Regulation. The regulatory regime in the US also limited entry into the various 
transport markets, and the rates/fares charged were made under the supervision of the 
regulatory agency. Service levels and quality was also regulated, as was any attempt to 
withdraw from any service. Due to this regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC), the bus companies were not under the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws that 
were administered by the Department of Justice. Transport firms in the US were commonly 
engaged in intramodel price-fixing agreements that were illegal under antitrust laws' (Smerk 
1981b: 209). 
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According to Utton (1986: 20) demand for such regulation which exempted them from 
antitrust laws is likely to have come not only from the groups that have the most to gain, but 
also where the effectiveness of private co-operation may be the most difficult to attain. 
Number of Buses 
Number of Employees 
Total bus-miles 
Revenue passengers 
Revenue passenger-miles 
Operating revenue (all 
services) 
Net operating revenue 
(before income tax) 
Greyhound and Trailways 
as a percentage of all 
Class 1 carriers 
77.4 
79.8 
79.8 
62.3 
80.4 
80.9 
67.7 
Table 2.2 Duopolistic Nature of the US Inter-City Bus Industry 1981 
Source: Button 1987: 47. 
57.3 
43.7 
Prior to 1982 inter-state bus services had been regulated under the 1935 Carriers Act. The 
ICC was more concerned with developing a network of inter-state service while at the same 
time attempting to create a limited amount of competition. This resulted in a duopoly 
situation between two national carriers Greyhound and Trailways. These companies were in 
competition, while sharing 80 per cent of the inter-state market by 198 1- see Table 2.2. 
This contrasted with the situation in the UK where under the 1930 Road Traffic Act The 
Traffic Commissioners in the UK, by exercise of their licensing powers, pursued a policy of 
cross-subsidisation of unprofitable services from profitable and, thus, competition, even of a 
duopolistic nature, was not favoured' (Button 1987: 47). 
Although the ICC did not believe its terms of reference required it to provide social bus 
services, prior to 1982 there was some cross-subsidisation of the inter-city bus industry 
(Button 1987: 47). As a regulator of the federal government, the ICC had sought to ensure 
that services provided by these transportation companies were safe [quality regulation] for the 
American public to travel on. They also ensured that the fares were reasonable and that the 
services were generally adequate to meet local demand. Also they had to ensure that the 
financing of the industry was carried out in a prudent fashion and that the nation was 
generally well served. 
Greyhound and Trailways 
as a percentage of total 
industry 
28.5 
50.2 
50.8 
20.9 
47.2 
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The regulatory commissions since the late 1920s had controlled intra-state bus operations. 
They were initially established to control the potential market power of bus operators and had 
a tradition of keeping fares low to limit customer exploitation (Button 1987: 46). 
During this period competition was increasing from two alternative forms of transport. The 
deregulation of the domestic air transport pricing in 1978 had resulted in lower fares. This 
combined with the deregulation of airline routes the following year brought about direct 
competition from domestic air companies, eg People's Express with Greyhound on many of 
its formerly profitable routes. 
Almost paradoxically, competition was also increasing from the railways which were now 
receiving public subsidy. In the Northeast Corridor market, many of the bus companies 
experienced serious market erosion. 
The bus operators faced a continuing deterioration in their financial position in the early 
1980s, net operating revenue fell from $132 million in 1980 to $57 million in 1982. Even 
with this fall in operating revenue there was no comparable reduction in costs. Profitability 
also declined by 1982 operating profits as a percentage of operating revenues had fallen to 
0.67% for Greyhound and its affiliates and to 2.7% for Trailways - and even these were 
shrinking rapidly (Button 1987: 48). 
During this period there had been an increasing belief that regulation made no sense in the 
highly competitive transportation market in the US. There was, therefore, a perceived need to 
allow the inter-city bus industry to compete on equal terms with other transport modes, and 
allow both innovation and cost saving opportunities to be taken by management. However, 
the bus industry was opposed to this. During the 1980s the argument for the deregulation of 
the bus and coach industry became more credible. Le Fevre (1981: 15) has argued that the 
model for delicensing coaches was the deregulation of air services in the US. The merits of 
de-regulation were brought into pre-eminence by the apparent success, of the policies of the 
American Civil Aeronautics Board and Laker's famous Skytrain. The 'safety of air travel was 
maintained but travellers had lower fares' (Le Fevre 1981: 15). The argument was also based 
in part on the success of the reform of the road haulage industry in the 1970s. 
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The intellectual basis for these reforms and the discussion of this can be linked in part to the 
development of the theory of contestable markets. At the beginning of the 1980s academics 
in the USA started to link subsidy levels and higher costs, an example of X inefficiency - see 
for example Dodgson (1991: 133) and 1.3. 
Without this government intervention and support, many transport systems would have been 
abandoned years before. However, this support resulted in the creation of natural monopolies 
in many urban areas. As we shall see, the US privately owned transport system effectively 
went bankrupt in the 1960s. Acton (1980: 26) has shown that revenue increased from $1.3 bn 
in 1945 to $2.3 bn in 1978 whilst in the same period operating costs rose from $1.2 bn to $4.7 
bn. 
The inter city bus services were often the only form of public transport available in many 
rural areas of the US, and were perceived by many to be an inferior form of transport that 
increasingly became the residual mode of transport for the poorest members of the 
community. The majority of passengers were either very old or quite young, with a high 
proportion of these coming from the ethnic minorities. These were diffused groups with little 
or no economic or political power whom the politicians could ignore. This may be evidence 
of Stiglers 'original sin' process of regulation, where a concentrated group, with high per 
capita stakes, were able to transfer wealth to themselves through regulation at the expense of 
diffused groups, with low per capita stakes - see Hood 1994: 25. 
By the early 1980s, the USA inter-city bus services had also become a minority mode of 
transport. Only three per cent of all trips in the US urban area were made by public transport 
compared with about 19 per cent in Great Britain (Dodgson 1991: 133). 
2.3.4 Bus Regulatory Reform Act. The introduction of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act 
(BRRA) in 1982 was not simply the result of the deterioration in the bus industry. It was 
6simply one of the last of a major package of reforms which liberalised entry and pricing in 
virtually all domestic US transport markets (and affecting, most notably, the road haulage and 
airline industries) but this package was merely one element of a much wider trend in 
regulatory reform which embraced communications, energy and finance besides transport' 
(Button 1987: 45). 
The BRRA had three main objectives. These were: 
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1. To free the inter-state bus industry from entry controls, making it much more open to 
competition ie making it a more contestable market 
2. Allow the industry to compete on equal terms with the domestic air transport industry 
3. To allow the industry to develop on more commercial lines by allowing management 
more commercial freedom 
The policy makers were well aware that such liberalisation of the market would probably 
result in established operators withdrawing from existing routes. This indeed happened, as we 
shall see below. However, they believed that new and often specialised operators would fill 
many of the gaps created, and that the social effects overall would be minimal. This would be 
due in part to the new business environment, in which management would be freed of many 
of the built in constraints which the old system of regulatory control had imposed. 
The effect of the BRRA was to end quantity regulation and open the inter-state bus market to 
all operators. These were now only subject to quality regulation and only had to demonstrate 
that they were "fit, willing and able" to provide the service. 'Fare regulations were phased out 
and by November 1985 all fare controls virtually ceased' (Button 1987: 49). 
The BRRA also removed anti-trust prosecution immunities to prevent collusion over fare 
policy and services. The Act also eased exit conditions and the ICC was given power to 
override state commissions' decisions and allow intra-state service closure. The power of the 
ICC was also extended to allow it to counter any measure by state authorities to impede the 
liberalisation process. 
It was perceived that 'the low entry costs attracted a vast number of new independents, eg 
55% of the applicants for non-scheduled and 65% for scheduled service licences in 18 
months after the BRAA came from new independent operators' (Button 1987: 50), however 
this has been contested - see KihI 1988: 258. 
2.3.5 The Contestable Environment and the Management's Response. In this new deregulated 
environment, the response of management was to focus on reducing costs. Major areas of 
cost reduction were identified which were the reduction of the labour force, alterations of 
terms and conditions of employment and wage cuts. This was because it was believed that 
market protection [regulation] inevitably means protection for the labour force producing the 
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service which may have resulted in a number of restrictive working practices; in particular, 
subsidies tend to leak into higher wages and/or lower productivity - see Mackie 1983: 45. 
Greyhound pursued an aggressive policy, cutting some 1,500 of its 11,000 labour force in 
1985 and (following a seven-week strike by the Amalgamated Transit Union) pushing 
through a 15 per cent wage cut. Trailways negotiated similar wage reductions from its 
employees. In both cases two-tier wage systems were also introduced with new employees 
being on a lower pay scale than existing labour. The management in the industry became 
even tougher on wage agreements and because it was unable to gain additional wage 
concessions from the Amalgamated Transit Union, the Greyhound Corporation sold its bus 
operations to a Dallas company in 1985 (Button 1987: 5 1). The Dallas company intended to 
expand its services, and to assist in this process, they reduced costs by hiring non-union 
labour who were prepared to work at lower rates of pay. 
Along with the reduction in the labour force and the cutting of wages there was also a 
reduction in the provision of existing services. In the first year some 1958 communities lost 
bus services. Button (1987: 50) has argued that although some of the larger bus companies 
withdrew from certain local markets, the impact of these withdrawals was diminished by the 
entry of new firms into the market. This would appear to understate the situation, the number 
of communities receiving a bus service declining on average by 3.3 per cent a year from 
1975-82. After the bus deregulation act, these trends accelerated to an average decline of 9.2 
per cent for 1982-83 and 11.6 per cent for 1983-84 - see Kihl 1988: 257. 
The proponents of bus deregulation argued that with free-markets, new and smaller carriers 
would enter the market and replace larger carriers in servicing smaller cities. Button (1987) 
argued that independent companies provided the single largest group of applicants for regular 
route licences after deregulation, due in part to the freer entry and exit conditions. In all there 
were 2,028 applications for new passenger authorizations of all types in the first 18 months of 
the new regime -a rise of 275% over the total of the previous five years for regular services 
and a 500% increase in charter licences. 
Kihl (1988: 258) believes that the experience since deregulation has not confirmed this 
expectation. She argues that most of the places listed in the American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation Officials' survey, as having acquired replacement services, were 
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served by expanded routes of existing carriers. Also the response of the larger bus companies 
was not always to withdraw from the market, in some cases they actually introduced new 
services. These new services were aimed, in the main, at the high-income travel market this 
being because of the potential of higher profits because of the low fare elasticity of demand. 
Airport bus services are one such example, some twenty-one airports by 1985 were being 
provided with express bus services offering transport to some 100 or more communities. 
At the same time there was a move to reform the fare structure, moving towards a more cost - 
based structure. Intra-state fare levels rose to match the inter-state fares. The bus companies 
made use of their remaining anti-trust immunity to collude in reforming the general structures 
of fares to conform more closely to the actual pattern of costs. This resulted in short distance 
schedule fares increasing, Greyhound established fares ranging from $6 for 0-13 miles and 
$144 for any trip over 1,401 miles. Kihl (1988: 261) argued that the problem was of fairly 
high minimum fares discouragingd. short trips, which were frequently made on buses, and the 
maximum fare was too high to compete with the discounted airfares. Also, prior to 
deregulation, cross-subsidisation of both inter and intra state services occurred which, 
however, due to the increased competitive environment, were reduced. 
The overall effect of the BRRA was to increase efficiency and the market share for 
Greyhound, while at the same time actually losing passengers. Bus trips declined due to 
overall shrinkage in the market but enhanced efficiency had produced even greater cost 
savings, Table 2.3 gives the outcomes in response to the BRRA. 
Operating Revenue $'000 Net Operating Income $'000 Passengers '000 
1982 1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 
Greyhound 647,219 607,219 (2,981) 10,261 36,943 33,329 
Other nine 206,184 199,234 9,688 7,176 11,952 11,168 
Total 853,676 806,453 6,702 17,437 48,895 43,497 
Table 2.3: Nine -Months Operating Results from the Ten Largest Inter -City 
Carriers 
1982-1983. Source: Button 1987: 53. 
2.3.6 Conclusions of the USA Experience. Due to the increase in car usage in both countries 
it is understandable that the two Governments were facing similar problems in their bus 
industry in the early 1980s. Therefore, given the similar political persuasion of these two 
Governments it is not surprising that there was a similarity in the thinking in how the problem 
could be remedied; ie to introduce competition into the market. However, the result of the 
55 
policy in the USA was to increase the profitability of the bus industry, at the expense of terms 
and conditions of employment of those working in the industry, and the level of employment. 
But the decline in passenger numbers was not halted. This, as we shall see, was to be the 
same for the UK. 
2.4 The UK Experience from 1980 
2.4.1 The 1980 Transport Act. According to Fawkner (1995/6: 18) the Government view of 
the situation in the bus and coach industry in the 1980s was: 
" Continuously mounting subsidies (a 13-fold increase in real terms between the 1950s' to 
f520m p. a. in 1982; 
" Decline in traffic (market share down from 42% in 1952 to 8% in 1985); 
"A rigid, unchanging network; 
" Restrictive labour practices; 
"A system in large parts nationalised or owned by local authorities. 
The Conservative Government as part of its wider policy objectives wanted to reduce public 
expenditure. Any industry therefore which received large subsidies was a possible candidate 
for reductions, and the bus and coach industry being one such target. They also believed that 
these subsidies resulted in increased costs, and the subsequent higher fares was making travel 
by car even more attractive to the public. 
These problems - as far as the Government was concerned - were compounded by the fact 
that the industry was dominated by a large nationalised company and smaller local 
government owned companies, and in its view, this was a 'sure-fire' situation for inefficiency 
to occur. Also the market was not open to new competition, increasing the likelihood that 
inefficiencies would occur. 
As a response to this situation in the early 1980s the Conservative Government passed the 
Transport Act. This Act was designed to liberalise the existing system in a number of similar 
ways to the American Bus Regulatory Reform Act. 
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1. The onus of proof in licensing cases was with the objector who had to show that 
application was against the public interest. The Traffic Commissioners when assessing 
the 'public interest' had to take into account the transport requirements of the whole area, 
as well as the needs of a particular community. They also had to take into account the 
county structure plans and transport plans contained within it and any other relevant 
representations. 
2 The Act also abolished route service licensing for express services, excursions and tours. 
The perceived success of the deregulation of express coaching was one of the impetuses 
for the further deregulation of the bus and coach industry and its eventual privatisation. 
3 Powers were given to local authorities, on application to the Minister of Transport, to 
establish 'trial' areas'. Within these areas, entry to the market was completely free, subject 
only to quality control through the licensing of operators. 
2.4.2 Deregglation of Express Coaching. Davis (1987: 286) has argued that the 1979-1997 
Conservative Governments had been more interested in the transfer of ownership of 
nationalised industries to the private sector rather than subjecting them to more extensive 
competition. However, express coaching was different, the dominant state-owned firm 
National Express was to be exposed to competition through the deregulation process. Also, as 
a result of express coach deregulation, British Rail would be exposed to competition in its 
passenger market, while still remaining in public ownership. 
The 1980 Transport Act marked a complete change in policy to express coaching market, and 
as a result most of the regulatory framework was removed. Clause 3 of the Act related to 
express coaching and amended the definition of express carriage (applied, curiously, to the 
vehicle rather than the service). The only restrictions - or regulations - which remained, 
related to the competence and the safety. The Government believed that the market was open 
to competition and it was anticipated that new entrants would come into the market after 
deregulation. Any operator, existing or potential, could enter any market segment without 
requiring a licence to operate a particular route. 
It was argued by Thompson & Whitfield (1995: 20) that the express coaching market was 
seen by the Government to have low entry costs in particular because there already existed a 
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large, unregulated and highly competitive market in the provision of contract coach services 
from which cross entry would be possible. 
2.4.3 Structure of the Express Coaching Market. When the 1980 Transport Act was passed, 
National Express was the largest operator in the express coach market and it provided a 
comprehensive network of scheduled express services. The characteristics of the market were 
described by Kilvington (1983: 35-36) as 'one dominated by publicly owned operators- 
National Express (NE) and the Scottish Bus Group (SBG); with an extensive network of 
places served but relatively slow operating speeds, limited frequencies and an emphasis away 
from motorway routes; fares around 50-75% of the normal rail tariffs; and a declining 
market'. 
As Bleasdale (1983: 515) has pointed out, the scheduled express coaching market served a 
predominately leisure market and was important in only a few regional markets. There was a 
traditional coach market between the SouthEast and Yorkshire and the NorthEast. The 
possibility of overnight travel had led to the existence of a strong London-Scotland coach 
market. 
Year Municipal NBC SBG Private 
1974 1.7 27.6 0.0 70.7 
1975 0.0 31.0 1.7 67.2 
1976 0.0 25.9 1.7 70.7 
1977 2.0 24.0 2.0 72.0 
1978 2.3 22.7 0.0 75.0 
1979 2.3 20.5 2.3 75.0 
1980 2.6 23.1 0.0 74.4 
% change 1974-1980 0.9 -4.5 0.0 3.7 
Table 2.4 Percentage point change of Express Coaching 
Journeys by Operators 
1974-80. Source: Transport Statistics various years 
Although express coaching only accounted for 0.5 per cent of all the NBCs passenger 
journeys in 1980, it had a total of 1,669 million passenger trips of which 9 million were 
express coach. Between 1974 and 1980 NBC market share in this sector fell by 4.5 
percentage points. In terms of passenger journeys, it fell from 16 million to 9 million, a fall of 
approximately 44 per cent. This was larger then the overall decline in the market over the 
period which was around 33 per cent (see Appendix I Table 1). 
58 
Part of the reason for the decline in passenger journeys was the increased competition from 
British Rail. The decline in NBC and Scottish Bus Group carryings between 1975 and 1980 
was chronicled by White and he su ggests BlIs response was effective - see Bleasdale 1983: 
515. 
However, the NBC prior to deregulation was developing its subsidiary National Express so 
that it was able to respond to the challenge from BR and also to take advantage of the new 
market opportunities arising from deregulation. An example of this is given by Bleasdale 
(1983: 517) as the London-Oxford route. This is a relatively short route (63 miles by rail) 
served by an indirect route via Reading. It was an obvious target for a well managed coach 
service and even before deregulation, Oxford South Midland (an NBC subsidiary) introduced 
an hourly interval service using the direct motorway system. 
Yet, as early as 1980 White (1980: 7) had raised doubts about the benefits of deregulating 
express coaching. With the introduction of competition on profitable trunk sectors, this 
threatened the incumbents ability to cross-subsidise and thus to maintain an extensive 
network of secondary but socially desirable services. There was also the danger of instability 
in the market, due to new operators entering with fares at an unsustainable low level, and 
running for a very short period against reputable firms who had competitive and sustainable 
fare Structures. 
The structure of the express coaching industry did alter after 1980, with National Express 
actually increasing its market share - see Table 2.5 - from 61.3 per cent in 1980 to 87.1 per 
cent by 1984 an increase of 25.8 per cent. As pointed out by Davis (1987: 288) National 
Express retained its dominant position essentially unscathed, and increased its profits in 
doing so (raising them from; E3.1 m to E5.4 m between 1980 and 1982). It is possible that 
these results would not have been obtained without the increase in competition. However, 
with few exceptions, the competitive initiatives of independent operators have led either to 
ultimate failure or to a joint venture with National Express. 
2.4.4 Conduct in the Express CoachinR Market. The deregulation of express coaching had an 
immediate and dramatic impact on the level of fares. These fares, after deregulation, had 
fallen as new companies entered the market 'frequently offering innovative services, and 
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there were spectacular price cuts on the major intercity routes' (Jaffer and Thompson 1986: 
45). 
These reductions in fares were in part a result of the competition from the British Coach 
Consortium (BCC) which had been established specifically in response to the 1980 Act. The 
BCC was an association of six of the major independent coach operators in the country 
working in collaboration to establish a nation wide network of trunk routes between cities, 
travelling at high speeds and, where possible, using the motorway network. According to 
Kilvington (1983: 36) a major feature of the operation, attracting great publicity, was the low 
level of fares. The latter was often 50 per cent of the existing national or Scottish fare, and 
hence dramatically below railway prices. 
This position did not go unchallenged from NE or SBG, who matched the m4jority of prices 
offered by BCC. As well, they increased the frequency of coaches on routes between the 
major centres of population. This period of fare reductions was short lived and from April 
1981 members of the BCC began to withdraw from routes as well as the consortium itself. 
The concept of an independent network of coach routes disappeared and few of the October 
1980 independent routes remained in place by 1983. 
There would appear to be conflicting views on what has happened to prices after 1980. Davis 
(1987: 288) has argued that the general level of fares has fallen substantially since 1980. This 
largely reflected the particularly marked price reductions made between 1980 and 1981; since 
then, the impression has been one of constant or gentle rising prices. 
While Jaffer and Thompson (1986: 45) have argued that since 1982, prices have risen 
steadily in real terms and are now substantially above the level to which they fell in the 
immediate aftermath of deregulation. This was a result of the exit from the market of many of 
its competitors, which allowed National Express to increase its prices in 1982 and 1983. 
'However, it is still possible to conclude at the end of 1983 that prices were lower in money 
terms (and hence substantially lower in real terms) than before deregulation' (Jaffer and 
Thompson 1986: 48-49). 
They also argued that the effects of deregulation impacted on NE in other ways. While prices 
may have remained high, this did not subtract from the benefits of deregulation. It could be 
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reasonably argued that the threat of competition forced NE to serve the market more 
eff iciently. 
According to Tomkins (1992), what is less well known and has a substantial impact on fare 
levels is that National Express owns few vehicles. It contracts about 55 coach operators to run 
its routes at fixed rates, using their vehicles painted in the National Express livery. The 
company makes its money from the difference between the fares it collects and the amount it 
pays its contractors. These contractual arrangements were finally established in April 1986, 
from then onwards National Express being responsible for planning, marketing and provision 
of its inter-city network while other NBC subsidiaries competed on equal terms with other 
operators to win seasonal contracts for running the services. According to Tomkins (1992) 
this policy gives its profits an air of fragility, representing as they do the difference between 
what the company can wring out of its low budget passengers and what it must pay the 
contractors who run some of its coach services. 
Year National Total NE Per Cent of 
Express Express Market 
1980 9.2 15.0 61.3 
1981 13.9 17.0 81.8 
1982 14.0 18.0 77.8 
1983 13.3 17.0 78.2 
1984 14.8 17.0 87.1 
1 1985 15.4 N/A N/A 
Table 2.5: Express Passenger Journeys (Millions) 
Source: NBC Annual Reports and Accounts 
Various Years 
2.4.5 Pe rmance of the Express Coaching Marke . The 1980 
deregulation of express 
coaching initially dramatically changed the performance of National Express. At first it 
appeared that deregulation was a success, but as the deregulated market developed, it became 
apparent that (see Table 2.5) National Express became even more dominant, increasing its 
market share from 61.3 per cent in 1980 to 87.1 per cent in 1984. 
In nominal terms both National Express's income increased by 121.7 per cent and its working 
profit increased by 151.6 per cent between 1980 and 1985. However working profit as a 
percentage of income increased by only 13.5 per cent from 9.6 per cent in 1980 to 10.9 per 
cent in 1985 - see Table 2.6. 
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Year Income Working Profit 
EM EM 
1980 32.2 3.1 
1981 42.0 4.0 
1982 51.7.5.9 
1983 51.5 3.8 
1984 59.6 2.6 
1985 71.4 7.8 
Working Profit as 
per cent of Income 
9.6 
9.5 
11.4 
7.4 
4.4 
10.9 
Table 2.6: National Express Financial Statistics 1980-1985 
Source: NBC Annual Reports and Accounts Various Years 
Table 2.7 shows that between 1980 and 1984 the market for express passenger journeys 
increased by 2 million an increase of 13.3 per cent at the same time private operators were 
losing market share to National Express. 
Year All Operators Percentage Year on 
Year Change 
1980 15 
1981 17 13.3 
1982 18 5.9 
1983 17 -5.5 
1984 17 0.0 
Table 2.7: Express Passenger Journeys 1980-84 
(Millions) Source: Transport Statistics 1976-86 106 
The decline in the private sector involvement in express coaching was due to a number of 
reasons. According to Brown (1987: 120) many of the existing small operators took 
advantage of what they thought was the new relaxed atmosphere and quickly introduced 
express routes - often to London. Most of these operators had inadequately researched their 
market and were unable to promote their services properly being surprised when National 
Express, adopted retaliatory tactics in the face of competition. 
With deregulation and the cross-entry into the market of competing suppliers there was also 
significant product differentiation, with new services being offered. At this time National 
Express business was expanding rapidly, and this led it to reappraise the types of coaches it 
operated, with luxurious double-deckers appearing on trunk routes. 'These were not only 
attractive and eye-catching marketing tools; they also enabled more passengers to be carried 
at a lower unit cost and help ease congestion in busy terminals by reducing the number of 
vehicle movements. National's Rapide brand name, applied to services with hostess, video 
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and toilet facilities, has almost become to 20th century coaches what Pullman's name became 
for 19th century trains' (Brown 1987: 120). 
White (1996: 25) has shown that National Express continued to dominate the express 
coaching market but the sharp rise in passenger journeys following deregulation which was 
associated with strong price competition was not sustained. National Express trips rose 
rapidly from under 10 million in 1980 to about 15 million in 1986, falling back to around 10 
million in 1992, with some recovery since then. 
The fortunes of the smaller independent operators were mixed. At one extreme it had led to 
financial disaster. Nevertheless, a small number of independent companies have succeeded 
and run very much on the pattern that was anticipated by the 1980 Act. However, according 
to Kilvington (1983: 36) the keyword for the success of the smaller operators has been 
specialisation. The identification and development of just one or two routes, either 
inadequately or not served by the existing market seems crucial. In route network terms these 
have been few and far between. 
The apparent success of the deregulation of long-distance coach services was used in the 
1984 White Paper to support the argument for the deregulation and privatisation of the rest of 
the bus and coach industry - see Department of Transport 1984: 2. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen the results are not so clear as the White Paper makes out. 
Competition did result in new services and reduction of fares, such as the Oxford to London 
service - see 2.4.3. But it also resulted in the increased concentration of a market that was 
already dominated by a publicly owned operator. There is also some evidence that the 
competition which was introduced into the industry was of the 'cherry picking' type where 
firms competed on existing and profitable routes and some competition 'at the margins' by the 
smaller independent operators. 
2.4.6 The Trial Areas. The 1980 Act provided for the designation of 'trial areas'. These were 
experimental areas where bus operators would no longer require Road Service Licences. 
Within these areas, duly qualified operators could run whatever services they chose, however 
they could only be set up by agreement with the relevant local authority. The thinking behind 
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the trial areas was to see if the public interest would be served by a complete abolition of road 
service licensing. 
During the discussion period both the Department of Transport and many of the local 
authorities who had expressed an interest in the concept of the trial areas realised that there 
could be a risk of loss of services if Road Service Licences were immediately removed. 
Also the local authorities may have been concerned that with an increase in competition and 
reduction in cross-subsidisation this may have resulted in them having to increase their 
revenue support of some of the routes, if they were to be maintained at the existing levels of 
service. 
In the end three counties established trial areas of roughly similar sizes and were mainly rural 
areas. These were 'North-West Norfolk (with an 'island' in Norwich to which buses could be 
run from the Area), a large rural tract of East and Mid-Devon, with a similar 'island' in 
Exeter, and most of the old county of Herefordshire' (Mackie and Preston 1996: 52). 
The three trial areas were established between April 1981 and October 1992, for a minimum 
period of two years, but they were all extended for an indefinite period. 
According to Evans (1985: 48) the three authorities reasons for applying for trial area status 
were mixed. The areas were predominately rural and most services in them were loss making 
and subsidised, and were unlikely to be greatly affected by competition. Mackie and Preston 
(1996: 52) believe that Norfolk County Council deliberately excluded from their area the 
towns of Cromer and Kings Lynn where profitable routes did exist. It is believed that 
Ministers tried very hard to persuade more urbanised local authorities, such as 
Nottinghamshire, to designate Trial Areas which would have given a better cross-section, but 
without success. 
The Government also used financial incentives for both county council and private operators, 
but it found it hard to persuade councils to establish them, despite inducements in the form of 
contingency funds and offers of new minibuses to new operators. 
The counties were already the paymasters and had already decided which services were to be 
subsidised, so they had little to gain from the influence that the traffic commissioners could 
64 
exert in their role as the licensing authority. They thought at best the commissioners just 
endorsed the decision already taken by the counties and in the worst case they actually got in 
the way of the county policy. Evans (1985: 48) believed that some of the counties felt, like. 
the Department of Transport, that private-sector operators might be able to provide better 
value for money on some subsidised services than the incumbent National Bus Company. 
Opposition to the trial areas - some may say predictably - in part came from the public sector 
owned bus operators. This was due to the threat posed by competition to the whole of their 
networks, whose viability depended on the use of cross-subsidisation as well the grants that 
they received from the counties. They argued that competition could result in substantial cuts 
in services and staff. However, the opposition was not limited to the public sector bus 
operators as many of the private sector operators took the same line. 
The opposition was the greatest in the Hereford trial area, where two NBC subsidiaries and 
most of the private operators opposed the setting up of the trial area. Their opposition was, 
according to Evans (1985: 48) directed not only at the trial area itself, but at the intention of 
the local authority to replace the previous arrangements for subsidising loss-making services 
by a new system of contracts by competitive tender. 
In Hereford the new system permitted any operator to run any service they wanted, subject 
only to giving notice and meeting the required safety standards. It was to be left to the market 
mechanism to arrive at the optimal service levels. It was believed that on the profitable routes 
fares could be reduced - in part through the elimination of cross-subsidisation - and 
frequencies could increase if other operators saw the opportunity to make profits. 
On other routes there might well be no services because it was uneconomical to maintain the 
existing service. In these cases subsidies could be used to ensure that these routes were 
maintained. In the case of Norfolk and Devon they continued to do this by negotiating with 
the existing operators. However, Hereford and Worcester identified their service 
requirements and invited tenders for them, and awarded contracts on the most favourable bid. 
The Council formally discouraged competition from other operators on subsidised routes, and 
warned that they might blacklist operators who did not compete, preventing them from 
tendering for educational contracts as well, an important sanction. Opponents of the trial area 
argued that this would enable the authority to exercise more control than the traffic 
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commissioners had done - see Evans 1985: 48. Herefordshire County Council established 
tender competition for 53 services that were identified as being unprofitable. 
The rest of this section will concentrate on what happened in Herefordshire, because 
according to Mackie and Preston (1996: 52) the other Trial Areas were unrepresentative. 
With the sole exception of Hereford City, they were outlying rural areas where bus services 
were low, and were determined not by commercial decisions of operators but by network 
support decisions by local authorities. 
Even before the start of the trial Hereford compared to the other two trial areas had many 
more services. Private operators ran half of the stage carriage-carriage bus kilometres in the 
area. According to Fairhead and Balcombe (1984: 4) this was because the NBC operators 
Midland Red and National Welsh who had experienced declining demand in the area had 
already surrendered a number of rural services to expanding and active independent operators 
in the previous six years. 
The trial area consisted of two parts, the City of Hereford, which was a county town with a 
population of 50,000; and a large and exceptionally low-density rural area with a population 
of 80,000. 
In the initial phase 53 tenders were involved, and it appeared that no operator was prepared to 
continue without subsidy, 15 of these were run by NBC subsidiaries. In the end these 
companies agreed to continue 12 of these services with no or in some cases part subsidies. 
There was competition for 32 of the contracts, and 19 changed hands, see Table 2.8 
During the period between 1981 and 1983 there were a few changes in the pattern of bus 
services. The subsidies for the Hereford Trial Area increased slightly between 1981 and 1983 
due to six contracts being surrendered and then re-let - see Table 2.8. Also support was 
requested and given to some previously unsubsidised services, which resulted in four new 
contracts. By the beginning of April 1983, when the original contracts expired, the tendering 
process was repeated, when a total of 38 contracts were awarded. This was less than before, 
and was due to some services having already been re-let, and some operators had opted to 
continue services without the subsidy from the county council. Some services were grouped 
together, and others carried so few passengers that the council decided not to continue 
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subsidising them. In 1983 competition for these contracts had increased since 1981 and also 
several new operators made bids (see Table 2.8). 
1981 Replacement New 1983 
Contracts Contracts 
Total number of contracts put out to tender 53 64 38 
Number competed for 32 64 31 
Number of bids 70 21 12 94 
Number of changes of operator 19 61 10 
Table 2.8 Competition for Services in Hereford Trial Area September 1981 
and April 1983. Source: Fairhead and Balcombe 1984: 5. 
The results of this tendering process resulted in first round annual savings of E62,000 (38 per 
cent) on revenue support and E65,000 on education transport payments were achieved with 
only minor service withdrawals - see Mackie and Preston (1996: 52). 
However, these savings were not achieved without some loss of bus services and jobs. 
According to Fairhead & Balcombe (1984: 5) the total reduction of Midland Red services in 
the Trial Area was about 17,000 vehicle miles per annum; this involved the reduction of the 
Midland Red bus fleet in Hereford from 19 to 13 and a corresponding loss of employment. 
The tendering process also impacted on Midland Red West's collective bargaining 
arrangements because pay rates were related to the Birmingham labour market prior to the 
establishment of the trial area. As a result of tendering Midland Red West (MRW) had 
improved productivity by some 25 per cent by negotiating more flexible working 
arrangements - see Mackie and Preston (1996: 53). However, some of this productivity gain 
might have come from breaking-up of the NBC in preparation for the privatisation. This 
break-up may have contributed to the competitive spur in MRW, not solely the introduction 
of competition into the market. According to Mackie and Preston (1996: 53) 'MRW itself 
suggested large parts of the gain had come from the break-up of the old Midland Red West 
Company rather than to the Trial Area itself. 
It was claimed that the most dramatic developments in the Trial Area had been in the bus 
services in the town of Hereford and its suburbs - see Fairhead and Balcombe 1984: 6. Before 
the introduction of the Trial Area, MRW or Yeoman Motors, a private operator, provided all 
the services in the town. When the Trial Area began, MRW - as previously indicated - 
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declined to make bids for subsidy contracts, and withdrew from all services that were not 
apparently commercially viable. These were mainly early morning, evening and Sunday 
services. The County Council asked for tenders for most of these services, and most of the 
contracts were awarded to a small independent company that was new to the area. This 
operator also provided services on other town services at more profitable times of day. This 
put them in direct competition with MRW who responded by reducing fares. 
This was not the end of the competition. In the spring of 1983 a new competitor appeared, 
and started running cheap local services. Once again MRW responded aggressively with on 
the road competition including making substantial fare reductions, head running (running 
your buses just ahead of the competition), and, on occasions free buses. According to Mackie 
and Preston (1996: 52) a 'high degree of instability resulted with(sic), and by autumn 1983, 
the average revenues on two competed routes only half of NBC's average cost per vehicle 
mile. 
The disapproval of the County Council brought an end to the free buses, but uneconomic 
fares were continued, as well as simultaneous departures on some routes. 
In January 1984 MRW added five vehicles to its Hereford fleet, and ran them just ahead of its 
competitor's services and at the same time increased its flat fare to 15p an increase of 50 per 
cent. One operator increased its fare to the same amount but another operator maintained the 
fare at 10p on two routes. 
Mackie and Preston (1996: 52) identified another problem with the city of Hereford Trial 
Area, this was that the estates within the city were mostly developed away from the main 
roads, so that the inter-urban and rural routes were somewhat isolated from the town routes. 
The interaction between commercial and tendered routes did not really arise in the trial area. 
2.4.7 The 1982 Transport Ac . This Act had three main objectives and the one relating to the 
transport sector was to reduce further the involvement of the state. This was to be achieved by 
selling off parts of the National Bus Company. It also had four other important features: 
1. to limit subsidies up to a level which the guidelines would set down; up to this level 
subsidies would be legal 
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2. Transport operators would have to prepare a three-year rolling plan on the level of 
services, fares and capital spending 
3. to put services provided by the operators out to tender from the private sector - from 
buffets at bus stations, to cleaning 
4 It changed the constitutional relationship between operators, councils and Government. 
The operators used to report directly to councils. Under the Bill the Government would 
have certain direct links with the operator 
2.4.8 The 1984 White Pape . In 1984 the Conservative Government published a White Paper 
'Buses' which outlined its further thinking on-the future of the bus and coach industry in the 
United Kingdom. The drive behind the White Paper was in part due to what the Government 
saw as the success of the introduction of competition into the express coaching market. 
However, the market for the express coach - see 2.4.3 - is a predominately leisure market. 
The underlying assumption of the White Paper would appear to have been, what worked in 
one market could also work in another, although different, type of market. 
Some of the objectives of the policy proposals along with the relevant chapters or paragraphs 
in the White Paper are listed below: 
1. Bus services freed from restrictions of competition by abolishing road service licensing 
through Great Britain - except London (Buses Chapter 4) 
2 Local authorities would be able to continue essential bus routes that would have ceased in 
a free market. They would however, be required to seek competitive tenders for contracts 
to run bus services that they wish to subsidise (Buses Paragraphs 3.4-3.8) 
3 The concessionary fare scheme would be continued and all operators would be allowed to 
participate in them on an equal basis (Buses Paragraphs 3.9-3.10) 
4 The Government was determined to foster public transport in the rural areas (Buses 
Paragraphs 3.11-3.13) 
However the White Paper also stated that 'It is generally agreed that this industry does not 
show economies of scale' (Department of Transport 1984: 15). Therefore the needs of the 
customer would be best served by creating locally-based companies with managers operating 
close to the market place (Mackie & Preston 1996: 190). 
The White Paper (Department of Transport 1984: 15) also argued that elements of the 
operation that might have developed more efficiently as separate units had been integrated 
into single organisations. According to the White Paper, a public sector bus company could 
have owned and run a bus station, had engineering, computing and off ice services. This had 
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tended to impose very large overheads and the development of policies and standards for the 
whole organisation that have may fitted ill with local circumstances or operational needs. 
It went on to argue that it was not evident that the industry had to be dominated by large scale 
and integrated operations, they were not necessary or even efficient. Or that such an industrial 
structure would meet the needs of the consumer for a great variety of local journeys at the 
price they would be prepared to pay for them. 
2.4.9 Structure of Market Prior to Deregulation. In 1983 there were approximate 68,000 
buses and coaches operating in Great Britain, some 38,000 of these vehicles were publicly 
owned; private operators owned the remainder. There were four sectors in the industry: 
passenger transport executives, municipal, nationalised and the private sector. The structure 
of the bus fleets are given in Table 2.9. 
Number of Buses 
Operator % of Total 
National Bus Company 14,600 21.5 
Scottish Bus Group 3,100 4.6 
London Transport Executive 5,600 8.2 
Passenger Transport Executive 9,600 7.8 
Municipal 
(E) 
5,300 14.1 
Private Operators 30,000 44.1 
All Operators 68,000 100.0 
Table 2.9 Bus Operators in Great Britain 1983. 
Source: Department of Transport 1984: 27 (E) = Estimate 
The Passenger Transport Executives were responsible for the provision of passenger transport 
services in the English metropolitan counties and the Strathclyde Region of Scotland, 
although some bus services were provided in the PTE areas by subsidiaries of the NBC. 
Certain district councils operated the municipal undertakings whose powers to operate 
services derived from local acts passed before 1930. There were 49 Councils - 37 English, 9 
Welsh and 3 Scottish. The nationalised sector comprised of the NBC and the SBG that 
operated in both urban and rural areas. These two groups provided over 75 per cent of stage 
bus services in rural areas throughout Great Britain in 1983. 
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The overall market was in decline. Between 1953 and 1983 bus and coach passenger 
kilometres had halved and its share of the total travel market had declined from 42 per cent to 
8 per cent. Between 1974 and 1983 25.3 per cent of this decline took place - see Table 2.10- 
the largest declines were experienced by National Express and the Municipal bus companies, 
followed closely by London Regional transport. 
Operator % Change 
LRT 26.1 
PTE 22.3 
Municipal 29.2 
National Bus Company 34.7 
Scottish Bus Company 19.2 
Private 0.0 
All Operators 25.3 
Table 2.10: Percentage Change in Passenger 
Journeys between 1974-83. Source: Transport 
Statistics of Great Britain 1974-1984 2.30 
Type of Stage Express Excursion and Contract Private Hire All 
operator tours Services 
London 19.6 3.0 0.5 17.6 
PTE 32.3 2.9 2.0 28.3 
Municipal 15.1 2.4 3.0 13.8 
NBC 25.2 70.6 15.2 8.4 4.9 23.6 
SBG 5.5 5.9 3.1 1.5 5.2 
Private 3.3 23.5 78.8 83.5 88.2 11.5 
Table 2.11 Percentage of Passenger Journey by Service and Type of Operator in 1983. 
Source: Transport Statistics of Great Britain 1974-1984 2.12 
Type of Stage Express Excursion and Contract Private Hire All 
operator tours Services 
London 12.4 0.8 0.2 8.0 
PTE 22.2 1.3 0.8 14.6 
Municipal 10.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 7.0 
NBC 38.6 63.8 10.1 4.8 1.7 29.3 
SBG 8.0 10.9 1.7 2.4 0.6 6.1 
Private 8.4 23.9 86.6 90.6 91.7 35.1 
Table 2.12 Percentage of Passenger Journeys by Vehicle Kilometres and Type of 
Operator in 1983. Source: Transport Statistics of Great Britain 1973-1983 2.12 
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If we examine the number of passenger journeys by type of operator and service - Table 
2.11- we see a clear divide between the then private and public sectors. The public sector 
firins were dominant in stage and express services while the private sector firms were 
dominant in excursions and tours, contracts and private hire, although this sector only 
accounted for approximately 11 per cent of all passenger journeys in the UK - see Table 2.11 
Examination of Table 2.12 shows that the private sector had the largest percentage of vehicle 
kilometres. This reflects the area in which they were dominant eg excursions, contract hire 
and private hire. 
2.4.10 Conduct and the Problem of Peak Loadin . Devine et al (1988: 428) 
described the 
pricing policy in the bus industry at that time as being fairly conservative in its attitude. The 
pricing structure was uniform throughout large sectors of an operators network, and any 
variation would normally come about with the distance the consumer traveled. There were 
however considerable variations in costs among individual services and between peak and 
off-peak periods. The peak problem is similar to that of the electricity supply industry; that is, 
the demand levels vary over time, and output cannot be stored, therefore capacity must be 
enough to meet peak demand. 
The cost of providing a bus service varies according to demand as well as the physical 
characteristics of the routes and the relevant population densities. Also the cost of producing 
peak period bus services are greater than they are for off-peak services. This is because the 
extra services required to meet peak demand cannot be stored, and must be supplied with 
extra vehicles when required. According to Hibbs (1975: 113) all forms of transport are 
characterised by the extreme perishability of the product (a factor that they share with other 
trades and professions). Seat miles produced and not sold perish in the moment of 
production; they cannot be stored. 
It is this that makes the problem of peak demand so difficult to handle, and is complicated by 
the fact that peak demand is almost always in one direction, into a city/town centre in the 
morning, and out of the centre in the afternoon. So despite the overloading of vehicles at peak 
times in one direction, the average load in the peak may be no better than it is at times when 
total demand is relatively low, but is two way. For example people on shopping trips using 
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buses outside of the peak, going in and out of the city/town centre between the peak periods. 
Yet the normal practice through the industry was to arrive at fares from a standard rate per 
mile. One reason for this was that it was easier for the operator to obtain permission from the 
Traffic Commissioners for a general fare rise. 
Devine et al (1988: 429) has argued that few attempts have been made by the bus industry to 
reflect the higher marginal costs of peak travel in higher prices, with the aim of covering the 
long-run marginal cost of meeting peak demand from peak revenue and/or of encouraging 
passengers to shift from peak to off-peak. Also, no account has been taken of the fact that the 
original price was probably well above off-peak marginal cost, and that the reduction could 
be justified on welfare grounds. 
As W Vickery has observed, rational pricing policy may 'come into ... violent conflict with 
popular notions of equity. ' Thus as he remarks, '... it is clear that on marginal cost principles 
transit fares should be substantially higher during rush hours than during off-peak hours. Yet 
a proposal of this sort is likely to be considered inequitable by many if not most of the lay 
population' (Hibbs 1975: 129). The major source of disputes with passengers in the bus 
industry is over fares, and it may well be that bus operators do not want to increase the 
potential for disputes by having different fares at different times on the same route. Which 
may be one reason why they have not introduced pricing structures like the railway 
companies, who operate peak pricing policies, especially on commuter routes into London. 
In the 1984 White Paper, (Buses: 66-67), the Government argued that the main difficulties 
arise in attempting to allocate costs by time of day, in particular in assessing the costs of 
supplying peak services. Most cost allocation methods load the peak heavily on the grounds 
that total capacity is largely deten-nined by the need to meet demand at these periods. Hence 
the bulk of overhead costs, including engineering and maintenance costs were attributed to 
the peaks. In the absence of part-time manning the level of peak operations also determines 
the number of full-time crews employed. 
This perceived problem of peak loading and the surpluses generated by the services run 
between the morning and afternoon peaks were used to subsidise other unprofitable 
operations. The Buses White Paper (1984: 67) argued that a study of bus services in and 
around Taunton in 1978 concluded that internally generated surpluses, mostly from inter- 
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urban and inter-peak services, dominated external subsidy as the means of support of 
unremunerative operations. 
The generation of these surpluses or monopoly profits meant that some consumers were 
subsidising other consumers and this resulted in a misallocation of resources. These 
monopoly profits allowed the incumbent financial power that could influence the structure of 
the market over and above those already given to it by the Road Service Licence. 
It was argued by Nash (1993: 1042) that the financial power of the area-wide monopolies was 
such that they could generally drive away any potential entrant. Also in a regulated and 
subsidised environment costs were expected to be higher as there is less pressure to restrict 
them. 
Nash (1993: 1043) also believed that the use of cross subsidies had hastened the decline of 
the industry because of these higher fares, and low service levels on the densely used routes 
that formed the core business of the industry. He believed that this favoured the better off 
rural and suburban dweller at the expense of the poorer inner city dweller. 
The 1980 NBC Annual Report saw the use of cross-subsidies in a different light 'Following 
the abandonment of quality licensing for express services and longer tours and excursions, 
11.2 per cent of the companies' revenue in 1980 came from deregulated services which had 
no support whatsoever, but whose contribution was important in sustaining loss-making stage 
carriage services' (Birks et al 1980: 127). But the objective of the 1985 Act was to clearly 
establish the social needs that the Government were prepared to support and provide at 
minimum cost to the public purse by putting them out to competitive tender. Any subsidies 
paid were to be specific and transparent - see Ridley 1989: 19. 
Stage carriage did offer the potential for operators to make a profit in urban areas, and on 
many inter-urban routes there were profitable services. However, Kivington (1983: 37) 
argued that many of the routes were not operated at maximum profits. This was due to the use 
standardised fares and the maintenance of services on Sunday, evenings, etc., for social rather 
than economic reasons. 
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Between 1980 and 1983 developments in competition in the stage carriage sector had been 
few and far between. The introduction of competition into the express coach sector had little 
or no impact on the stage carriage sector, even though the procedure for obtaining Road 
Service Licences had been considerably relaxed. The reason for this, especially in the case of 
the small operator, may well have been the fear of retaliation by larger operators. It may well 
have been that the fear of retaliation affected even the largest municipal and national bus 
operators. 
Another reason for the lack of competition could have been due to the co-ordinating duties of 
the county councils. The acceptance of a subsidy by an operator gives an inevitable control to 
the local authority. 'The latter can clearly influence, overtly or otherwise, the actions of the 
former' (Kilvington 1983: 37). 
Also during this period at many traffic courts, the evidence from the county council had been 
crucial to the outcome. Kilvington (1983: 37) believed that most of the county councils 
argued against new entrants/services of a competitive nature because of the likely 'knock on 
effects' on the overall, cross-subsidised network. 
From the Governments point of view, it thought that competition was being frustrated in this 
sector, despite some relaxation of regulation. 
2.4.11 Possibility of Labour Efficiency Gains. As the White Paper pointed out (Department 
of Transport 1984: 36) the bus industry is labour intensive and wages accounted for as much 
as two-thirds of the total costs for the main public sector operators. It is inevitable in an 
industry like the bus industry where the largest single cost is labour, that the main focus 
would be on reducing unit labour costs. The employees' earnings, add-on costs and labour 
productivity determine this. The Government suggested 'that the private operators used their 
labour more flexibly, thus reducing costs' (Department of Transport 1984: 62). 
The Government also believed that major improvements in efficiency were possible with 
deregulation, given the right pressures to identify and secure them. In the White Paper (1984: 
16) it cited the Hereford Trial Area where the management Midland Red negotiated changes 
in the national agreements which led to an improvement in productivity of 25 to 30 per cent. 
Competition was seen as the only way to secure and sustain these efficiency gains 
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2.5 The Privatisation of the Industry 
2.5.0 Introduction. In this section of the chapter we will examine the various privatisations 
which took place within the industry. We start with the sale of the NBC and the subsequent 
re-oligopolisation of these companies. 
2.5.1 Sale of the National Bus Company. Following on from the publication of the Buses 
White Paper, the 1985 Transport Act was passed which deregulated local bus services in the 
UK - except those in London. Although the 1982 Transport Act had provided for the 
privatisation of parts of the NBC it was under the provisions of the 1985 Transport Act that 
the NBCs operations were to be transferred to the private sector as free standing companies. 
The Government also wanted to encourage participation by existing employees in these new 
companies, including bids from staff for the units in which they worked. This would not 
preclude other purchasers from bidding for these companies. The disposal programme was to 
be completed within three years. 
Prior to the publication of the Act discussions had taken place about the future of the NBC, 'a 
management led buy out of the entire company along the same lines of the successful 
National Freight Corporation buy out in 1982 was being canvassed, particularly by chief 
executive, Robert Brook' (Mackie and Preston 1996: 56). 
The driving force behind the splitting up of the NBC into these small free-standing units was 
perceived to be the then Secretary of State for Transport Nicholas Ridley, who in the end 
came out in favour of 'on the road' competition - see Ridley, 1989: 19. 
The NBC was perceived to be too large and would start from too strong a financial base to 
ensure 'fair competition'. According to Mackie and Preston (1996: 56) the NBCs proposal for 
privatisation en bloc, which might have been acceptable in a regulated environment, was not 
consistent with deregulation. 
Yet according to Fisher (1986) there was no reason to split up NBC if other far-flung 
organisations were not to have the same treatment. Associated British Ports (ABP) for 
example, which runs 19 ports, was privatised as a single company. "If the argument for 
breaking up NBC is valid then its equally valid for breaking up the British Airports Authority 
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or British Airways. If it's not valid for those, then it is not valid for NBC. " It should be 
remembered that Ridley had taken over from Tom King as Minister of Transport, and ring 
was not seen as belonging to the radical wing of the Government. So the change in policy 
may have had more to do with ministerial whim, rather than a consistent policy objective. 
2.5.2 Structure of the Industry. Prior to deregulation according to Booth (1997: 17) more than 
one out of every two buses in Britain was in public ownership, with 49 local authority-owned 
undertakings, seven PTEs, London Transport, the 72 NBC subsidiaries, and the II SGB 
subsidiaries. Between them these organisations owned some 38,000 of Britain's 68,000 buses 
and coaches. 
The consolidation of the industry after deregulation has been divided into two stages. the first 
stage took place between 1988-1991, and the second from 1993 onwards. The deregulation 
process created an unstable environment that was further complicated by the privatisation of 
the NBC and the organisational changes to subsidiaries as part of this process. It has been 
suggested that there were two problems with this: 
'It created a large number of smaller bus companies, with no sustained or established 
trading record, with new managing directors having limited experience of such 
appointments. These people were then expected, within months (or some cases weeks), to 
lead bids for the privatisation of their company. With hindsight, it is miraculous that all 
managed to remain in business. Ironically enough, the only ex NBC to have gone into 
receivership since privatisation, National Welsh, was not affected by the break-up policy. 
It left other companies with central work's and other overhead structures much too large 
for their remaining operations. ' (TAS 1997: 174) 
2.5.3 Weakness of ex-NBC Subsidiaries. The Government policy of splitting up the NBC 
according to the TAS Partnership went against the historical nature of the industry. The 
privatisation structure, which was forced on the ex NBC subsidiaries, created a large number 
of unstable units, some of which had been taken over even before the privatisation process 
had been completed. 
This resulted in the creation of several groups of companies, originating from management 
buy outs (MBO) of NBC subsidiaries which had been successful from the early days of 
privatisation and had taken over these unsuccessful MBOs. Other unsuccessful MBOs were 
taken over by 'outsiders' from this latter process came Stagecoach Holdings and Drawlane 
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(later British Bus, now part of the Arriva Group). From the fon-ner process came groups such 
as Badgerline, Caldaire and Western Travel - see TAS 1997: F4. 
According to the Transport Committee (1995-96 Volume I: xvi) by 1989 most of the 
unstable units had been sold and all but 14 of the 72 companies into which NBC was split had 
became part of one of five larger groups. 
2.5.4 The ex-PTE. The seven Passenger Transport Authorities were required to establish 
arms- length wholly owned subsidiaries in 1986 to carry out the bus operations carried out by 
the PTEs. These companies remained as single units, with the exception of Greater 
Manchester Buses which was split into two. 
Privatised Company 
May 1989 Busways Travel Services 
Ltd 
Mar 1994 Greater Manchester Buses 
North 
Mar 1994 Greater Manchester Buses 
South 
Nov 1993 Mainline Group Limited 
Dec 1992 MTL Trust Holding Ltd 
Feb 1993 Srathclyde Buses Ltd 
1991 West Nfidlands Travel 
Oct 1988 Yorkshire Rider Ltd 
Original Sold to 
Management and 
Employees 
Management 
Management and 
Employees 
Employees 
Employees 
Management and 
Employees 
Employees 
Management and 
Employees 
Year Sold on to 
Stagecoach Holdings plc 
1994 
Apr FirstBus plc 
1996 
Feb Stagecoach Holdings plc 
1996 
20% of equity owned by 
FirstGroup - Remaining 
80% brought Jul 1998 
No change 
Jun FirstBus plc 
1993 
Apr Merged with National 
1995 Express 
Apr Badgerline Group (now 
1994 FirstBus) 
Table: 2.13: Privatisation of Passenger Transport Executive Bus Companies 
Source: Adapted from TAS 1999: Page FA-4 
According to Batchelor (8 Jan 1994: 4) the governments' intention was to free them from 
local political interference and the constraint of public spending limits. All of these 
subsidiaries were sold to management or management and employee buy outs. 
A number of the fon-ner PTE operators lost market share due to competition mainly from new 
entrants and from former NBC and STG operators and neighbouring ex-PTE operators. Only 
in West Yorkshire and in the West Midlands did the strength and strong response of these 
companies enable them to retain, in large measure, the market share they enjoyed in October 
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1986. The ability to retain share may have been linked in part to the quality of the 
management in the particular firms. 
These companies also faced the difficulties, while being in public ownership, of achieving 
similar cost reductions that were being achieved in the private sector. The result was that 
some of the companies incurred substantial trading losses while at the same time having to 
deal with restructuring costs. This resulted in the operations being less stable than their size 
and asset base would have implied. As a result of this instability by February 1996 only one 
of the former PTE operations was still owned by the original management - see Table 2.13. 
2.5.5 The Municipal Sector. Like the PTEs local authorities were required to establish their 
bus operations as 'arms-length' wholly owned companies by October 1986. This was an 
attempt to commercialise their operations but not to privatise them in the first instance. 
According to Moore (1993: 42) by placing the political control "at arm's length" and ridding 
the municipal operator of entanglement with local authority bureaucracy and attitudes, a very 
effective means of managing public assets has been created. Unlike nationalised 
organisations, there is a sense of local ownership in the municipal company, the coat of arms 
symbolising that local connection. 
After deregulation many of these companies were vulnerable to competition. Their 
environment had changed dramatically. TAS (1997: F-7) has argued that the protection of 
joint agreements and co-ordinated, subsidised networks was removed, but the companies 
could not expand without inviting retaliation from their ex-NBC or Scottish Transport Group 
(STG) neighbours. At the same time, their own networks were open to competitive attack 
from those neighbours, as well as new entrants to the market. Since 1986 eight local authority 
owned companies have ceased trading. 
Until 1986, local authorities were free to dispose of bus operations as they wished and there 
were sales of these undertakings prior to 1986. Since 1986 twenty-one local authority 
companies have been sold, in many cases originally to management or management and 
employee buyouts - see Table 2.14. 
The reason why so many companies have been taken-over is diverse. Partly it was due to 
company's management, which were faced with a change in the organisational culture, and 
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having to operate in a high competitive commercial environment. Five local authority 
operations did not survive for various reasons and either went into receivership or were 
wound up. 
Privatised Company Purchaser Date Sold on to 
May 1989 Barrow 
Dec 1993 Brighton Transport Ltd 
Burnley & Pendle Transport 
Co Ltd 
Mar 1989 Chesterfield Transport lid 
May 1991 Cleveland Transit Ltd 
Colchester Borough 
Transport Ltd 
Cynon Valley 
Darlington 
Aug 1989 Derby City Transport Ltd 
Dec 1993 FyIde Transport Ltd 
Jan 1989 Grampian Regional 
Transport Ltd 
Great Yannouth Transport 
Grimsby-Cleediropes 
Transport Co Ltd 
Jun 1993 Hartlepool Transport 
Hyndbum Transport lAd 
1986 Ipswich Buses 
Dec 1993 Kingston upon HuH 
Transport Ltd 
Lancaster 
Leicester Citybus Ltd 
Nov 1991 Lincoln City Transport LAd 
Maidstone 
Merthyr Tydfil 
Northampton Transport Ltd 
Jun 1986 Portsmouth Transport Ltd 
Preston Bus limited 
Rhymney Valley 
Dec 1993 Southampton City Transport 
Co Ltd 
1986 Southend Transport Ltd 
1991 Tayside Public Transport 
Ribble 
Management and 
Employees 
Company ceased trading 
Jul 1997 Go-Ahead Group plc 
Burnley & Pendle Council Sep 1996 
Management and Jul 1995 
Employees 
Management and Nov 1994 
Employees 
Colchester Council Dec 1993 
Western Travel Aug 1992 
Nov 1994 
Management and Jul 1994 
Employees 
Management May 1994 
Management and Jun 1995 
Employees 
Great Yarmouth Council Sep 1996 
Grimsby-Cleethropes Oct 1993 
Council 
Management and Dec 1994 
Employees 
Hyndbum Council Sep 1996 
Ipswich Borough Council Nov 1994 
Employees & Cleveland Nov 1994 
Transport 
Aug 1993 
Leicester City Council Dec 1993 
Employees & Deby City Jul 1993 
Transport 
May 1993 
Aug 1989 
Northampton City Council Sep 1993 
Employees & Southampton Jun 1997 
City Transport 
Preston Council Mar 1993 
National Welsh Mar 1989 
Management and Jun 1997 
Employees 
Southend Council Jun 1993 
Management and Mar 1997 
Employ s 
Stagecoach Holding 
PIC 
Stagecoach Holdings 
PIC 
Stagecoach Holdings 
PIC 
British Bus 
Brought from 
receivers to form 
Aberdare Bus 
Company 
Ceased trading 
BritishBus (Cowie 
Group) 
Blackpool Transport 
Services Ltd 
GTR merged with 
Badgerline to form 
FtrstB us PIC 
FirstB us PIC 
Stagecoach Holding 
PIC 
Stagecoach Holdings 
PIC 
Stagecoach Holding 
PIC 
17% equity stake By 
GRT Bus Group 
Stagecoach Holdings 
PIC 
Ceased trading 
GTR Bus Group 
(now FirstBus) 
The York-shire 
Traction Company 
LAd 
Ceased trading 
Ceased trading 
GTR Bus Group) 
(GRT now 
FirstGroup) 
Stagecoach then 
Transit Holding now 
FirstHampshire 
Employees 
National Welsh went 
backrupt 
FirstBus PIC 
British Bus (Cowie 
Group) 
National Express 
Group 
Table: 2.14 Privatisation of Local Authority Owned Bus Companies. 
Source: Adapted from TAS 1999: FA-2-3 
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There were 51 anus-length companies originally established, ten of these were sold on to 
management and employee buy-outs. Nine of these were sold to operators in the private 
sector with only Preston Bus still being owned by its management and employees. One other 
notable exception was Fylde Transport which sold the majority holding to Blackpool 
Transport in May 1994, and this returned the company to public ownership. This is the only 
time this has happened in the industry. 
From the Table 2.14 we can see that 13 of the 21 local authority companies were sold in 
1993. This according to Batchelor (1994: 4) was brought about by a change in the rules 
governing their finances. Local authorities up and down the country had been racing to sell 
off their bus companies before the end of 1993. From January 1 1994 local authorities were 
required to devote half the proceeds of assets sales to paying off debt. Before, they could 
spend the money where they liked. It is possible that all these sales may not have happened 
without considerable political pressure from the Government. 'South Yorkshire Passenger 
Transport Authority yesterday announced the sale of Mainline Group, its bus company, to an 
employee buy-out but complained it had been done under pressure from the government. Mr 
Jack Meredith, chairman, said: The authority has fought long and hard for several years to 
keep Mainline a publicly owned company but ever increasing government pressure has 
forced our hand' (Financial Times 1993b). 
In contrast to the privatisation of the NBC, the privatisation of the local authority owned 
operations has been a gradual process. This may have been due, in part to the political 
opposition of some Labour controlled councils. Also as TAS (1997: F-S) have pointed out, 
the Conservative Government did not take powers in the 1985 Transport Act to force local 
authorities to sell their bus companies, and had to resort to exhortation and limited financial 
incentives to encourage privatisation. This gradual process may also have been influenced by 
the difficult trading conditions in and outside of the industry. According to Mackie and 
Preston (1996: 74) in particular, high interest rates have acted as a dampener on privatisation 
and take-over activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to TAS (1999: F-7) in 
1998 15 companies still remained in local authority ownership. 
In 1992 the Government severely damaged its objective of encouraging the sale of these 
companies to their management and employees by withdrawing the concession that operators 
could be sold by single-bidder sales - especially since the level of proceeds realised from 
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those municipal sales which had gone ahead was subject to the scrutiny of the District 
Auditor - see TAS 1997: F-8. The privatisation process 'in future except in "exceptional 
circumstances" would be by the competitive tender' (TAS 1999: F-7). 
2.5.6 The Scottish Transport Group. Prior to privatisation the STG had made considerable 
changes to its structure, creating a number of subsidiaries broadly in line geographically with 
the Scottish Regional Councils which came into existence in 1974. The Government 
acquired powers to privatise the STG in 1989. The sell-of process was similar to the NBC 
sale, with each subsidiary being offered for tender Table 2.15 gives the outcome of this 
privatisation. 
In 1991 the privatisation process was completed and as can be seen from the Table 2.15 there 
were major changes in ownership. Only one company Highland and Scottish remained in 
independent ownership. 
2.5.7 The Sale of London Transport's Bus Operatiniz Companies. London Transport (LT) was 
established in 1984 as a public corporation directly accountable to the Secretary of State for 
Transport with 13 operating subsidiaries. This transferred the control of LT from the Greater 
London Council. 
In December 1992 when the Department of Transport (DoT) announced the sale, they 
expected LT to sell the companies into a market based on contracts with privatised companies 
(and other operators) for all of London Transport's bus routes. This was expected to operate 
briefly, enabling purchasers to obtain experience of managing the newly privatised 
companies and their routes before deregulation - National Audit Office 1995: p6. 
The privatisation of LT bus operating companies was different from the previous 
privatisations because the market had not been deregulated. This meant that LT had to put all 
its bus routes onto a contractual basis, including the extension of the existing competitive 
programme for LT bus routes, which had started in 1985 - see also 4.3. 
The decision to postpone the deregulation of London's bus services was confirmed by the 
Government in November 1993. This postponement appears to have been for solely for 
political reasons. According to the Financial Times (1993b), the reason for withdrawing the 
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plans would have been the desire of some ministers - believed to include Mr John Major - to 
get rid of controversial issues from a programme that was supposed to unite the Conservative 
party. 
Privatised Company Purchaser date Sold on to 
Mar 91 Bluebird Buscs 
Oct 91 Clydeside Buses 
Ltd(part of Westem 
Scottish) 
Oct 90 Eastern Scottish 
Omnibuses Ltd 
Jul 91 Fife Scottish 
Omnibus Ltd 
Aug 91 Highland Scottish 
Omnibuses Ltd 
Feb 92 Kelvin Central 
Buses Ltd 
Aug 90 Lowland Ornnibus 
Ltd 
Sep 90 Midland Bluebird 
Ltd 
Jun 91 Strathtay Scottish 
Ornnibuses Ltd 
Oct 91 Western Scottish Management & 
Employees 
Table 2.15: The Sale of the Scottish Transport Group with outcomes. 
Source: adapted From TAS 1997 FA-5 
The DoT then had to reconsider the LT post-sale regulatory role. According to the National 
Audit Office (1995: 6) the decision required the creation of a long-term contract-tendering 
regime. The Department aimed to promote sustained and fair competition after the sales, by 
building on London Transport's competitive tendering programme for route contracts. 
In 1985 LT had introduced a system of gross cost tendering for a specific route, with the 
revenue accruing directly to LT. Under this system an entire service was put out to 
competitive tender. Both LT subsidiaries and other operators were able to bid. By March 
1993 LT had put all its untendered routes, about 43 per cent of the network, on a contractual 
basis, and about half of these had been gained by LT owned subsidiaries. 
In April 1993, according to the Chartered Institute of Transport (1994: 7), the remaining 
'block grant' routes operated directly by LT's own subsidiaries were placed on a negotiated 
Stagecoach 
Holding plc 
Management & Nov 94 
Employees (17% 
Luton & District) 
Management & Sep 94 
Employees 
Stagecoach 
Holding plc 
Rapsons /Scottish Oct 95 
Citylink 
(Clansman) 
Management & Aug 94 
Luton & District Purchased 
remaining share - taken over 
by British Bus (Cowie 
Group) 
GRT (now FirstGroup) 
Highland Bus & Coach 
Company (Rapsons sold 
out) 
SB Holdings Ltd (now 
FirstBus p1c) 
Auturnn GRT Bus Group (now 
94 FirstBus p1c) 
GRT Bus Group (now 
FirstBus p1c) 
The Yorkshirc Traction Ltd 
Employees 
Management & 
Employees 
Jun 94 Stagecoach Holding plc 
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net cost contract, where the operator took the revenue risk. By 1994, following some further 
tendering on specific routes, about 50 per cent of the bus-kilometres were run on a gross cost 
basis and the other 50 per cent on a net cost basis. 
The London bus market was substantially different from the rest of Great Britain. Outside of 
London, 85 per cent of the bus-kilometres were provided commercially without any specific 
subsidy. This may have played a part in producing results in London which were 
substantially different from the rest of the country. 
The privatisation process began in 1992 with the sale of London Coaches - London's largest 
sightseeing bus operator - to its management. The ten bus operating companies were 
privatised between September 1994 and January 1995. 
Like previous privatisations within the industry, management and employees were to be 
given the opportunity to purchase their own companies. However, according to the National 
Audit Office (1995: 14) ministers considered that without experience of management in the 
private sector, management and employees might find greater difficulty than private sector 
bidders in raising finance, and be discouraged by the financial commitment involved in 
preparing the bid. They therefore agreed that London Transport should offer management and 
employees a limited price preference in the sale, and financial support to encourage them to 
bid. When the sale was completed, four of the companies were management and employee 
buy-outs. 
The London bus market has not been immune from the consolidation process, with the larger 
groups or companies buying up smaller competitors since privatisation. As TAS (1997: F-13) 
has pointed out, the sale of London General by its management to the Go-Ahead Group in 
June 1996 marked the first consolidation of ownership of the former LBL subsidiaries, 
yielding a substantial profit for both managers and, more critically, their City backers. By 
1998 three of these companies have been taken over, only Metroline Travel remains 
independent - see Table 2.16 - although in the summer of 1997 Metroline Travel was 
successfully floated on the stock exchange. The floatation valued the company at about 
E35m; the privatisation proceeds were E20m in Oct 1994. In August 1998 MTL Trust 
Holdings sold London Northern to Metroline plc for E41.8m including debt. 
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Privatised Company Sold to Date Sold on to 
Aug 94 
Sep 94 
Sep 94 
Sep 94 
Nov 94 
Nov 94 
Nov 94 
Oct 94 
Sep 94 
Jan 95 
Jan 94 
Centre West London 
Buses Ltd 
East London Bus & 
Coach Company 
Leaside Bus Company 
Ltd 
London Central Bus Co 
Ltd 
London General 
Transport Services Ltd 
London Northern 
Limited 
London United Busways 
Ltd 
Metroline Travel Ltd 
South East London & 
Kent Bus Co Ltd 
South London Transport 
Ltd 
Stanwell Buses Ltd 
Management & 
Employees 
Stagecoach plc 
Cowie Group plc 
(now Arriva) 
Go-Ahead Group 
Ltd 
Management & 
Employees 
MTL Trust 
Holdings 
Management & 
Employees 
Management & 
Employees 
Stagecoach plc 
Cowie Group plc 
Jun 96 Go-Ahead Group 
Ltd 
Aug 97 Transdev (French 
transport operator) 
Sum 97 Floated on stock 
market 
Management & Sep 95 London United 
Employees Busways Ltd Aug 
97 
Feb 97 FirstGroup plc 
Table 2.16 The Sale of the London Buses Subsidiaries 1988-1998 with outcomes. 
Source: adapted From TAS 1997 FA-2 
The independent London operators have not been immune from this consolidation process 
either. In 1998 'FirstGroup acquired Capital City Bus - one of the largest independent 
contractors - from its management' (TAS 1999: F- 13). 
2.5.8 A Natural Oligovol ? After the privatisation of the industry as Robbins (1989: 11) has 
pointed out 'there was nothing to prevent a 1930s style wave of takeovers and mergers to 
form a new group of operators', allowing 'the industry to find its own optimal level of 
concentration? This could well have been the case and would be in line with the advice they 
would have been receiving from leading economists who had the ear of government' 
(Langridge and Sealey 2000: 113). 
'When in doubt smaller rather than larger successor companies should be 
created, and allowed to merge thereafter... '(Beasley and Littlechild 1997: 30). 
85 
'Ironically, the outcome for the industry, in terms of its structure, is similar to NBC's own 
management proposals for privatisation at the time of deregulation' (Langridge and Sealey 
2000: 114). 
2.6 Type of market 
2.6.0 Introduction. In this section we will attempt to identify the type of market operating in 
the industry at the time of its privatisation and deregulation. 
2.6.1 A Contestable Market. One of the central hypotheses of the Buses White Paper was 
that the bus market was believed to be "highly contestable" or "partially contestable" once the 
primary barrier of restricted entry was removed. The Confederation of Passenger Transport 
(CPT) in evidence to the Transport Committee believed that the public transport market was 
shown to be partially contestable. Both incumbents and entrants face risks and opportunities, 
and each has the potential to take actions which could reduce or increase the degree of 
contestability (Transport Committee Minutes of Evidence 1995: 135). 
2.6.2 Two Types of Market. The 'White Paper thought that there would be two types of 
market within the industry, one of which involved heavily used routes (the commercial 
sector) and the other which had less heavily-used unprofitable routes (the subsidised sector). 
But for both types of markets, although they were considerably different, contestability would 
bring about the competitive solution' (Langridge and Sealey 2000: 109). 
The commercial sector market was one that had routes with a frequent service, intending 
passengers did not necessarily need to know the timetable to arrange their journeys. 
Knowing that buses run frequently means that waiting times will be short and they can catch 
the next available bus. It was argued by the White Paper (Department of Transport 1984: 52) 
that this was the kind of route on which, in the absence of quantity regulation, competition on 
the ground was likely to develop. It was thought that there would be opportunities for several 
operators to survive. Also, with deregulation, much of the competition would take the form 
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of new types of services. For that reason, the total market should have expanded and on 
many services fares would fall. However none of these predictions were consistent with a 
highly contestable market. Contestability would have been consistent with little, or no, 
change in the incumbents level of service, as long as it earned only normal profits' (Langridge 
and Sealey 2000: 111). 
The subsidised sector involved less heavily used routes, which had totally free entry - and 
therefore totally free exit according to the theory of perfectly contestable markets - see 1.3 - 
it was argued that on these routes, the intending travellers would benefit from a number of 
different outcomes: 
Operators offering different types of services and the market would become 
differentiated. 
2. Operators would withdraw from the market if there was not sufficient demand for their 
services. 
3. If there were enough demand to support more than one operator with the same kind of 
service, they would usually agree to co-ordinate their services (subject to the provisions 
of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act). 
Although, one and two conform to the principles of contestability, three is a standard 
neo-classical analysis of an imperfect market. 
The White Paper (1984: 52) argued that substitution of one operator for another would not be 
a frequent occurrence once the market had settled down after deregulation, and there were 
few reasons in principle for fearing that competition would lead to frequent and unsettling 
changes in the supply of services. 'The actual degree of competition on the ground - and 
therefore the amount of change travellers would have to face, would be much less than the 
potential degree of competition. Consistent with market contestability theory, incumbent 
operators would be kept up to the mark by the threat of competition' (Langridge and Sealey 
2000: 111). 
The CPT believed that although deregulation opened up the market to any public service 
vehicle operator, an existing operator would still have an advantage over a new entrant to the 
industry through 
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knowledge and experience 
" resources (staff and experience) 
" infrastructure and planning 
" reputation 
They also believed that entrants would seek to minimise these barriers, for example by: 
entering from a contiguous market in which they had already gained some knowledge 
and experience which they could use in the new market 
initially entry into the local bus market would be on a small scale and this would be 
achieved by obtaining local authority contracts (Transport Committee Minutes of 
Evidence 1995: 135). 
2.6.3 Entry into the Market. A bus could be described as a fixed cost with wheels drawing on 
an analogy by Baumol (1987: 232). If demand in a particular market declines and there is 
plenty of demand in another market, the operator can simply transfer the bus out of one 
market into another one. The bus is a fixed cost and constitutes no sunk cost on any 
particular route, this would allow costless exit from an existing market and costless entry into 
a new one. 
Even if it was not possible for a new firm to enter the industry, there would not be 
surmountable barriers to entry for an established firm in the industry - see 1.3. This would 
mean that it would be possible for it to enter a new market if it saw supra-normal profits 
being made. Therefore, if an incumbent operator believed that another established firm 
within the industry had reserve or excess capacity, which in the short run might be shifted 
into their market, this could have the effect of restraining supra-normal profits being made by 
an incumbent operator. However, as pointed out earlier, the existence of reserve'or excess 
capacity conflicts with the concept of a contestable market. 
According to the Buses White Paper (Department of Transport 1984: 51-52) in the bus 
industry entry costs are low, sunk costs are comparatively small in relation to operating costs 
and economies of scale are limited. So in the absence of quantity regulation any operator 
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would know that, in respect of any service they provide, they are liable to challenge from 
other operators or potential operators who think they can offer better value for money. 
However, as we have pointed out earlier, if there is entry into the market, this would mean 
that contestability had failed - see 1.3 - unless the market demand has increased more than the 
capacity of the incumbent(s), and new entrants entered to make up the shortfall in supply. Not 
because they saw the existence of supra normal profits. 'It is the threat of entry that is 
supposed to ensure that the incumbent is innovative and price responsive as any potential 
entrant, while still bringing about the competitive solution. If entry occurs, this implies the 
existence of supra-normal profits, although this has to be qualified, as it could be argued that 
deregulation was creating a new market and until this market had matured the full effects of 
contestability would not be seen' (Langridge and Sealey 2000: 111). According to Mackie 
and Preston (1996: 79) the White Paper assumed that there would be considerable on-the- 
road-competition, particularly as independent operators that had previously been limited to 
the express, contracts and excursions and tour markets cross-entered the local (or stage) bus 
industry and ex-NBC/SBG began to compete with the metropolitan PTCs and Municipal bus 
companies. 
The CPT also argued that deregulation made it possible for companies to enter markets on an 
experimental basis, from which they could either expand or withdraw. They also argued that 
on the road experimentation might be quicker and cheaper than theoretical service planning. 
In theory, the entry and exit costs are the same for all operators, but this does not take into 
account that there could be different degrees of entry and especially exit costs in a market. 
This could depend in part on the type of ownership of a particular operator. A large privately 
owned company is more likely to have a greater degree of flexibility on whether it enters or 
exits a particular market. The survival of a large company would not be put in jeopardy by 
the loss of one service. If it was a small independent firm that withdrew from a particular 
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market, the implications for it could be greater than for a larger firrn, as it also might lose its 
livelihood. 
Also, if an operator was originally established by a council to service a particular area and if 
it left that market, the initial rationale for its existence would cease and it may have no other 
market to go to. In this case it would sell its assets - with some element of sunk costs 
involved due to asymmetry of information - so exit from the market would not be costless. 
According to the CPT (Transport Committee, Minutes of Evidence 1995: 136), since 
deregulation, and due in part to the depth of the recession, there has been no shortage of 
cheap second hand vehicles and this has enabled new firms to enter the industry with ease. 
However, inadequate enforcement has made entry into the market too cheap, enabling 
unscrupulous operators to achieve excessively low operating costs. Where this occurred, fair 
competition is impossible, as quality operator's costs can always be undercut. 
2.6.4 Hit and Run Entry. According to evidence given by the CPT to the Transport Select 
Committee (Transport Committee, Minutes of Evidence 1995: 135) when a bus operator puts 
on a new commercial service in a competitive market its aim is to make a profit, and they 
intend this profit to be a continuing one. Finns do not normally start services with the idea of 
making a quick profit at the expense of the incumbent, and then get out. 
The CPT went on to argue that where market entry is of short duration, it is likely that the 
entrant actually hoped to become a long term player, but was forced out by more effective 
retaliation than anticipated from the incumbent, and/or because of shortcomings in their own 
operation. If entry into the market is by a firm which has underestimated the true cost of the 
scheduled service and set a price below the true market price the incumbent will have no 
other choice than to compete on price, even though it means the incumbent occurring losses. 
Often both incumbent and entrant incur losses during this period of short-lived competition. 
The "winner" is the operator that can withstand the losses for the longest time. According to 
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Kay and Thompson (1991: 29) the existence of barriers to entry can give an incumbent a 
'longer purse' in a post entry war. The recognition of this by both the entrant and the 
incumbent means that resisting entry is more likely to be a worthwhile strategy. Sometimes 
the customer may gain, because innovation is forced upon an incumbent that endures after the 
end of competition, for example, higher frequencies. This situation contradicts contestability 
theory, an incumbent is in theory unable to alter its prices in the short run - see 1.5.5. 
According to the CPT (Transport Committee, Minutes of Evidence 1995: 136) in practice 
operators do compete on price and alter their prices whenever they wish. 
Another possible situation is given - although the CPT gave no example - that if a particular 
market cannot sustain an additional operator, once the new entrant has withdrawn, the status 
quo will return. 
2.6.5 Conclusions on Contestabj! jjy. This part of the chapter has tried to show that there is 
some confusion over the theory of contestable markets. It is generally accepted that a perfect 
contestable market is unrealistic - see Baumol 1987: 233 - in reality, it is the degree of 
contestability in a particular market that is important and the policy outcomes that come as a 
result of that analysis. In regard to the UK bus industry the market is probably not as 
contestable as the Conservative Government believed. 
The last word in this section is left to the White Paper Buses: 
'Instability, excess provision and deliberate fare cutting below cost occur when 
only parts of the market are effectively contestable' (Buses 1984: 53). 
2.7 Change in Market Structure 
2.7.0 Introduction. In this section we will analyse the changes that have taken place in the 
market structure since the start of the privatisation process using the SCP paradigm.. 
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2.7.1 Overall Changes in Market Structure. Through the privatisation process the bus market 
has changed from one dominated by the public sector firms, which accounted for 75 per cent 
of the turnover in 1985 to one dominated by three privately owned groups, who accounted for 
52.2 per cent of the market by turnover in 1998 - see table 2.17. However, Bachelor (1994: 4) 
has argued that floatations and mergers may change the structure of the bus industry but 
organic growth will depend to a large degree on planning policies that favour public 
transport. 
Year Year Actual 
1989 1998 Increase 
Major Groups 
FirstGroup 3.7 22.4 18.7 
Stagecoach Holding 3.9 15.8 11.9 
Cowie (Arriva) 3.4 14.0 10.6 
Total 11.0 52.2 41.2 
Second Tier Groups 
Go-Ahead Group 1.7 6.7 5.0 
National Express* 6.0 6.5 0.5 
MTL Trust** 2.1 2.2 0.1 
Total 1.7 15.4 13.7 
Total All Groups 12.7 67.6 54.9 
Others 
Smaller Groups 8.1 3.1 -5.0 
Employee Owned 1.7 0.3 -1.4 
Management Owned 13.8 7.8 -6.0 
Publicly Owned 30.4 6.6 -23.8 
Scottish Bus Group 5.7 0.0 -5.7 
London Transport 15.5 0.0 -15.5 
Independent Operators 12.0 14.6 2.6 
Total Other Groups 87.2 31.9 -55.3 
Table 2.17 Change in Percentage Market Share by 
Turnover in Bus Industry 1989-1998. 
Source: Adapted from Bus Industry Monitor 1999; 
F-15. *data from 1991 **data from 1993 
2.7.2 Conduct. We will now examine what has happened to fares and costs in the industry 
since deregulation. In the 1984 White Paper the Government argued that one of the factors 
that had contributed to the decline in public transport use had been the upward trend in real 
fares. The only exception to this was the PTE sector, where the maintenance of low fares had 
been a policy objective of the controlling authorities - see Buses 1984: 35. The data for the 
increase in local bus fares indices for different areas between 1985/86 and 1997/98 is given in 
Appendix I Table 2. 
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The information to calculate the index is obtained from a panel of bus operators, who account 
for about 85 per cent of passenger receipts on local bus services. However the index has been 
criticised for a number of reasons. In the Transport Statistics Report (1997: 50) it is claimed 
that in theory, the index measures the change in the average charge to the fare-paying 
passenger. In practice however, changes in the generosity of concessionary fare schemes may 
not always be included in the fare changes supplied by operators when constructing the price 
index. 
Mackie et al (1995: 240/1) has also argued that the true rise in real fares outside London, may 
be understated in the official statistics. The reason for this is that bus services consists of a 
large number of different products which should receive the correct weights when calculating 
the index. If market conditions are stable, then the inherent errors probably balance out when 
computing rates of change in the index. However, the last decade has seen unprecedented 
change in the route structure, affecting the pattern of through services offered and fares paid 
for given journeys. This is through the availability and price of Travelcards and multi-journey 
tickets, including operator-specific tickets, and the generosities of concessionary travel 
arrangements for elderly and children who account for a large proportion of bus travellers. 
Bearing these criticisms in mind we will now look at what has happened to the real fare index 
since 1985/86. Overall in Great Britain, the real fare index has increased by 28.7 per cent 
over the period. The largest increase - 6.5 per cent - occurred between 85/86 and 86/87 when 
the full affects of deregulation were coming into effect. The change in fare increases has 
broadly reflected the pattern of subsidy withdrawal, with large real increases in London and 
the Metropolitan areas, especially South Yorkshire and Merseyside. In the metropolitan areas 
the largest increase - 22.6 per cent - occurred between 85/86 and 86/87, following a major 
reorganisation of local bus services, bringing fares closer to those in the rest of Great Britain. 
According to Mackie et al 1995 (pp 240/1) in the rest of the country, real fare changes have 
been much more modest. 
The 1984 White paper believed that as a result of deregulation on many services passengers 
would pay lower fares. The assumption for this may have been in part that competition would 
induce operators to bring in fares policies that would be based on route pricing. However, in 
giving evidence to the Transport Committee Brian Souter, Executive Chairman of Stagecoach 
Holdings stated 'personally I have been disappointed to some extent with (sic) has been that, 
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as an industry, we have not abandoned network pricing. I thought that with deregulation 
probably the industry would have moved to route pricing .... and I think route pricing would 
be a good thing because with network pricing we really do not take into account elasticity of 
demand on a route by route basis' (The Consequences of Bus Deregulation Volume 11: 24). 
Local Bus Fares Rail Fares Motoring Costs 
28.6 25.1 1.0 
Table 2.18 Percentage Change in Real Passenger 
Transport Price indices 1985/86 to 1997/98 1995=100 
Source: Focus on Public Transport 1999 page 58, 
Between 1972 and 1983, stage bus fares rose by over 30 per cent above the rate of inflation, 
while motoring grew by only 3 per cent and as was stated earlier was considered by the 
Government a major contributory factor to the decline in passenger usage. At this point it 
will be useful to look at what has happened to real bus fares compared with other travelling 
costs since deregulation to see if this trend has been reduced or reversed. Table 2.18 (see 
Appendix I Table 3 for detail) gives the change in real indices for 1985/86 to 1997/98 for 
local bus fares, rail fares, motoring costs. 
Since deregulation bus fares have risen by an average of 2.2 per cent year on year and by 28.6 
per cent for the period. This was the largest increase for any of the groups during the period. 
However, in evidence to the Transport Committee the DoT stated that fares had been rising 
slightly ahead of general inflation but (apart from the large increases in some of the 
metropolitan areas as general fare subsidies ended) on a trend similar to that experienced 
before 1985 (Transport Committee Volume 11: 170). A trend which since 1984 had been 
largely responsible for the decline in bus usage? 
It is not surprising then that along with increasing real fares there has been a decline in real 
passenger eceipts between 1985/86 and 1997/98. These fell by 4.8 per cent over the period 
(see Appendix I Table 4 for detail). London was the only area that showed an increase in 
passenger eceipts during the period, an increase of 29.5 per cent. The reasons for this were 
discussed earlier. 
We will now examine what has happened to operating costs since deregulation. In this 
section we are using costs per vehicle kilometre excluding depreciation. Fuel Duty Rebate, 
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which is available to operators of local bus services, has been taken into account when 
calculating the operating costs. 
Changes to cost occur through changes in passenger journeys as well as by changes in actual 
operating costs. Cost reductions have been brought about by a number of factors, including 
the introduction of driver only buses, mini buses, more flexible wage structures and working 
practices. There has also been greater investment in new buses and this has brought about 
reductions in maintenance costs. New, more efficient vehicles have also contributed to these 
savings. 
Table 2.19 shows the percentage change in real operating costs pence per kilometre between 
1986/87 and 1997/98 see Appendix I Table 6 for details. From the table we can see that there 
has been a wide difference in the reduction of costs. 
London MetroPolitan Shires Scotland Wales GB 
42.0 -47.9 -34.5 -43.9 -37.7 40.7 
Table 2.19 Percentage Change in Real Operating Costs Pence Per 
Vehicle Filometre by Area 1986/87-1997/98 - Including Depreciation 
Source: Focus on Public Transport 1999: 77 
The cost reduction should have been beneficial to the consumer. However, it has been argued 
by Mackie et al (1995: 240) that since deregulation the cost savings resulting from 
deregulation have been wholly swallowed up by subsidy cuts and mileage increases with 
nothing left over for reductions in fares. Indeed as we have shown real fares increased 
substantially. 
Public Transport Support (PTS) is a term that covers all forms of local authority current 
expenditure on public transport, but does not include concessionary fare reimbursement. 
Outside of London, the Passenger Transport Executives and county and regional councils 
provide this support. It has been called 'public transport support' outside London since 
deregulation; prior to this it was known as 'revenue support'. 'Costs and local authority 
subsidies have been reduced but continuing declines in the number of passengers using the 
buses coupled with increases in route mileage's run has pushed up average costs per 
passenger' (Batchelor 1994: 4). 
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Over the period local bus service PTS in Great Britain declined by 68 per cent in real terms 
(see Appendix I Table 7 for detail). Following the implementation of the Transport Act 1985, 
transport support was targeted towards services not provided commercially, after a 
competitive tendering process had taken place for these socially necessary services. 
London Metropolitan Shires Scotland Wales GB 
-99.6 -73.0 -43.4 -36.4 -55.0 -72.7 
Table 2.20 Percentage Change in Real Passenger Transport 
Support by Area 1985186-1997/98. Source: Table A3.6 
Table 2.20 shows the Percentage change in real passenger transport support by area 1985/86- 
1997/98. From the table we can see that London has had the greatest fall in PTS this was due 
to the change to funding as in London from 1994/95 London Transport internally funded 
support, with no direct revenue support from central government. 
Concessionary fare reimbursement, under 1985 Act local authorities and PTAs were able to 
provide concessionary fare schemes for elderly people, the disabled and children. The local 
authorities or the PTEs reimburses the operators for the revenue lost as a result of their 
participation in the schemes, after taking into account any extra income generated from the 
extra travel by the scheme. The concessionary fare reimbursement scheme should be seen as 
a subsidy to the passenger, not to the operator taking part in the scheme. 
London Metropolitan Shires Scotland Wales GB 
0.0 4.0 0.8 -15.9 -6.6 -0.9 
Table 2.21 Percentage in Real Concessionary Fares 
Reimbursement by Area 1985/86-1996/97 
Source: Table 5.3 Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain 1996/97 
Over the decade in Great Britain the real expenditure on the concessionary fare 
reimbursement has remained almost static, showing a 0.9 per cent decrease (see Appendix 1 
Table 5 for details). However, there have been substantial variations between the different 
areas. 
2.7.3.1 Performance. The thinking behind the 1985 White Paper and the desired outcome of 
all the measures proposed by the Government would be to slow or halt the seemingly 
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inevitable decline in service to the travelling public. They believed that the total market for 
public transport should expand - see Buses (Department of Transport 1984: 25) 
London Metropolitan Shires Scotland Wales GB 
7.8 -39.7 -20.1 -30.4 -20.2 -22.8 
Table 2.22 Percentage Change in Passenger Journeys (m) by Area 
1985/86-1996/97. Source: Table 2.1 Bus and Coach Statistics 
Great Britain 1997/98 
Table 2.22 gives the changes in passenger journeys by area between 1985/86 and 1996/97. 
From this table we can see that overall in Great Britain local bus passenger journeys declined 
by 22.8 per cent - see Appendix I Table 8 for details. 
The exception to this was London where passenger journeys increased between 1985/86 and 
1996/97 by 7.8 per in 1996/97- the reasons for this have already been discussed. However, it 
was the only area that was still regulated, which may have had some influence on the results. 
Since 1993/94 passenger journeys increased by 11.2 per cent from 1,1 17m to 1,242m. The 
last time there was a significant increase in patronage was by 7 per cent between 1983 and 
1984. This coincided with a policy of reductions in fares and a structure based on fare zones 
- see Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain 1997: 8. 
In contrast, in the English metropolitan areas passenger journeys declined by 39.7 per cent of 
which 12.5 per cent occurred between 1985/86 and 1986/87. This exceptional may be 
associated with substantial fare increases and reorganisation of services which took place. 
The metropolitan areas - even taking into account the exceptional decrease between 1985/86- 
1986/87 - have lost a greater percentage of passenger journeys than any other area between 
1986/87 and 1997/98. 
The English shire counties experienced a decline of 20.1 per cent between 1985/86 and 
1996/97. In Scotland passenger journeys fell by 30.4 per cent over the period whilst Wales 
experienced a decrease of 20.2 per cent. 
One of the main objectives of the 1985 Transport Act was to increase passenger usage. If 
patronage had increased it was argued by Nash (1993: 1044) we could have seen the 
'Mohring-effect' whereby as patronage and output increase, the quality of service also 
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increases, and service frequency rises while waiting times falls. This is exactly analogous to a 
producer economy of scale, except that the benefits of the reduced costs are felt by the 
consumer. 
There is some evidence to support this point of view according to Batchelor (1994: 4) the 
ingredients for a successful bus operation include an aggressive approach to bus frequencies, 
often combined with a switch from cumbersome double-deckers to mini or midi buses; 
improved financial controls and a crackdown on costs. 
Although overall bus patronage has continued to decline and some bus operators have blamed 
the recession for this, others have managed to increase passenger numbers, despite the 
downturn. Plymouth Citybus, still municipally owned, has increased passenger numbers by 5 
per cent a year over the past five years and converted a E400,000 annual subsidy into a pre- 
tax profit of fl. 3m. - see Batchelor 1994: 4. 
In evidence to the Transport Committee the Department of Transport believed that the 24 per 
cent bus mileage increase outside of London since 1985/86 had given passengers more 
choice. This according to Nash (1993: 1044) was primarily due to a big increase in minibus 
operators in medium sized towns and cities. They are popular and successful, particularly 
where they have turned a relatively low frequency service (say half hourly) into a high 
frequency one (perhaps every ten minutes) and also penetrated housing estates where the 
conventional bus was confined to the main roads. Although these smaller buses are cheaper 
to buy, operate and maintain and are nimbler in traffic, according to Batchelor (1994: 4) 
Badgerline, the quoted Bristol-based operator, has put midi-buses on less travelled routes to 
allow no opening for competitors. 
London Metropolitan Shires Scotland Wales GB 
32.6 21.9 27.8 29.1 23.2 26.7 
Table 2.23 Percentage Change in Local Bus Service Vehicle 
Kilometres (millions) 1985/86-1997/98. Source: Table 12 Focus 
on Public Transport 1999 Edition p 62 
Table 2.23 gives the changes in vehicle kilometres by area between 1985/96 and 1996/97, 
overall in Great Britain vehicle kilometres increased by 29.7 over the period - see Appendix 1 
Table 9 for details. In the English metropolitan areas the largest year on year increase 
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occurred, 10.6 per cent from 557 million vehicle kilometres to 616 million vehicle kilometres 
between 1986/87 and 1987/88. This could be attributed to increased competition in the 
deregulated environment. 
2.7.3.2 Financial Ratios. So far we have concentrated on the outcome of various performance 
indicators in assessing the performance of the industry since privatisation and deregulation. 
We will now examine the changes in the performance of 12 former national Bus subsidiaries 
between 1984 and 1998. In Table 2.24 we give the change in various ratios between 1984 and 
1998. 
Wages 
as a% 
Pre-Tax of Real 
Profit average Average 
Pre-Tax fOOO* per Total 
Year Profit % Employee Cost 
1984 6.1 1.1 62.0 
1990 8.1 2.5 60.4 
1998 9.6 2.5 60.2 
Percentage Change 
wage Average 
fOOO Employment 
16.3 996 
15.5 748 
14.5 669 
1984/90 33.1 130.3 -2.7 -4.8 
1990/98 18.3 -0.7 -0.2 -6.6 
1984/98 57.4 128.7 -2.9 -11.0 
-24.9 
-10.6 
-32.8 
Table 2.24 Change in performance of former NBC subsidiaries 
1984-1998. * 1998 =100 
Between 1984 and 1998 pre-tax profitability increased by 57.4 per cent, the majority of the 
increase 33.1 per cent occurring between 1984 and 1990. The largest increase in any ratio 
was the pre-tax profit per employee that increased by 128.7 per cent between 1984 and 1998. 
However, the largest increased occurred between 1984 and 1990, an increase of 130.3 per 
cent. 
Wages as a percentage of total costs decline by 2.9 per cent from 62.0 per cent to 60.2 per 
cent. Again the largest decrease occurred between 1984 and 1990, when they declined by 2.7 
per cent, only 0.2 per cent of the reduction occurred between 1990 and 1998. However, the 
real average wage declined by 11.0 over the period, but the largest decrease 6.6 per cent 
occurred between 1990 and 1998. Average employment fell by 32.8 per cent over the period, 
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again the largest decline occurred, of the average 327 job reductions, 248 (75.8 per cent) 
occurred between 1984 and 1990. 
These results would tend to indicate that the main effects of privatisation and deregulation 
took place between 1984 and 1990. Only the rate of decline in the real average wage was 
greater between 1990 and 1998 than 1984 and 1990. A more detailed discussion on the 
changes in earnings is undertaken in Chapter 4. However, the re-oliogopolisation of the 
industry has appeared to have little effect on the financial performance of the industry. 
2.8 Conclusions of Chapter 
2.8.0 Conclusion. In this chapter we have critically examined using in part the SCP 
paradigm, the changes that have taken place to the bus and coach industry both in the United 
States and the UK. From this examination we have seen that there are certain sin-dlarities in 
the outcomes, but for deregulation especially. The opening up of markets to competition, 
particularly in the UK, resulted in the reduction of trade unions ability to influence the 
earnings of their members, this is discussed more fully in Chapter 4. One result of the 
introduction of competition both in the UK and the United States into the bus and coach 
industry was that labour contracts had to be re-negotiated. This may have been an incidental, 
but a welcome result of deregulation, for the Government in the United States, but it was an 
anticipated consequence of deregulation in the UK. 
The privatisation of the NBC, as we shall see was substantially different from that of 
Associated British Ports (ABP) - see 3.3.2.4. The NBC was broken down into the smallest 
possible units against the wishes of its senior management, while ABP was transferred as a 
complete entity to the private sector. The reason for this would appear to have more to do 
with ministerial whim, rather than a consistent application of set policy. 
As a result of the privatisation process the structure of the industry in the UK has changed 
from one being dominated by a publicly owned firm to one which is dominated by three 
private firms. The process of oligopolisation of the industry took place over a relatively short 
time period in the 1990s. 'The process of consolidation has been such that, at the time of 
writing, of over 70 NBC subsidiaries privatised, less than ten retain an existence outside of 
the major groups'(TAS 1999: F-4). 
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If we ask if the objectives of the 1984 White Paper have been achieved the answer must be 
that to some extent they have been. In its evidence to the Transport Committee the DoT 
believed that most of the objectives of the reforms have been achieved (Minutes of Evidence 
1995: 170). Its reply was: 
" operating costs have been reduced by 43% per vehicle mile in real terms: 
" subsidies paid by local authorities are better targeted and the competitive tendering 
regime has reduced costs by more than half in real terms 
" bus mileage has increased by 24% outside London since 1985/86, giving passengers more 
choice 
" the use of mini and midi buses, is now widespread and many people, especially off main 
corridors and on outlying housing estates, are now served by buses when previously they 
were not 
" competition still exists both on the road and for local authority contracts although the 
nature of the competition is changing 
However, by 1998 the most important objective of the White Paper to slow or halt the 
seemingly inevitable decline in service to the travelling public had not been achieved. The 
DoT, in its evidence to the Transport Committee stated, nevertheless, despite the 
improvements to services, patronage has continued to decline at a rate very similar to that 
prevailing before. The causes are basically the growth of car ownership with growing 
national prosperity (annual mileage travelled per person by bus has remained almost constant 
for those households without a car and for those with one car), and changes in patterns of 
living and working. 
The deregulation and privatisation process has failed to stop the decline in bus usage, and by 
itself could not have stopped this decline. As was pointed out earlier, the privatisation and 
subsequent mergers may change the structure of the bus industry, but the organic growth of 
passenger numbers will probably depend upon a non-market solution such as planning 
policies that favour public transport. 
In the next chapter we will examine the changes that have taken place in the port industry as a 
result of the privatisation process. 
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3 The UK Port Industry: Nationalisation and privatisation 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.0 Introduction. This chapter will use the elements of the SCP paradigm to critically 
analyse what has happened to the UK port industry pre and post privatisation. This chapter 
will also compare and contrast what occurred in the port industry with what has taken place 
in the bus and coach industry. This is due to the difference in the cost structures, the port 
industry having high levels of sunk costs, the existence of which, theoretically at least, should 
make it a less contestable market. 
3.1.1 Different Types of Ownership Around the World. The way in which ports were 
organised and owned differed around the world in the 1980s. Any type of organisation - 
I 
public or private - could be involved in providing port facilities, and according to Liu (1995a: 
164): 
'port ownership is not simply a dichotomy between public and private 
ownership. The allocation of the provision rights, and hence property rights 
for the infrastructure, superstructure and services among various parties gives 
rise to different patterns of ownership. ' 
In the USA they were the responsibility of the state or municipal authorities, although this did 
not prevent the Federal Government having several important and expensive programmes 
within them - see Goss 1984: 10. 
In Canada, the ports were a federal responsibility, and this was a source of resentment 
because the provinces and cities had no influence on their management. The situation became 
so serious that it had to be rectified by statute, which gave powers to create local port 
corporations. However, they were still ultimately under federal control, but with strong local 
influences. 
Liu (1995a: 169) believed that the UK's approach to port administration had traditionally 
been less interventionist than many other industrialised nations (for instance, most of 
Continental Europe). Receiving neither financial assistance nor intervention from the state, 
public ports in the UK operated in much the same way as private ports. The view which 
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underlies the port policy of successive UK Governments, whether Conservative or Labour, is 
that ports should be treated as commercial undertakings whenever appropriate and public 
control in the port sector should be kept to the minimum. However, the Labour Government 
in the 1960s was considering nationalising all the UK ports, but abandoned this for political 
reasons. 
According to Goss (1984: 10) in the early 1980s, it appears that, in almost any country except 
the UK, it was accepted that national, regional and local governments had legitimate interests 
in seaports. There were very few ports in the early 1980s around the world, which were not 
controlled in some way by public-sector port authorities. However, there were exceptions, 
such as Felixstowe in Suffolk and Bernicia on the shores of San Fransico Bay - see Goss 
1984: 10. 
3.1.2 What is a Port? At this point a question we might like to ask is what is a port? 
According to Liu (1995a: 164) a 'port basically functions as a meeting point for various 
transport modes, including maritime shipping, inland navigation, highway and railway 
transport. ' However it also has to provide certain facilities and services in order to be able to 
meet the requirements of its customers. These are as follows (see Liu 1995a: 164): 
" Infrastructure - land, water area, docks, locks, breakwaters, channels, navigational aids 
and physical links to inland transport 
" Superstructure - quay cranes, gantries, forklift trucks, warehousing and sheds 
" Services - cargo loading/unloading, storage, pilotage and towage 
Not all ports provide all these comprehensive services. There are many port owners who are 
largely, or entirely, landlords in that they own, and construct their facilities, and then they 
lease them out to other firms who will provide cargo-handling facilities. 
According to Goss (1984: 10) there are two basic components to the cost of sea transport: the 
cost incurred in the ports; and the tonne/mile costs at sea. We are concerned with ports rather 
than the cost of sea transport. In general port costs are greater than for other transport modes. 
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3.1.3 Ports as Public Goods. Seaports generally involve an element of what economists call 
'public goods' - see Goss 1984: 11. Public goods are distinguished by a number of factors, 
such as the inability to exclude users who refuse to pay - the 'free-rider' problem. The 
provision of navigational aids is one such service, in that it increases maritime safety and 
extends to other port users who are not paying for the service. 
Goss cites the case of a dredged channel towards the entrance of a port as a special and 
interesting case of a 'public good'. This is because there is no relationship between the cost 
of the channel and the number passing through the channel once it is there. The cost involved 
in originally dredging and maintaining a channel is a 'sunk cost' - no pull intended - and one 
which could be re-occurring, if the channel is prone to silting-up. If the port owner - public or 
private - let the channels silt up it would go out of business; the fact that others benefit is 
irrelevant. To stay in business they have to spend money on something which has no other 
alternative use and therefore once spent is 'gone forever'. It is the existence of such large 
sunk costs which makes this industry so different from the bus and coach industry and this 
has implications for the type of competition which takes place in the industry. 
However, Baird (1999: 116) shows that even though it is a sunk cost, some if not all of the 
money, can be recuperated. The Harwich Haven Authority (HHA) undertook a dredging 
programme in Harwich Haven in 1996, which cost E19m, the cost of which was to be 
recovered through fees on vessels. To cover these dredging costs there was an increase in the 
HHA tariff with larger ships paying more in conservancy fees. To ensure that the dredging 
programme went ahead the Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company (FD&RC) - the owners 
of Felixstowe Docks - provided guarantees to HHA that ships would continue to call at the 
port and pay the necessary fees to cover the increased capital costs. According to the 
FD&RC, the ultimate financial risk is therefore borne by the private sector, with all port costs 
being recovered through user charges. 
3.1.4 Economies of Scale and Merger Activit . Horizontal mergers can take place in seaports 
for two distinct reasons. The first reason is economies of scale; these can be gained in 
investing in new and smaller roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) facilities, or with the installation of bulk 
handling equipment. 
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The second reason, especially for private-sector port operators, is the reduction of 
competition. Existing private sector operators would either own or have leases on the prime 
sites. For potential entrants, even if there was a reasonable alternative site, to develop the site 
would require massive investments in sunk costs. An example of this would be the 
establishment of Thameport, in the early 1990s, although it was set up on a brown-field site. 
However by taking over other firms, it would be possible in theory for the existing firms to 
raise their prices and therefore profits, without inducing new entry into the industry, because 
of the existence of the high sunk costs -a barrier to entry - in the industry. But as we shall 
see - 3.2.7- the customers in the port industry can switch ships to other ports if they need to, 
and this has reduced the ability of the port owner to raise prices. 
The other alternative for entry into the market is for a potential entrant to take over an 
existing firm. This as we shall see occurred when Hutchinson Whampoa took over the Port of 
Felixstowe - see 3.6.3. 
3.1.5 Measurement. Another question we might like to ask is how do we measure the 
structure of this industry? In examining the structure of the port industry, we need, according 
to Bird (1963: 21) to handle port statistics with care, if they are to give valid comparisons of 
the size of port functions. Some of the different criteria for the statistics and their 
disadvantages are given in Table 3.1. 
Criteria Main Disadvantage 
Berthing accommodation for ships and May not be fully used by vessels trading 
capacity for handling cargo regularly 
Depth of port approaches and the Ports which can accommodate the largest 
accommodation for ships ships are not necessarily the largest ports 
Weight of cargoes landed and shipped Raw material and fuel-handling over- 
'weighted' 
Value of cargo landed and shipped Fluctuates with rise and fall of prices 
Net registered tonnage of shipping Vessels may arrive with partly-loaded 
entering port cargoes or in ballast 
Table 3.1 Criteria for Assessing Comparative Sizes of Ports - adapted from 
Bird 1963: 21 
The analysis in Table 3.1 shows that to some extent two of the criteria tend to cancel each 
other out. These are: 
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1. value of cargo landed and shipped 
2. net registered tonnage of shipping entering port 
In the 1989 White Paper (Employment Department 1989: 34) the figures used for the major 
ports excluded crude oil and oil products. This resulted in some of the dock labour scheme 
and non-scheme ports not being included in the list of major ports, because their non-oil 
tonnage was low. However, they handled very large tonnage of oil products in relation to the 
small tonnage of non-oil goods. This methodology is supported by Goss (1998: 54) arguing 
that oil and other liquid cargoes should be excluded, because they are usually handled over 
the oil company's own installations, or by other specialists, and because the very large 
volumes involved would distort the figures if they were included. However, in this study we 
will use total tonnage through the ports including oil and domestic trade, both excluded by 
Goss, except for the trust ports where we will use his methodology - see 3.5.7.2. 
To gain an overview of what was happening within the industry between 1965 and 1998 we 
have had to use a time series data set, which unfortunately includes the 'substantial elements' 
not used by Goss. So the main data set used in this chapter is derived from the historic series 
issued by the Department of Transport in their Port\Maritime Statistics series publications. 
However, we will also use a more limited data set that was used in the White Paper 
(Employment Department 1989), which excluded oil, and oil related products. In the White 
Paper the figures used were for 1987 only, and in this study we will use the data set from 
1983 to 1998. This is part of a wider problem of trying to use data sets over a long period, the 
base on which they are calculated is often revised, making statistically valid calculation 
difficult if not impossible. 
3.2 Nationalisation of the Railway Ports 
3.2.1 The 1947 Transport Act. During the Second World War the UK ports were grouped for 
wartime purposes and administered by Regional Port Directors who were empowered to issue 
instructions to the port authorities, which continued to function as previously. But it was the 
nationalisation of the railway companies, which automatically brought about 30 per cent of 
the nation's ports under public ownership. Under the terms of the 1947 Act all properties 
owned by rail ports and docks were transferred to the British Transport Commission (BTC) - 
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see Liu 1995a: 166. The main groups brought under public ownership were in South Wales, 
on Humberside, in Scotland and at Southampton. Also included were the so called 'packet 
ports' such as Folkestone, Parkstone Quay, or Holyhead, where ferry services predominated 
but were regarded as virtual extensions of train services (Bonavia 1987: 106). The main ports, 
however, such as London, Merseyside, Manchester and the Clyde had never been owned by 
the railways, and were administered by public authorities. 
3.2.2 Economic Objectives. The economic objectives of the 1947 Act were to secure the 
provision of an efficient, adequate, economic and properly integrated system of public inland 
and port facilities. The majority of the ports were brought into public ownership as part of the 
BTC in 1948. One of the five executives of the BTC - The Docks and Inland Waterways 
Executive (I)ME) was given the responsibility for co-ordinating the publicly owned ports 
and waterways. The DIWE had also taken over all the canals and was responsible for 
surveying the harbours of the country and preparing group schemes of reorganisation (Kelf- 
Cohen 1969: 67). Integration, it appeared could only be achieved by common ownership, 
which meant state ownership (Thompson & Hunter 1973: 13 1). 
From 1948 until the early 1980s about a third of all the UK harbours including many of the 
major ports were managed by nationalised bodies. 
3.2.3 Structure of the Industr . The UK coast has been described as being littered with the 
legacies of our island history with some 300 'ports' in total and the majority type of 
ownership prior to the privatisation programme was public, albeit of different types. Prior to 
1980 there were about 70 port authorities of commercial significance in Britain, although the 
ten largest authorities accounted for 80 per cent of the industry's revenue. This view about 
the size of the ports was also pointed out by Bird (1963: 21) 'of the 112 British sea ports 
recognised by Her Majesty's Customs for statistical purposes, only about a dozen deserve the 
adjective 'major', dealing as they do with nine-tenths of the foreign trade by value. ' 
Although the dominant ports in the UK were mostly publicly owned, nearly all kinds of 
ownership could have been found -see appendix 3.2 for a list of Port Authorities by type of 
ownership in 1965. The reason the majority of the UK ports were public owned was because 
the legal regime of property rights is generally different between land (or territory) and water 
(or aquatory). On land it is generally quite easy to establish or acquire property rights - all 
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that is required is money! On water, however the situation is quite different and in the UK 
normally requires an Act of Parliament. The approval of the Crown Estates Commissioners is 
not sufficient, partly because they only control rights on the foreshore, ie between high and 
low water-marks, and partly because much of the property rights, even within this area, are 
actually vested elsewhere. Yet, without a secure right, who would construct port facilities? - 
see Goss 1984: 11. 
In 1965 the top 10 ports accounted for 72 percent of all the tonnage going through the UK 
ports - see Table 3.2. 
Port 
Type of 
ownership 
-000,000 
tonnes 
Market 
Share 
London Trust Port 64.6 20.2 
Liverpool Trust Port 31.7 9.9 
Milford Haven Trust Port 24.8 7.8 
Southampton BTDB9 24.4 7.6 
Medway Trust Port 22.3 7.0 
Manchester Private Company 15.8 5.0 
Clyde (including Trust Port 15.3 4.8 
Androssan) 
Tees and Hartlepool Trust Port 12.1 3.8 
Hull BTDB 9.4 3.0 
Bristol Local Authority 9.3 2.9 
1 TOTAL 229.7 1 72.01 
Table 3.2 Foreign and Domestic Traffic through Top 10 Largest UK Ports in 
1965. Source: Port Statistics 1996 Table 4.3 
Prior to the start of the privatisation programme, which began in 1982, there had already been 
changes in the structure of the industry. These changes, in the main, had been due to the 
advent of North Sea Oil. Only five of the original Top 10 stayed in the 1980 Top 10 Ports. 
However there had been a reduction in the market concentration from 72 per cent in 1965 to 
68.4 per cent in 1980. 
If we consolidate the figures from Tables 3.2 and 3.3 into market share by type of ownership 
- see Table 3.4 - we see that the predominant form of ownership of the top 10 ports in 1965 
was trust ports, which accounted for 53.5 percent of the total market share. However, while 
still the predominant form of ownership in 1980, the trust ports market had declined to 43.3 
per cent, a decline of nearly 19 per cent. The market share of the local authority ports had 
9 British Transport Docks Board 
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risen from 2.9 per cent to 10.7 per cent, an increase of 269 per cent. The BTDB market share 
had also increased, but only by 5.6 per cent from 10.6 per cent to 11.2 per cent. The only 
other sector to show a decrease was the private sector, which declined from 5.0 per cent to 
3.1 per cent, a decrease of 38 per cent. 
Port 
Ownership 
Type 
000,000 
Tonnes 
Market 
Share 
London Trust Port 54.2 13.2 
Tees and Hartlepool Trust Port 39.4 9.6 
Milford Haven Trust Port 39.3 9.5 
OForth Trust Port 28.8 7.0 
Sullom Voe Local Authority 28.5 6.9 
Southampton Nationalised 23.9 5.8 
Grimsby and Immingham Nationalised 22.1 5.4 
Medway Trust Port 17.2 4.2 
Orkney Local Authority 15.4 3.7 
Manchester Private and Others 12.7 3.1 
Total 1 281.5 1 68.4 
Table 3.3 Foreign and Domestic Traffic through Top 10 Largest 
UK Ports in 1980. Source: Port Statistics 1996 pp 87-89 
Market Share 
Typeof 7 
Ownership 1965 1980 
Trust Port 53.5 43.4 
BTDB 10.6 11.2 
Private Company 5.0 3.1 
Local Authority 2.9 10.7 
TOTAL 72.0 68.3 
Table 3.4 Percentage of Total Market Share by 
Ownership Type 1965-80 
3.2.4 Changing Trade Patterns. Part of the explanation for this change was that during the 
1970s the trading pattern swung from relatively long distance routes eg Australia and New 
Zealand, towards the then European Economic Community (EEC). This resulted in a shift in 
demand away from West Coast ports, such as Liverpool and Glasgow, to those on the East 
Coast. This change also affected the pattern of sea transport techniques from those which 
were suitable for long voyages to those which were short, ie roll-on, roll-off services. 
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JK Stuart 10 (1981: 13), who was then the deputy chairman and managing director of the 
British Transport Docks Board (BTDB), argued that the UK as an island offered little real 
scope for developing trade other than for UK exports and imports. He also argued that the 
concept that there was massive scope for trans-shipment to and from Continental 
Europe"was illusory. He cities the fact that the European market for shipping trades was up 
to twelve times the size of the UK market. The problem facing the UK ports was to stop the 
European ports from eating further into their markets. This meant stopping the European 
ports dominating the direct deep-sea markets and trans-shipping to and from the UK - see 
Stuart 1981: 13. 
3.2.5 The National Ports Council. Prior to 1964 there was no central control over the 
development and management of the UK port authorities. The port authority's powers were 
set out in local Acts and there was little central government involvement. The Conservative 
Government of the time established the National Ports Council (NPQ after the 1962 report of 
the Committee of Inquiry into the Major Ports of Great Britain - known as the Rochdale 
Report, after its Chairperson. The NPC had mainly advisory powers, but under the 1964 
Harbours Act it was given responsibility to secure the improvement and greater efficiency of 
the nation's harbours and this was accomplished primarily through controls on harbour 
development and capital loans and grants - see Thomas 1994: 137. During the life of the 
NPC the industry underwent considerable changes. 
In the 1970s in the port industry there had been increasing disillusionment with centralised 
planning techniques, and an increasing tendency to favour market-based solutions. According 
to Goss (1998: 65), the NPC appeared to be a prime target as a central, if small, bureaucracy 
which was increasingly disliked by those with whom it was supposed to work. The campaign 
to abolish the NPC was greatly strengthened with the coming to power of the Conservative 
government in 1979, and in 1981 it was abolished. 
3.2.6. A Complex Structure. From the previous sections it can be seen that the structure of 
the UK port industry was a complex and dynamic one. But, in many ways its structure was 
very similar to that of the bus and coach industry prior to deregulation and privatisation. The 
BTDB was the largest individual firm in the industry, and like the National Bus Company it 
10 Stuart was one of main architects of privatisation (see Financial Times 1989a: 12) 
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was spread over a wide geographical area. Their market share was also similar, prior to 
privatisation in 1982 the BTDB market share was 18.4 per cent, although it had peaked at 
23.7 per cent in 1970. In 1985/86 the NBC had a market share of 24.9 per cent. There was 
also a mixture of different types of ownership, municipal and private, and in both cases, the 
private sector was the smallest element of the market. 
However there were two significant differences between the industries. The first was that 
there were no formal quantitative restrictions on entry into the ports industry prior to 
privatisation, although getting the required parliamentary legislation passed would probably 
have been very difficult. The second was that overall, the traffic passing through the UK 
ports was increasing - see Fig 3.1 - while demand for bus journeys was declining. This 
increasing traffic through the ports continued on a steady upward trend through the whole 
period of this study. 
F- 
Year 
Fig: 3.1 Total Tonnage Through UK Ports 1965-1998 
Source: Port/Maritime Statistics 
3.2.7 Competition in the IndlLstry. According to Stuart (1981: 13) there was no real 
competition in the industry, partly because of the pattern of ownership. He argued that 
because 90 per cent of the UK ports were publicly owned what competition could there be? 
He also said that the ports were a service industry and could not in the main create trade, they 
were almost dependent on producer and manufacturing industries to supply the cargoes for 
" In future European will be an equivalent term for Continental Europe 
ill 
which the ports were competing. The consumers on the other hand were very large 
companies and could play one port authority off against another. To illustrate this Stuart 
compared the 1979 annual turnover of the BTDB and six of its customers with which it was 
trying to trade and whose business it [BTDB] was constantly seeking - see table 3.5. 
British Transport Docks Board 133.5 
Ocean Transport & Trading 534.2 
P&O 1,377.6 
British Steel Corporation 3,105.0 
Esso Petroleum 3,112.5 
National Coal Board 3,740.4 
British Petroleum 18,234.7 
Table 3.5. Annual Turnover in 1979 fin 
Source Stuart 1981: 13 
However, later in the same article he wrote 'In many of the other container areas, for example 
the Trans-Atlantic trades and even the Far-East trades, container operators have switched 
from port to port with lightning rapidity. It is quite false to suggest, therefore, that C) 
competition is not a major force in the new containerised systems, just as it always has been 
in the conventional trades' (Stuart 1981: 13). This statement would appear to confirm that the 
UK port industry, because of 'consumer power', has been competitive for a long time. 
Consumer or buyer power according to Johnson & Scholes (2002: 117) is likely to be high: 
" When there is a concentration of buyers, particularly if the volume of purchases of the 
buyers are high. 
" The supplying industry comprises a large number of small operators. 
" When there are alternative sources of supply, perhaps because the product required is 
undifferentiated between suppliers - this would be the casefor the port industry12 - or, as 
for many public sector operations, when the deregulation of markets spawns new 
competitors. However, this was not the case in the port industry, there was excess 
capacity, but the structure of the industry both in number and location of the ports, was 
virtually the same, ie highlyfragmented. 
" The component or material cost is a high percentage of their total cost, since buyers will 
be likely to 'shop around' to get the best price and therefore 'squeeze' the suppliers. 
12 Authors'own comment 
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The cost of switching a supplier is low or involves little risk - for example if there are no 
long-term contracts or supplier approval requirements 
There is the threat of backward1forward or both integration by the buyer (e. g. by 
acquiring a supplier) if satisfactory prices or quality cannot be obtained. 
The port industry was also affected by the dramatic redevelopment of the transport 
infrastructure in the UK. The change in the infrastructure increased the competitive pressure 
on the ports, as the customer could pick and choose which port to use for virtually any inland 
destination or origin of cargo. 
Baird (1995: 140) has argued that such competition between ports had been evident for many 
years and intensified further after the introduction of roll-on roll-off ferries and 
containerships revolutionised the industry. The fixed asset base of the industry - which 
involved high sunk costs - meant that ports must operate where they are and with the basic 
infrastructure which was handed down by their founders and predecessors. Also the shippers 
were unwilling to sign long-term agreements with a particular port: a port therefore could 
invest heavily in new facilities to attract a customer, only to have the customer switch to a 
rival port after a year of two, leaving the facilities redundant (Walker 1994: 138). 
'Thus, competition between ports is nothing new, competition has 
characterised the industry for some time and will doubtless continue to do so 
irrespective of whether or not ports are privately or publicly owned. ' Baird 
1995: 140. 
However, what is more important according to Liu (1995a: 169) is that modem ships are 
large in. size and expensive in terms of opportunity costs of waiting time at ports. Thus both 
port and ship operators' interests require traffic to be concentrated at bigger and fewer ports 
than they once were. The degree of spatial competition between ports is a function of 
geographical separation of ports, the configuration of the inland transport system, and the 
nature of the trade. Its long coastline endows the UK with a large number of seaports and 
they arewell connected with their hinterland by a well-developed inland transport system. 
Thus the local monopoly power enjoyed by UK ports is probably limited. However Baird has 
challenged this view - see 3.5.9.3. 
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3.3 Privatisation of the State Owned Ports 
3.3. I. A Brief History. The British Transports Docks Board was created by the Transport Act 
of 1962 to take on this responsibility for the nationalised ports when the BTC was dissolved. 
The exception was four small docks which linked to the inland waterway system, and which 
were put under the control of the British Waterways Board. These smaller ports situated on 
estuaries, canals or rivers handled only small quantities of cargo - see Appendix 3.2. 
On the 1" January 1963 the BTDB became the owners of the ports which had been 
administered by the docks division of the BTC, together with the port of Lowestoft, 
previously administered by British Rail. The BTDB had its own powers and jurisdiction and 
was responsible to the Minister of Transport. It owned over nineteen ports - including some 
of the largest and some of the smallest docks in the UK, and in 1965 accounted for about 21.5 
per cent of the total tonnage going through UK ports. 
The Transport Act 1962 laid down the primary duty of the BTDB to 'provide port facilities at 
the harbours it owned or managed. Its principal powers included the operation of harbours 
and the provision of port facilities at them, the consignment of goods to, from or through its 
harbours and the storage of goods. '(Associate British Ports Holding plc 1983: 5) 
3.3.2 .1 The Structure, Conduct and 
Performance of the BTDB. In the next part of this 
chapter we examine the BTDB using the various elements of the SCP paradigm. 
3.3.2.2 Structure. Between 1965 and 1982 the market share of the BTDB declined from 21.8 
per cent to a low of 17.4 per cent in 1980, although actual tonnage had increased from 68,573 
thousand tonnes to 71,672 thousand tonnes, an increase of 4.5 per cent. By 1982, just prior to 
privatisation its market share had risen slightly to 18.6 per cent - see Fig 3.2. 
However, it has to be remembered that when the BTDB was formed it owned 26 ports. When 
it was privatised in 1982 the number of ports it owned had declined to 19. Some of these 
ports had been transferred to other port authorities within the public sector. 
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Year 
Fig 3.2 BTDB/ABP Market Share 1965-1998 
Source: Report & Accounts 
3.3.2.3 Conduct of the BTDB. When the BTDB was established in 1963 the Board mapped 
out several complementary strategies and applied what it hoped would be effective and 
relevant policies. Sir Humphrey Browne (1980: 57) the chairman of BTDBs described the 
strategy as being based on two main objectives; 
1. to operate the ports profitably and to be totally self-financing 
2. to increase progressively BTDB's share of UK seabome traffic 
One of the first jobs was to reduce and eliminate as quickly as possible any excess and 
redundant capacity, while at the same time reducing manpower. Prior to this, the BTDB had 
been actively taking over stevedoring companies within its ports to bring this activity directly 
under its control. 
3.3.2.4 Performance of the BTDB. The BTDB was one of the most successful nationalised 
industries (Hamer 1981b: 9). In 1979 it made a profit, before tax and interest of J27m and 
received a return on capital of 15 per cent. Since 1972, the BTDB had generated all the 
investment it had needed internally and, despite the 1980 recession, it had achieved a return 
on capital of 10 per cent. The success of the BTDB was even recognised by the Conservative 
Party (Fowler 1977: 23) as 'one of the few nationalised industries to produce an adequate 
return on capital: while its accounts correctly show each port as a different profit centre. ' 
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When the BTDB was established it had a large capital debt, nothing had been written-off, and 
there were virtually no reserves and the physical state of the ports was also of concern. It was 
faced with the major task of replacing its entire superstructure due to the rapidly changing 
technology in cargo handling, while at the same time, putting its finances on a sound 
financial footing. 
According to Walker (1994: 138) the organisation was popularly denigrated as the 'sleepy 
dinosaur' of the industry, and compared unfavourably with the relatively successful private 
port of Felixstowe, which it had tried and failed to take over in 1976. In fact the Docks Board 
had been making a profit out of running its 19 ports since 1974, and had been paying back its 
debt to the taxpayer ahead of schedule - indeed, a model of successful state enterprise. 
In its last year of trading the BTDB made its third loss since being established in 1963. The 
main reason for this loss was the recession and BTDB suffered accordingly. However, this 
was not the only reason for the loss. Its performance was also adversely affected by a number 
of special factors - see British Transport Docks Board 1982: 5 for detail. 
One of the reasons was that at this time the Government was financially assisting both the 
Port of London, a trust port, and the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, a private sector 
company in which the Government was a majority shareholder. It may appear strange that a 
government which was opposed, in the main, to state intervention was prepared to support 
both public and private 'lame ducks' at the expense of a successful public company. 
However, the subsidising of competition was not the sole prerogative of the Government. 
'The perennial losses by the port of Bristol continued to mount reaching ElOm in 1980/81: 
even higher losses have been indicated for 1981/82, and over half the local rates have been 
devoted to subsidising the port. ' (British Transport Docks Board 1982: 5) In March 1984 the 
Bristol City Council raised a loan of E55m to clear the port debt, generated primarily by the 
building of the Royal Portbury Dock in the late 1970s. Unfortunately for Bristol, unlike 
London or Liverpool, the Conservative Government, did not see Bristol as a suitable case for 
treatment in giving the city a financial helping hand. 
According to Baxter (1981: 51) the financial problems and the need for control or local 
government support were not new to the UK ports. But the 1981 recession had accelerated 
the need for adjustment to be made in the industry. Overcapacity was rife and only one port 
had closed down in recent years and that was Preston. But this was not the only factor 
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affecting all the UK ports in the early 1980s. Stuart (1981: 15) described these as the three 
'Rs'. These were: 
1. The unit load revolution 
2. Rigidity of the labour supply - particularly enshrined in the Dock Labour Scheme 
3. Lack of growth in the market, indeed better described as a deepening recession 
3.3.2 5 Privatisation of the BTDB. According to Lui (1995a: 163) the port industry was one 
of the earliest sectors involved in the UK Government's privatisation programme. The 
Transport Act 1981 empowered the Government to transfer the ownership of the BTDB from 
the public sector. On the 31" December 1982 the BTDB was reconstituted as Associated 
British Ports (ABP) and the Company was granted powers corresponding to that of a holding 
company over a wholly owned subsidiary. ABP was a body corporate and a public authority 
deriving its constitution from the 1981 Transport Act. As a statutory corporation, it was not 
subject to the provisions of the Companies Act. 
As we stated earlier, the market conditions prior to privatisation of the BTBD differed from 
the privatisation of the National Bus Company. One of the major differences was the product 
market in which it was operating. Unlike the market for bus travel, which was declining, 
tonnage going through the UK ports traffic was increasing - see Fig 3.3. Between 1965 and 
1982 tonnage had increased by 31 per cent from 319,212 thousand tonnes to 418,373 
thousand tonnes. Figure 3.3 shows both the total UK tonnage and ABP tonnage from 1965 to 
1998. UK tonnage increased by 71.8 per cent during this period from 319 million tonnes to 
548.4 million tonnes. This overall growth was considerably greater than that achieved by 
ABP, even after privatisation. 
Another difference was that in the legislation, which authorised the sale of the BTDB, there 
was to be 'no break-up of the business and no individual sale of the board's 19 ports' (Baily 
1980a: 4). This was different from the break-up of the National Bus Company - see 2.5.1, 
and was also unlike most other cases of privatisation where the Government retained 
important ownership rights. There were no restrictions on the amount of individual 
shareholdings, the reservation of a golden share and the prohibition of foreign ownership was 
not applied to the sale of ABP. According to Liu (1995a: 167) the withdrawal of ownership 
rights in ABP reflects the attitude of the Government to treat ports as normal commercial 
undertakings. 
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Fig 3.3 Total UK and ABP Tonnage 1965-1998 
Source: Port/Maritime Statistics & ABP Reports & Accounts 
Another important element in the public offer of a privatised industry is the structure of the 
privatised company. In the main British privatisations have involved the disposal of an entire 
nationalised industry, and would not have involved any substantial change in the role of the 
board or other structural relationships existing within the company prior to privatisation. An 
exception to this was when the statutory position of the company was perceived to be 
unattractive to private investors. In such a case, a holding company or some other such device 
was used to distance the asset holder from the operating company - this was the case for ABP 
(see Letwin 1988: 100). 
ABP was floated on the stock market in 1983, and was a runaway success with investors, 
mainly, some observers commented, because the Government fixed the offer price at a low 
level and effectively wrote off a debt of some ESO million owed by the Docks Board to the 
Government (Walker 1994: 138). 
The sale at 'a knock down price' may have been seen by some as just part of the wider 
approach by the Conservative Government to encourage the sale of state assets, particularly 
when the privatisation concerned is a natural monopoly, and it involved only the change of 
ownership from the public to private sector. 
118 
However, in the case of ABP, and the later port privatisations, there could be cause for 
concern. In this particular privatisation we are interested to see the outcome of two effects. 
The first is a universal one, which is associated with the argument for the superiority of 
private ownership over public ownership, which may be advanced from the perspective of 
principal-agent theory. Liu (1995b: 263) points out the 'principal-agent' effect, which is the 
theory that a switch to private ownership will improve the efficiency and hence the 
profitability of the firm. Even with no change in the competitive environment, it will still 
improve the cost efficiency of the firm because the change in ownership will sharpen 
managerial incentives and replace defective bureaucratic monitoring hierarchies with the 
capital market for corporate control. However, Liu points out that the strength of this 
argument has been questioned by a number of economists, who suggest that the principal- 
agent problems may also arise in the private sector as a result of capital market imperfections. 
The second is about full cost recovery (Baird 1999: 118) which largely rests on the 
assumption that ports in the UK do actually fully recover their total costs of infrastructure and 
equipment from user charges. The assumption for this argument is that the market is already 
competitive, therefore price should approximately equal marginal cost. However the 
privatised ports in the UK - as we shall see - have been transferred from the public to the 
private sector at significant discounts. This has resulted in reduced debt and hence reduced 
interest payments incurred by the successor companies than would have otherwise been the 
case, and this could be regarded as a form of State Aid. 
'This implies that private ports in the UK do not fully recover their costs from 
user charges as is being claimed. ' Baird 1999: 119. 
This would especially apply to the privatised ports and due to the long life of assets in this 
industry, this could give them a considerable advantage in the long term. However this aid is 
not restricted to the public sector, the private sector had also received subsidies or been given 
state aid. 'Thamesport cost E150 to build in 1990 and was sold to bankers for just one third of 
its capital cost (00 million) in 1995. The port was expanded further with an injection of 
capital from the second owner, and then after to Hutchison Ports, the third owner, in 1998 for 
a price of El 12 million, approximately equivalent to half its real capital cost at the time. ' 
(Baird 1999: 119). 
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According to Moore (1984: 11) the primary objective of the Government's privatisation 
programme was to reduce the power of the monopolist and encourage competition. Yet we 
have demonstrated that the UK port industry was not a monopoly, and that there was also a 
competitive product market in operation. So the primary objectives of privatisation could not 
be achieved, it is difficult therefore to understand why ABP, and the other ports were 
privatised. Also it is hard to see how by effectively subsidising some competition that the 
Conservative Government lived up to its primary objective of encouraging competition. Or 
was it more likely that the privatisation(s) of the ports was carried out as a revenue-raising 
exercise or more simply for political motive? 
3.3.3.1 ABP Structure. When ABP was privatised in 1983 it owned and operated 19 ports and 
had a market share of 19.6 per cent - see Fig 3.2. By 1991 its market share had reached 22.9 
per cent and since then it has remained fairly stable, albeit with a slight upward trend. 
In 1992 ABP announced that it owned a 49 per cent stake in Tilbury Container Services 
(TCS). TCS is the largest refrigerated container terminal in the northern hemisphere, with a 
capacity for over 1,000 refrigerated containers. It is also London's only deep-water riverside 
container berth. By 1998 ABP shareholding in TCS was reduced to 33 per cent, this was due 
to the Port of London Tilbury Limited taking a one-third share in the company. Each of the 
three groups now own one-third of the company. 
The TCS tonnage is not included in ABP total tonnage, they are included in the overall 
figures for the Port of London in Port/Maritime Statistics. 13 This means that ABP market 
share is actually higher that we have used in Figure 3.1. 
3.3.3.2 ABP Conduct. In terms of conduct, the major change since privatisation has been the 
move away from providing both dock and stevedoring services to being a'landlord' who only 
provides port facilities, stevedoring services are provided by other firms within the various 
ports. The effect of this on employment within AEP has been dramatic, as Table 3.6 shows, 
although the effects of the abolition of the NDSL on employment have to be remembered. 
13 The DoTER collects these figures on a Port Group basis and they do not have the disagregated figures for 
Tilbury Container Services. 
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Year Employees 
1976 11,656 
1982 9,242 
1997 2,096 
Table 3.6 Employees in ABP Ports Group 
3.3.3.3 ABP Perfon-nance. The post-privatisation performance of ABP could be judged in a 
number of ways. An example of which is how it performed in relation to its tonnage 
compared with the UK as a whole. As we can see from Figure 3.3 the tonnage going through 
ABP has not mirrored the overall growth of tonnage through the UK ports. Furthermore, it 
should be remembered that ABP acquired a number of ports after privatisation and if we 
deducted those ports' tonnage from the ABP total, the performance results would be even 
lower. 
Another way of assessing ABP performance is to look at its real revenue. According to Liu 
(1995b: 268) since port markets in the UK are fairly competitive, its is reasonable to assume 
that port charges are more or less in line with costs, and therefore reflects the true level of 
output. 
The poor performance of ABP can be confirmed by examination of Figure 3.4, which shows 
the logs of the real GDP and ABPs real revenue from 1963 to 1998 - see Appendix 5 for data. 
From Figure 3.4 we can see that the period of greatest growth occurred when it was in public 
ownership, the largest growth'occurring between 1963 and 1978. Real revenue peaked in 
1976 at E415m. Since it was privatised in 1983 the real revenue has declined from E306m to 
E254m, a decrease of 17 per cent. This would appear to go against one of the main tenets of 
privatisation, that firms would be bettpr managed under private sector management. However 
. 'Part of the erratic nature of the data can be explained by the changes in the UK economy, 
the fortunes of the [port] sector mirror changes in gross domestic product' (Voyle 1992: 2). 
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In 1992 ABP came under pressure from financial analysis in the City of London because of 
its under-performance, this under-performance was also seen as holding down the shares of 
better performers in the industry, such as Mersey Docks and Clydeport. This pressure 
resulted in a management shake-up (Voyle 1994: 2). It could be reasonable to ask why did it 
take so long for the market to put pressure on ABP performance? It is not in the interests of 
individuals to invest large resources in monitoring management, especially if they possess to 
few votes to effect the decision. This is known as the collective action problem. Therefore 
management may not be effectively monitored and disciplined by the capital markets, 
especially in a situation where share ownership is highly diffused. 
In June 1998 ABP like other privatised transport companies acquired a foreign subsidiary. 
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Figure 3.4 ABP real revenue and Real GDP 1963-1998 at 2000-2001 prices 
The company purchased was American Port Services Inc (APS). APS has two core 
businesses - port services and airport/aviation services - principally operating within the 
USA. The overseas expansion is likely to have been driven by the possibility of a reference to 
the MMC [now the Competition Commission] if ABP took over a major rival in the UK. 
3.3.3.4 ABP: a SuMmary. The privatisation of ABP transferred a significant proportion of the 
UK port industry and a successful state asset to the private sector. The political rationale for 
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this transfer is not clear, as there was no reference to transferring the ports to the private 
sector in the 1979 Conservative manifesto. The only reference to any form of privatisation 
was 'We aim to sell shares in the National Freight Corporation to the general public in order 
to achieve substantial private investment in it (Times Newspapers 1979: 287). According to 
Desai (1994: 35), Samuel Brittan records that the option of privatisation was considered and 
rejected by the Conservative Party for the 1979 and 1983 manifestos as being technically too 
difficult or politically unacceptable. Brittan (1986: 33) pointed out that most of the early 
privatisations [including ABP] did not include public sector monopolies. They were sales of 
concernsalready operating in highly competitive markets, although it might be argued that 
ABP was a semi-monopoly - to use Brittan's terminology. However, in its 1983 manifesto it 
stated 'A company which has to satisfy its customers and compete to survive is more likely to 
be efficient, alert to innovation, and genuinely accountable to the public. That is why we have 
transferred to private ownership, in whole or in part, Cable and Wireless, Associated British 
Ports' (Times Newspapers 1983: 292). 
The privatisation of ABP, was not simply the transfer of ownership from the public to the 
private sector. It was also the transfer of publicly owned local monopolies, which were 
responsible to Government and were supposed to serve the 'public interest, to private 
commercially driven local monopolies, with no requirement of acting in the 'public interest'. 
This concept will be discussed in more detail when we examine the sale of the trust ports. 
However, one of the reasons why publicly owned companies may not be as profitable as 
private firms, is that they [the public company] may have contradictory aims of trying to meet 
social and commercial obligations simultaneously. One of the unanswered questions is would 
a privately owned firm be more efficient than a publicly owned company if they had to meet 
the same criteria? 
Also, why should we expect differences in the performance of private and public industries? 
When an industry is privatised, if the managers of the newly privatised firm are the same 
management of the public company, any change does not necessarily come from the 
character or abilities of the management, but, from the constraints and opportunities with 
which that management is faced. 
'Under privatisation, management is likely to become more efficient and search for more 
profitable opportunities.... It also leads to an increase in capital market incentives for 
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managers to perform well. These incentives can be examined with reference to the principal- 
agent theory, and from this theoretical framework, the implications of the separation of 
ownership from control for the efficiency and performance of privatised industries' 
(Lipczynski and Wilson 2001: 386). However, there would appear to be no significant 
evidence of the 'principal-agent' effect when ABP was transferred to the private sector. As 
we have shown its post-privatisation performance compared to the rest of the industry has 
been unspectacular. Indeed according to Liu (1995a: 167) much of the financial growth of 
ABP has been attributed to property development, rather than its port interests. This has been 
excluded from this analysis and therefore may explain the results obtained. 
According to Kay and Thompson (1986: 18) 'the paradox of privatisation is that (sic) the 
view that it contributes to economic efficiency is derived from the belief that private sector 
managers are subject to incentives and disciplines from, and more demanding than those 
which apply to their public sector counterparts. They go onto to argue that if this were so, 
then it would be expected that the prospect of privatisation would be distinctly unwelcome by 
the management concerned. But without the consent, or acquiescence, of the same managers 
privatisation of any sort is a difficult and protracted business. In the case of ABP its chief 
executive actively encouraged privatisation. The clear theme to emerge from the political 
history of this privatisation is that by far the most effective and influential of the various 
interest groups was the senior management. Their positive interest in privatisation was being 
rid of what was seen as the burdensome form of Treasury control; their concurrent interests 
were to ensure that this was achieved without changes to the existing organisational structure 
and without a more competitive environment. However, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that they saw the opportunity to make large personal financial gains for themselves, and this 
may have been the real driving force behind their call for ABP to be privatised. 
It also has to be remembered that unlike the bus industry, where quantity regulation was 
abolished, there was no change to the competitive environment within the port industry as a 
direct result of the privatisation of ABP. It was the transfer of a company from the public to 
the private sector, in a market that was already competitive. 
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3.4 The Privatisation of Sealink. 
3.4.0 Introduction. In this section we critically examine the second privatisation of ports 
within the UK, which involved the Sealink ports. 
3.4.1 Sealink: a Historic Review. The second port privatisation involved the ports and 
shipping services owned and managed by the British Rail Board subsidiary company Sealink 
Harbours Ltd. A number of ports were operated by state-owned companies other than BTDB, 
the principal one was Sealink (a wholly owned subsidiary of British Rail) which operated 
seven ports - see Appendix 3.2. These ports were used primarily for ferry services of the 
railways and for passengers travelling to Europe and Ireland. 
It may seem surprising that a railway company - albeit a nationalised one - would own and 
operate ports and a shipping fleet. However from the middle of the 19th century the privately 
owned railway companies in the United Kingdom diversified into ports and shipping in order 
to provide links between their railways systems and those in Europe including Ireland. Boat 
trains and ships were scheduled to provide good connections and convenient port 
interchanges for rail passengers. 
With the nationalisation of the railways in 1948 the shipping services and ports of the 
nationalised railway companies became part of the individual railway regions of British Rail 
(BR). In 1969 the shipping services and ports were brought together under the management 
of the Shipping and International Services Division (SISD) of the British Railways Board 
(BRB). 
3.4.2 Sealink and Privatisation. According to Tomkins (1992c: 12) the privatisation of BR 
had started even before the first Thatcher administration in 1979. BR had started selling off 
the station hotels it had inherited from the former private railway companies. However, as a 
first stage in the Conservative denationalisation programme in 1979, the SISD was 
reconstituted as a wholly owned subsidiary company under the name of Sealink UK, to which 
the harbour undertakings were transferred - see Thomas 1994: 142. 
3.4.3 European Ferries. The proposed sale of Sealink attracted the interest of European 
Ferries Limited (EFL), the publicly quoted company, which owned Townsend Thoresen and 
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the Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company. EFL expressed its desire to acquire Sealink in 
December 1980. Under the powers given to the BRB in the 1981 Transport Act it was able to 
dispose of the whole, or any part of the undertakings of any of its subsidiaries - MMC 198 1: 
88. However from the outset the BRB was opposed to EFL acquiring Sealink. 
In March 1981 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) sent to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC) a reference to look at the merger situation between EF and 
Sealink, because they were the only two UK ferry operators who also owned ports. EFL at 
that time owned two harbours, Lame Harbour Ltd and the Felixstowe Dock and Railway 
Company. Felixstowe by 1981 had become a major port for deep-sea container traffic and 
was also used by other companies for ro/ro freight services to the continent. Some 70 per cent 
of the capacity on the Ipswich-Europort service was supplied for Ferrymaster's -a subsidiary 
of P&O's European Services Division - exclusive use, the balance of the available capacity 
being marketed to other customers by North Sea Ferries, the ferry operator concerned. All the 
operators at Felixstowe in 1981 had been using the port before EFL acquired it. EFL had also 
acquired a 50 per cent interest in the former naval dockyard in Harwich in 1973 - see 
MMC1981: 33. 
There were no other competing tourist ferry services operating in their ports, although the 
right of entry to a port and to use its was established in the Harbours, Docks and Piers 
Clauses Act of 1847 - see MMC 1981: 55. The MMC noted that neither company had 
granted access to their ports to ferry operators who would provide services, which directly 
compete with their services. The MMC came to the conclusion that the merged company 
would own ten ports, and have effective control or priority of facilities in a further six ports - 
MMC 1981: 91. The MMC concluded that the merger may have been expected to operate 
against the public interest and accordingly recommended that the merger should not be 
allowed. The Government accepted the report of the MMC. 
3.4.4. The Auction. In March 1984 the Government did a 'U-turn' and decided to sell Sealink 
by auction. The reasons for this 'U-turn' are not clear although it is unlikely that it was at the 
instigation of the Minister of Transport, Nicholas Ridley. who had been appointed to that 
position in October 1983. 
While preparing for its privatisation, in 1982, Sealink announced that it had plans to reduce 
its workforce by over 2,000 in the next five years. This was part of an economy programme 
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aimed at reducing losses, which amounted to L9.6m in 1981. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
details of the job reductions became known 24 hours after a final agreement had been reached 
with the National Union of Seamen (NUS) which ended a strike at all Sealink's ports (Felton 
1982: 2). 
At the end of May there was a strike at Sealink and, apparently, among insiders there was a 
growing conviction that Nicholas Ridley, incensed by the strike, was prepared to reverse his 
decision to sell Sealink as a whole and to dispose of it piecemeal if necessary - Eglin 1984: 
57. However, the unanswered question is why, if Ridley was the arch neo-classicist, did he 
not insist on breaking up Sealink, into the small possible units to ensure fair competition, as 
he would argue later in the year, in the 1984 Buses White Paper, for the break-up of the 
National Bus Company? As we pointed out earlier, Ridley had been appointed Secretary of 
State in October 1983 and had plenty of time to reverse the decision of his predecessor Tom 
King if he wanted to. 
If part of the policy of privatisation was to increase competition, why undertake a trade 
auction and not a floatation, which was what had happened to ABP? The only perceived 
difference brought about by the auction would be the possibility of a change in senior 
management, unless it was taken over MBO consortium, at the time the MBO team were 
perceived to be the favourites to take control of Sealink. This could imply that he had little or 
no belief in the 'principal-agent' effect. 
There was also a strong case at the time for separating the ports from the ferries at the very 
least. It was perhaps unfortunate that the MMC in 1981 decided that the case put forward by 
P&O Ferries that Sealinks ports should be transferred to other ownership was outside of their 
terms of reference - MMC 1981: 89. 
One potential biddder, P&O was told by the DTI that any bid it made would be referred to the 
MMC. This effectively ruled out P&O bidding for Sealink because BR had set the deadline 
for the sale of Sealink for the end of May. The reason they were effectively ruled out was 
because an examination by the MMC would normal be expected t6 take six months and BR 
was already under pressure from the Government to complete the sale as soon as possible - 
see Warner 1984: 15. This would appear to be a rather strange decision, in terms of 
competition policy, that a company could be excluded from bidding on the grounds it would 
127 
not be practical to wait for an inquiry to decide whether such a merger could operate against 
the UK public interest. Even though the wait may well have been worthwhile financially for 
the UK taxpayer - see Hannah 1984: 19. 
3.4.5. The Sale. In July the Sealink subsidiary was sold by tender to British Ferries Ltd, 
which itself was a subsidiary of Sea Containers Ltd, an American owned, Bermuda based 
company. According to Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 166) only three companies submitted 
proposals to buy Sealink, but there was only one firm bid which was accepted. The E66 
million realised from the sale fell far short of the E108 million book value of the company. 
Was this another illustration of more state aid - see 3.3.2.4. Yet according to Nicholas 
Ridley, announcing the sale of Sealink to Sea Containers to the House of Commons said "The 
price is good and the sale makes good industrial logic" Times 18 July 1984: 4. However, 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 166) have questioned whether the method and the timing of the 
sale were appropriate. 
The Sea Containers bid outstripped the much lower sum put forward by the National 
Freight/Sealink management consortium, which until then had been considered by many to 
be the favourite to take control of the company. The view of the BRB was that it had obtained 
a fair price for Sealink, considering two of the most obvious potential purchasers were ruled 
out on competition grounds - Davis 1984e: 15. 
3.4.6 The Stena Bid. There had been a dramatic change in the profile of the Sea Containers 
group, since it acquired Sealink from the UK Government in 1984. Sea Containers posted net 
profits of $70m. that year, of which Sealink contributed only $15m. But revenue jumped 
from $143 in to $369m, indicating that there was plenty of potential for future profits if 
Sealink's costs could be reduced. The Sea Container group ran into financial trouble in 1986 
when there was a decline in container and roll-on roll-off traffic. At Harwich it declined from 
3.6m tonnes to 2.6m. tonnes between 1985 and 1986. This was one of the reasons behind the 
Sea Containers' decision to put the port up for sale - along with Heysham and Newhaven. In 
the event, the talks between Sea Containers and Associated British Ports broke down over the 
price, and all three ports were taken off the market. It would appear that ABP was not 
concerned about the possibility of a MMC investigation at this time. If ABP had purchased 
these ports it would have had a marginal effect on its market share. The three ports in 1985 
accounted for 1.3 per cent of the total UK tonnage. 
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Stena Line acquired Sealink for 050m in April 1990 after a year long and bitter takeover 
battle. In the end Stena paid $570m in cash (then equivalent to E350m) for a substantial part 
of Sealink, with Sea Containers retaining the profitable Hoverspeed and Isle of Wight ferry 
operations, as well as the three ports of Heysham, Newhaven and Folkestone. 
During the take-over battle, as part of its defensive strategy, Sea Containers was planning to 
sell Sealink's Isle of Wight ferry service for E107.5m to the Radiant Shipping Company - see 
Hill 1989: 30. If they had sold the ferry service to Radiant, Sea Containers would have 
received E41.5 more for the service than the E66 they paid for the whole of Sealink 5 years 
earlier. 
The price obtained by them for the sale of these assets may go in some way to support the 
argument of Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 166), who had questioned whether the method and 
the timing of the sale were appropriate. That is, that the asset was sold well below its true 
market value, and was the chosen method, a trade auction, the best way to maximise the sale 
price for the taxpayer? 
The sale to Stenna of some of its Sealink assets could be argued was 'good' business, as Sea 
Containers negotiated a very good deal. However, the sale price on the Isle of Wight ferry 
indicates that Sealink's assets were originally sold below their true worth. 
3.4.7 Sealink Structure. The seven Sealink ports have only had a small share of the tonnage 
going through the UK ports. In this section we will group all the ports under the heading of 
the Sealink ports, irrespective of who owned them after their privatisation. In the earlier data 
sets there is inconsistency in the data due to the unavailability of information for all the ports. 
There is also a problem with the data set for Harwich, this data set includes information on 
Parkeston Quay (Sealink) and Navyard Wharf, ideally we would like information on 
Parkeston Quay only. Bearing these limitations in mind, when they were privatised in 1984 
the Sealink ports accounted for 2.13 per cent of all UK tonnage - see Figure 3.5. 
The ports total market share rose from 1.87 per cent in 1984 to 2.57 per cent in 1998 and 
increase of some 37 per cent. Along with the other UK ports the Sealinks port had an increase 
in tonnage going through them. Tonnage increased from 9.5m Tonnes in 1984 to 14.1m 
Tonnes in 1998, an increase of 48 per cent - see Figure 3.6. 
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3.4.8 Harwich Takeover. In August 1997 HSBC Holding, a unit of HSBC Investment 
Banking, bought Harwich International port - the former Sealink port - for E72m from Stena 
Line, the shipping group (Gresser 1997: 22). Mr Nigel Hammond, a HSBC director, said the 
business would be 'eminently floatable' in the medium term, but added that HSBC hoped to 
use Harwich for acquisitions before then. HSBC envisaged that Harwich, would double in 
size and would be able to make acquisitions through increased earnings. Stena booked a 
El 1.5m capital gain from the disposal of Harwich. 
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Fig 3.5 Sealink Ports Market Share 1965-1998 
Source: Port/Martime Statistics 
Hutchison Whampoa, the diversified Hong Kong group, added Harwich to its UK port 
holdings alongside Thamesport and Felixstowe. Taking over Harwich is believed to have cost 
Hutchison Ports EI 12m. Derek Harrington, managing director of Hutchison Ports (UK), said 
the company planned to develop Harwich as an entry point to the European mainland and as a 
stop-off for cruise liners. The purchase complemented Hutchison's two other ports, which are 
also on the East Coast and which are primarily container ports. 
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3.5. The Privatisation of the Trust and Local Authority Ports. 
3.5.0. Introduction. This section will scrutinise the privatisation of the local authority and 
trust ports. It will start with a review of the trust and local authority ports, and then go on to 
evaluate the results of the privatisation process. 
3.5.1 The Trust Ports. In the UK prior to privatisation there were 16 major Trust Ports; there 
were also 111 ports administered and owned by autonomous statutory authorities. These ports 
were collectively referred to as the trust ports, and they were designated as Boards, Trust, 
Authorities or Commissions. In 1965,38 of these trust ports made statistical returns to the 
National Ports Council. These trust ports were established by individual acts of Parliament or 
statutory orders, however they were not directly responsible to Parliament. The trust ports 
were non-profit making organisations and were not permitted to engage in non-port related 
activities. According to Liu (1995a: 165) the development of the trust ports took place in the 
l9th century and they were responsible for ensuring that harbour facilities in a given area 
were properly maintained for the benefit of the shipping and fishing communities. However, 
according to Thomas (1994: 136) several of the trust ports were established in the late 19 th 
and early 20th centuries to take over, ironically, from private dock companies which had 
proved unable to develop or maintain adequate port facilities. There was a board of trustees 
for each port, which was responsible for the running of the port. The trustees were drawn C) 
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from representatives of port users, trade unions and other local interests. The Port of London 
Authority - the largest of the trust ports - accounted for 12 per cent of the total trade prior to 
privatisation. The other significant trust port was the Dover Harbour Board. 
3.5.2 Municipal Ports. The local authorities owned this type of port where they were located. 
According to Liu (1995a: 167) this was the earliest type of ownership for ports in the UK, 
being the approach to port administration by the British monarchy as early as the 10 th 
century. It was not a widely developed system, and the most significant examples were 
Bristol, Boston and Ramsgate. Twenty of the municipal ports submitted returns to the 
National Ports Council in 1965 - see Appendix 3.2. These ports are administered under 
relevant local harbour legislation and are ultimately responsible, through local councillors, to 
Council Taxpayers. 
3.5.3 The Privatisation of the Municipal and Trust Ports. The move to privatise the local 
authority and trust ports started in March 1988, when Paul Channon, the then Transport 
Secretary, said that it was high time the public sector of the industry took a close look at the 
benefits of privatisation (Brown 1988-b: 11). The remarks about privatisation were made 
after approaches from the British Ports Federation (BPF), the trade association for the port 
authorities. The BPF had argued that some of the public sector ports were prevented by 
statutory restrictions, from competing effectively with the privately owned sector of the 
industry. However, it is possible that the real reason some of the trust port managers wanted 
to transfer to the private sector, was the possibility of making 'windfall" profit gains, which 
had been experienced by other privatised industry managers. 
It was believed [wrongly so] that the trust ports could not easily diversify, this was partly due 
to their trust status. 'In reality, some trust ports, prior to privatisation, had already established 
subsidiary companies in property development' (Baird 1995: 137). In effect diversification 
was taking place prior to privatisation. 14 However, the Government specifically ruled out the 
option of relaxing the existing rules preventing the trust ports from borrowing more money 
and diversifying into non-port operations, without a change of ownership. However, it was 
not expected at the time that there would be early legislation, because of the complexity of 
the issues (Brown 1988c: 18). 
132 
However, privatisation was thought to be especially relevant for the larger trust ports, such as 
Dover, Hull and London. The top 5 ports in 1991 handled 43.4 per cent of the total tonnage 
going through the UK ports. Three of the five ports were trust ports, and one was owned by a 
local authority. Only one port was privately owned, that was Grimsby and Immingham which 
was owned by the privatised ABP. The top 10 ports handled 66.7 per cent, while the top 20 
handled 82.9 per cent of all UK tonnage. It was however recognised that different conditions 
applied to the smaller trust ports, and that privatisation was not seen as an automatic option, 
although it was not ruled out if they wanted it. 
3.5.4. The First Sale. In November 1989, the small port of Boston, in Lincolnshire, became 
the first publicly owned port to be sold to the private sector, since the Government urged the 
public sector to investigate the benefits of privatisation (Brown 1989: 4). The port was 
originally put up for sale in July 1988 (Brown 1988b: 11). Boston Council decide to sell it to 
a local joint venture of for E4.1m. It was not surprising that the first privatisation was of a 
local authority owned port. The sale of a local authority port would have been relatively 
straightforward compared to the sale of a trust port. The sale of a trust port would have 
required enabling legislation. 
However, this was not the first attempt by a council to sell its port, Bristol Council had tried 
to sell its port to ABP without success (Brown 1988a: 8). Finally in August 1991 the Bristol 
City Council agreed a E36m deal to hand over the management of the Avonmouth and Royal 
Portbury Docks for an initial payment of E22.5m for a 150-year lease on the port (Financial 
Times 23 Aug 199 1 c: 7). 
3.5.5 The Trust Ports Bill. In July 1990, a seemingly innocent Commons question asked by 
Roger Moate, MP for Faversham, resulted in the Prime Minister outlining the policy for the 
trust Ports. 
'The abolition of the dock labour scheme was a great success for the ports and 
their hinterlands. I understand that for other ports in trust to be privatised it 
would have to be done by the private bill procedure, which is very 
cumbersome. We are looking into the possibility of an enabling bill so that 
14 Under the Transport and Works Act 1993 restrictions on the right of trust ports to diversify their activities was 
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they could be privatised more easily. ' (Kelly 1990: 19) 
In the 1990 Queen's Speech, it was announced that there would be a Trust Ports Bill 
introduced during that session of Parliament (Tompkins 1990: 14). The purpose of the Bill 
was to establish a simple framework and mechanism through which the trust ports could 
voluntarily privatise themselves without recourse to complex private legislation, obviating 
the need for separate Acts each time a trust port wanted to privatise. 
However, the bill contained controversial reserve powers enabling the transport secretary to 
enforce the privatisation of the 14 trust ports each with annual turnover of more than f5m. In 
the end the Port Act gave the Government powers to force the privatisation of these trust 
ports if they did not volunteer for privatisation in the following two years (Tomkins 1991c). 
If the port failed to do so, the Government would start consultations with the port's 
management to see whether it had valid reasons for retaining its trust status. If the port 
succeeded in persuading the government to leave it in the public sector, it would be given a 
further five years before the position was reviewed again. 
Mr Patrick McLoughlin, the then shipping minister, said that most of the larger ports 
[management] favoured privatisation and compulsion was unlikely to be used often. This 
would appear to confirm that this was important if a trust port was privatised, although it 
would not guarantee that they would actually take over control of the port. If the management 
were in favour of privatisation it was likely to happen. 'However, ' he said, 'the presumption is 
that we would want these ports to go into the private sector, and unless there were very good 
arguments against doing so, we would be ready to use our reserve powers if needed. ' 
(Tompkins 1991a: 8) For a number of reasons having these reserve powers would appear to 
have been excessive. One reason was because the port privatisation was not going to be a big 
money raiser for the Government. According to Kirby (1992: 12) it was unlikely to raise 
more than E500m. Compared to the then recently floated tranche of British Telecom shares 
which was worth f6bn to the Government. Also, all these ports were already being 
encouraged to seek privatisation, the Act could then be seen as a "big stick". 
removed - see Uu 1995a: 18 1. 
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At the time it was assumed that the ports would be taken over by a MBO or MEBO, as these 
were believed to be the favoured exit route to the private sector. However, the Act required 
the port authorities to obtain the best open market price through fair and open competition. 
Interestingly, the BPF said it would oppose that part of the bill relating to compulsion. It 
said: 'A few ports are keen to privatise as soon as possible and this bill will enable them to do 
so. But the government shouldn't try to push privatisation on ports that don't need it ' 
(Tomkins 1991a: 8). This would appear to be in line with the idea that the drive for 
privatisation was coming from individual port management. The BPF also argued that the 
ports industry was not like the electricity or water industries: each port is different and has a 
close relationship with the community in which it exists, often counting for a large part of 
local infrastructure and providing a high percentage of employment. 
But it could be that some of the trust port managers were concerned that enforced 
privatisation would throw them into the clutches of bidders who would be more interested in 
closing the ports to either eliminate competition or to exploit the redevelopment potential of 
their land assets, rather than continuing to run the individual port as an independent and 
successful public enterprises. A leading article in the Financial Times (1991b) was unclear 
why any trust ports should deserve such a fate. According to the FT there was no groundswell 
of opinion craving their privatisation, nor was the conversion of the ports into housing or 
commercial estates likely to be seen in the same light as the abolition of the Dock Labour 
Scheme. The FT argued the Government should leave the rest of the trust ports to decide if 
they should privatise themselves. 
3.5.6. The First Sales of the Trust Ports 15 . The 1991 Port Act (the Act) enabled all the major 
trust ports to be converted into companies. In 1992, before the compulsory powers available 
under the Act took effect, five port authorities used the Act voluntarily, with the consent of 
the Secretary of State, to sell their trust ports. 'An important feature of the trust ports' 
privatisation is that each sale, whether voluntary or compulsory, is conducted by the relevant 
port authority, and not by the Department (National Audit Office 1993: 3). 
15 The title of this section is taken in part from the Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General 'Department 
of Transport: The First sales of Trust Ports'. 
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3.5.7.0 Introduction. The following section provides an analysis of the first five trust ports to 
be privatised. 
3.5.7.1 Tees and Hartlepool. This was the first trust port to be privatised under the Act. The 
port authority board accepted the recommendations of its assessment committee, endorsed by 
its professional advisors, that the second highest bid from Teeside Holdings should be 
accepted. The boards judged that this bid was to be preferred to the other bids in terms of 
general commercial quality, the business's long term stability, and the potential benefit both 
to the port and the local community. 
The winning consortium, called Teesside Holdings, was a three-way joint venture between 
Powell Duffryn, Humberside Holdings and 3i, the venture capital group. 
3.5.7.2 Tees and Hartlepool's Market Share. In analysing the performance of the privatised 
trust ports we will use the non-oil tonnage rather than the total tonnage used in analysing the 
SCP of ABP. The data set is more limited running from 1983, but it does allow us to compare 
the performance of these ports in line with the methodology used in the 1989 White Paper 
Employment in the Ports: The Dock Labour Scheme. 
In terms of market share Tees & Hartlepool had a market share of 6.8 per cent in 1983 and 
the following year it reached its second highest market share of 8.3 per cent - see Figure 3.7. 
From 1984 until 1990 its market share declined to 6.6 per cent. After that there was a steady 
rise until 1995 when it market share peaked at 8.4 per cent. But since then it has continued to 
decline. The increase in market share between 1994 and 1995 can be explained by an increase 
in container tonnage from 3.2m tonnes to 4.9m tonnes an increase of 53 per cent in its 
container trade. In 1998 it had declined to 7.5 per cent despite the increase in the overall non- 
oil traffic of 0.7 per cent over the previous year. 
3.5.7.3 Tees and Hartlepool's Performance. From Fig 3.8 it can be seen that Tees and 
Hartlepool has experienced a growth rate similar to the national trend, much of it coming 
between 1983 and 1989. From 1993 there has been steady growth, but there does not appear 
to be any clear indication of any principal-agent effect from privatisation in 1994. After 1995 
there was a slight decline in tonnage. Over the 1983-1999 period the national non-oil tonnage 
grew by 43.2 per cent while Tees and Hartlepool tonnage grew by 56.4 per cent. 
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Again this would appear to contradict one of the main tenets of privatisation, which is that the 
performance of the firm would improve just by transferring the ownership to the private 
sector. There could be a number of possible reasons for there not being a privatisation or 
principal-agent effect. In this case it may be due to the port already operating in a competitive 
market, and therefore it was already efficient. 
Fig 3.7 Tees & Hartlepool Non-Oil Market Share 
1983-1998 Source: Port/Maritime Statistics 
The privatisation of industries has often been accompanied by increased competition. The 
introduction of market forces leads companies to pursue strategies aimed at improving 
efficiency' (Lipczynski and Wilson 2001: 386). However, we have argued that the port 
industry was already competitive, therefore the gains from any x-inefficiencies would be 
limited. If this is the case then it is the nature of the market which is more important than the 
type of ownership. The privatisation process and the principal-agent effect would have little 
or no effect in a market that is already competitive. 
According to a study carried out by Saundry and Turnbull (1997: 327) those who reported 
any positive benefits from privatisation indicated that these benefits were conditional on the 
abolition of the NDLS. They go on to state: 
'To reiterate employment deregulation, rather than privatisation, was more 
important in reducing costs' Saundry and Tumbull 1997: 329. 
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The second possible reason is the change in managerial environment, when privatisation took 
place. Again there would appear to be no clear evidence that the private sector management 
performance was in anyway superior to the management prior to privatisation. 
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Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real Profit '000 14,437 15,593 16,854 18,736 20,353 25,627 
Real Profit Margin % 36.9 38.8 42.0 45.9 47.5 34.8 
Annual % change 8.0 8.1 11.2 8.6 (25.9) 
Table 3.7. Tees & Hartlepool Real Profit and Real Profit Margin 1993-1998 
Source: Fame Database 
In 3.3.3.3 we used the concept of real revenue as a proxy for the performance of the firm, 
and in Fig 3.9 we show the real revenue for Tees and Hartlepool for the period 1992-1998. 
Between 1993 and 1997 increased by 1.0.7 per cent from E39,907,000 to E42,900,000. 
Between 1997 and 1998 real revenue increased by 81.7 per cent from E42,900,000 to 
E74,297,000. Looking at the non-oil tonnage there would be no obvious reason for this 
increase in real revenue. This would also apply to oil traffic, which increased by I per cent 
from 31,271 million tonnes in 1987 to 31,600 million tonnes in 1988. It is not clear if this is a 
one off occurrence or the start of a new trend. 
From Table 3.7. it can be seen that although turnover increased between 1997 and 1998, real 
profit margin declined by 25.9 per cent from 47.5 per cent to 34.8 per cent. 
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Fig 3.9 Tees & Hartlepool Real Revenue 1993-1998 - 
1993=100 
3.5.8.1 The Sale of the Clyde Port Authorit . Clydeport which had been described as the 
gateway to Scotland's industrial heartland, received three indicative bids although two days 
before the deadline for indicative bids the earlier than expected closure of Ravenscraig Steel, 
one of the port's major customers, was announced. This according to the National Audit 
Office (1993: 7) increased uncertainty as to the port's future prospects. There was also 
concern that deferring the sale might weaken the port's commercial position and there was no 
certainty that a higher price could be obtained if they delayed the sale. 
The successful Clydeport Holdings MEBO bid included offering employees at least a 60 per 
cent stake in the equity share capital of the port. The ; C26m bid fell below the benchmark 
valuation range, however the Department noted that the benchmark valuation had excluded a 
number of contingent liabilities, including the closure of Ravenscraig. They considered the 
MEBO the best 'bid emerging from a properly marketed sale such as this was a fairer 
reflection of the market value than a theoretical benchmark valuation' (National Audit Office 
1993: 7). 
The sale of the port took place in March 1992 and in 1994 Clydeport announced that it 
intended to float on the stock market, and the way the shares were placed on the Stock 
Exchange, virtually ruled out any future hostile bid for the company. This in effect would 
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then reduce the disciplining effect of the capital markets, which was another argument for 
privatisation. 
3.5.8.2. Clydeport's Market Share. In 1983 Clydeport had a market share of 3.33 per cent in 
1983. It rose to a peak of 3.7 per cent in 1985. From then onwards Clydeport experienced a 
sustained and substantial decline in its market share, reaching a low of 1.2 per cent in 1993. 
This decline was arrested in 1993 and its market share rose to 2.4 per cent in 1995, but since 
then it has declined slightly to 2.2 per cent in 1998 - see Figure 3.10. 
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Fig 3.10 Clydeport Market Share 1983-1998 
Source: Port/Maritime Statistics 
The initial increase in market share may be evidence of the principal-agent effect, but the 
increase in market was not maintained after 1995, although all non-oil tonnage increased by 
7.0 per cent between 1995 and 1998. 
3.5.8.3 Clydeport's Performance. In terms of tonnage Clydeport matched the national trend 
until 1988. From 1989 its tonnage started to decline, in 1991 it went into steep decline until 
1993. In 1993 its tonnage reached its lowest level, while between 1993 and 1994 the trend 
was reversed, and its tonnage increased in 1994 and peaked in 1995 - see Figure 3.11. 
Between 1992 and 1998 the real revenue for Clydeport increased by 108.3 per cent from 
E10.6m to E22.0 million. However, where non-oil traffic declined between 1991 and 1993, 
real total revenue fell between 1995 and 1996, after that it continued to rise - see Fig 3.12 
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Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real Profit VOOO 1,633 2,454 5,617 5324 5,311 7,852 11,023 
Profit Margin 15.4 20.7 35.4 29.3 30.4 38.2 42.3 
Annual % Change 34.4 71.0 17.2 3.7 25.7 10.7 
Table 3.8 Clydeport Real Profit and Real Profit Margin 1992-1998 
Source: Fame database 
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Fig 3.11 UK and Clyde Non-oil Tonnage 1983-1998 
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Fig 3.12 Clydeport Real Revenue 1992-1998 
Source: Fame Database 
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Overall Clydeports real profits increased by 586 per cent between 1992 and 1998, from 
f 1.633m to f11.023m. Also the profit margin increased from 15.4 per cent to 42.3 per cent an 
increase of 174.7 per cent - see Table 3.8 
3.5.9.1 The Sale of the Forth Port Authority. Forth Ports in 1992 operated the ports of Leith, 
Grangemouth, Burtisland, Kirkcaldy, Methil and Granton. The privatisation of the Forth Port 
Authority was different from the other privatisations because the authority wanted to be 
floated on the stock exchange. It believed that this method would best achieve the 
Government's objectives and also ensure a significant and substantial involvement of 
managers and employees. 
Mr Hugh Thompson, Forth's chief executive, said he had rejected the more popular 
management buy-out route because the company would have been highly geared, limiting its 
activities and scope to make acquisitions (Bolger 1992: 20). Also the directors of Forth Ports 
decided to attempt a flotation to ensure its management team remained intact, something 
which might have been threatened if it had been sold to an external bidder (Buxton 1992: 10). 
However, flotation went against the government's stated objective concerning the desire to 
seek competing bids. 
Market Share. The Forth Ports has experienced a volatile market share performance. In 1983 
its market share was 2.1 per cent, which steadily declined to 1.6 per cent in 1989. In 1990 it 
rose to 1.9 per cent, from then it declined to 1.4 per cent. From 1994 there was an increase in 
market share to 2.0 per cent in 1998. In this section we have excluded the effects of the 
takeover of Tilbury on Forth Ports market share. 
The performance of Forth Ports from 1994 may indicate the principal/agent effect. If this is 
the case it begs the question why in this case and not the other privatised trust ports? In 
3.5.9.1 we pointed out that Forth Ports wanted to be floated on the stock exchange. This 
flotation would allow the company to take over other companies, indicating a more 
aggressive management style than in the other trust ports. 
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Fig 3.13 Forth Ports Market Share 1983-1998 
Source: Port/Maritime Statistics 
3.5.9.3 Conduct. Criticism has been expressed of the estuarial monopoly power of the 
successor to the Forth Trust Port. Forth Ports plc now owns virtually every single commercial 
harbour on the estuary. There is therefore no competition between these ports, or in the entire 
estuary. According to Baird (1995: 140) a ship requiring to load or discharge cargo in the 
Firth of Forth is more or less compelled to use one of the commercial harbours now owned 
by the successor to the trust; in other words a private estuarial monopoly. Also when another 
company sought to establish a competing harbour facility, Forth Ports has used its powers - it 
retained its maritime regulatory and statutory functions of a Port Authority when its was 
privatised - to stop the reopening of Alloa Harbour. It was still responsible for estuarial 
safety, pilotage, and conservancy, and in overall control of a defined area of jurisdiction - see 
Baird 1995: 139 for details. The Chamber of Shipping described the action taken by Forth 
Ports as being 'vexatious and unjustified interference with the public right of navigation'. 
From the start of the flotation process Forth Ports indicated that they were looking actively at 
acquisition opportunities. In September 1995 the privatised ports operator, paid E131.6m for 
the port of Tilbury, which had been privatised in 1992 and sold to a MBO for E32m 
(Batchelor and Dyer 1995: 22). 
3.5.9.4 Performance. The increase in tonnage through the Forth Ports between 1983 and 1998 
was below the increase in its non-oil tonnage - see Figure 3.14. Between 1983 and 1998 total 
143 
non-oil traffic increased by 43.2 per cent while the Forth Ports non-oil traffic increased by 
32.2 per cent. 
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Fig 3.15. Forth Ports Real Revenue 1992-1998 
Source: Fame Database 
The port's real revenue between 1992 and 1998 increased by 80 per cent from E32.4m to 
E58.4m. These figures exclude the increase in revenue from the takeover of the Port of 
Tilbury London Ltd in 1996. The real revenue was fairly constant between 1992 and 1994. 
Between 1994 and 1995 there was a substantial increase from E34.1 m to E43.7m, while there 
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was a slight downturn between 1995 and 1996. From 1996 until 1998 there was an 18.5 per 
cent increase from f49. m to E58.4m. 
Real profits have also increased since privatisation, rising from E10.9m in 1992 to; E23.7m in 
1999, an increase of 117 per cent - see Table 3.9. Profit margins also increased over the same 
period from 28.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent an increase of 41.1 per cent. 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real Profit VOOO 10,899 9,616 13,744 15,348 14,642 16,670 23,659 
Profit Margin 28.7 25.7 26.2 32.4 34.8 33.8 40.5 
per cent Change (10.5) 1.8 23.7 7.4 (2.9) 19.8 
Table 3.9. Forth Ports Real Profit and Real Profit Margin 1992-1998 
Source: Fame database 
3.5.10.1 The Medway Sale. By November 1998 the Medway Ports Authority had announced 
its intention to seek privatisation under the Ports Act. The Medway Port's fixed assets 
included Sheerness, a deep water port and the former Royal Navy dock yard at Chatham, 
which included 140 acres of land with considerable development potential within fairly close 
proximity to the Medway road tunnel, which was then under construction (Arnold and 
Cooper 1999: 145). 
The management buyout team, Medports Mebo Ltd bid E28m for the ports. However, 
financial and banking interests apparently held 49 per cent of the equity and the amount of 
employee participation was 51 Per cent. Further analysis revealed that five directors had 
purchased 250,000 shares, the 250 employees were only allowed to buy 307,000. 
Charterhouse Development, the financial backers to the MEBO "owned something like; El5m 
equity preference shares and Elm ordinary shares" (Arnold and Cooper 1999: 145). 
Like the other trust ports Medway was subject to a clawback arrangement, which was 
supposed to enable the taxpayer to benefit from value not identified at the time of sale. This 
clawback arrangement, however, only applied to gains from the disposal of land and 
buildings. Not to the sale the sale of the port as an entity; a fact, according to Arnold and 
Cooper (1999: 139), that was to prove significant in the light subsequent resale of the port - 
see 3.5.10.2. 
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3.5.10.2 The Sale to Mersey Docks and Harbour Co. On the 20 August 1993, the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Company announced it was in the early stages of exclusive discussions 
with the Medway Ports regarding a possible take over (Pearce 1993: 8). Earlier that week 
Medway had received a number of approaches from potential bidders, including Forth Ports 
and Powell Duffryn. The approaches could have been the response to an announcement at the 
beginning of the month when it announced plans for a stock market flotation. The flotation 
was expected to raise about E70m, although at the time they still did not rule out the 
possibility of becoming part of a larger port group. The port had made no secret of its desire 
to link up with other port and shipping groups, and had indicated that in the absence of a 
merger its flotation would enable it to make its own acquisitions. 
The port had achieved large cost savings. It had halved its workforce from 600 at 
privatisation and introduced new working practices (Hamilton Fazey 1993: 19). At the end of 
the previous year it had been embroiled in a bitter dispute with some of its workforce. The 
company wanted to cut wages and increase working hours, doing away with working 
practices which it considered hampering its chances of retaining customers. This, it has to be 
remembered, was some four years after the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme, 
which was supposed to have given management control over manning and working practices. 
The dispute ended in the redundancy of 269 dockers, who were obliged to sell their shares 
back to the company, because they ceased to be employees. They were required to sell their 
shares back to the company for E2.50 per share under the independent valuation by KPMG 
Peat Marwick, the accountants. By September 1993 Medway employed 100 dockers, 
bringing in contractors employed by other stevedoring companies for specialist work when 
required 
3.5.10.3 Market Share. In 1983 Medway accounted for 3.1 per cent of the non-oil UK 
tonnage. From 1984 until 1992 there was an almost continuous increase in its market share, 
increasing by 88 per cent from 2.5 per cent to 4.7 per cent. This was considerably greater than 
the 41.2 per cent increase in total UK non-oil tonnage over the same period. From 1992 to 
1994 the market share declined from 4.7 per cent to 3.5 per cent. Again we see a slight 
increase at the time of privatisation, with a decline in market share from 1996. 
3.5.10.4 Perfon-nance. Between 1984 and 1992 the percentage growth of non-oil tonnage 
through the Medway ports was greater than the growth of the UK. Since 1992 there has been 
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a decline in the rate of growth. However, between 1994 and 1998 UK non-oil traffic 
decreased by 1.2 per cent from 269m tonnes to 266m tonnes. During the same period 
Medway's non-oil tonnage increased by 5.3 per cent from 9.3m tonnes to 9.8m tonnes. This 
may be indicative of the principal-agent effect. 
Due to the restructuring of the company it is not possible to construct a data set for real revenue and real profits 
and profit margins. 
3.5.11.1 The Sale of Tilbur . The Port of London Authority (PLA) was the only authority to 
continue to operate after the sale of a port. The PLA still had the navigation responsibility 
and remained in the public sector. The sale, or rather the 'non-sale' of Tilbury represented 
something of an inconsistency in the port privatisation process (Baird 1995: 138). Under the 
Act no levy was payable to the Government. All the proceeds of the sale would be required 
by the authority to restructure its finances and to repay Government debt (National Audit 
Office 1993: 12). Under Tilbury's ESOP, 7 per cent of the company was given free to 
employees, 17 per cent of the ordinary shares were offered for sale to employees, 
management kept 20.1 per cent, some 6 per cent was being held in reserve, and the remaining 
49.9 per cent went to Schroder Ventures (Purkiss 1992: 32). 
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3.5.11.2 Market Share. The Department of Transport, the Environment and the Regions does 
not have individual infon-nation on the Port of Tilbury. The returns from the Port of London 
16 aggregate Tilbury into the Port of London total . In September 1995 Forth Ports the 
privatised trust port operator, paid E131.6m for the port of Tilbury (Batchelor & Dyer 1995: 
22). 
3.5.11.3 Performance. The Port of Tilbury London Ltd performance is difference from the 
rest of the privatised trust ports. In real terms it is the only port to experience a smallest 
increase in its real revenue. Between 1992 and 1998 it increased by 0.5 per cent, however its 
performance was more volatile as can be seen from Fig 3.18. Its real revenue peaked in 1994 
and since then it has declined at a steady rate. From its peak it has declined by 12 per cent to 
03.7 million. 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real Profit VOOO 5,427 3,029 9,785 5,866 8,646 9,169 8,774 
Profit Margin 16.2 7.8 24.3 15.1 21.9 23.9 22.0 
Table 3.10 Port of Tilbury London Ltd Real Profit and Real Profit Margin 
1992-1998. Source: Fame database 
16 The Port of London Tilbury London Ltd have been approached directly about supplying this information but 
they have not responded to this request. 
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The port has also had the lowest level of profit margins of all the privatised ports on which 
we have been able to gather data. 
Year 
Fig 3.18 Port of Tilbury London Ltd Real Revenue 
1992-1998 Source: Fame Database 
3.5.12.1 The Market Structure After the Sale of the Trust Ports. The transfer of the seven trust 
ports to the private sector had a ma or impact on the structure of the industry. As Table 3.11 j 
shows nearly 34 percent of the Great Britain port tonnage in 1991 was transferred to the 
private sector between 1992 and 1997. Tonnage through these ports has increased since 1991 
by 18.5 per cent, although all the ports have experienced a decline in their market share. 
Overall their market share has declined by 13.6 per cent from 33.9 per cent to 29.3 per cent. 
1991 1998 
Port Million Market Million Market 
Tonnes Share Tonnes Share 
London 52.8 11.8 57.3 10.4 
Tees & Harlepool 42.7 9.5 51.4 9.1 
Forth Ports 26.4 5.9 44.4 4.9 
Medway 16.0 3.6 15.5 3.0 
Clyde 8.2 1.8 8.1 1.3 
Dundee 1.2 0.3 1.1 0.2 
Ipswich 4.6 1.0 2.2 0.4 
Total 151.9 33.9 180.0 29.3 
Table 3.11 Market Share of Trust Ports 1991 and 1998 
Source: Table 1.3 and Table 4.3 Maritime Statistics 1998 
From 1993 the Act gave the Secretary of State powers to compel a port authority to privatise 
where the related trust port had an annual turnover of above f5m at 1991 prices. These 
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provisions had, at the time, the potential to compel the further sale of a further 10 trust ports. 
However, only two further sales of trust ports took place. These were the Port of Dundee, 
voluntary in 1995, and Ipswich in 1997 under the compulsory provisions of the Act. ABP 
paid E24.4m for Ipswich, which was put up for sale in 1995 (Batchelor 1997: 15). 
At the time of the 1997 General Election, a final decision on the compulsory sale of the Port 
of Tyne had not been taken. The incoming Labour Administration decided that the 
compulsory privatisation of Tyne should not be pursued. 
3.5.12.2. Conduct As we argued earlier - 3.2.7, the UK port industry was already 
competitive, and because of this we have not seen any major changes in the conduct of the 
industry. The disciplining effect of consumer power has resulted in a stable market and this 
has been assisted by the fact that firms were operating in an expanding and profitable market. 
3.5.12.3 Performance. Since privatisation the former trust ports have experienced 
improvements in their financial position, rather than marked increases in their non-oil market 
share. This may indicate that there have been two different effects and these have happened at 
different times within the industry. The first, which we will discuss in more detail in the next 
chapter, is the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme. If supernormal profits were 
being made before abolition, and abolition reduced the relative share going to labour, this is 
an issue of distribution. But, as we have demonstrated, profitability increased after 
privatisation, some three years after the abolition of the NDLS. 
The second effect, efficiency, would appear to have come into effect after the privatisation of 
the trust ports. This, it could be argued, is evidence of the principal-agent effect. If this were 
the case it would appear that the efficiency effect has a greater influence on the performance 
of the privatised trust ports than the distribution effect of the change in rent sharing with the 
trade unions. 
3.5.13 Conclusions of Trust Port Privatisation. The success of the Conservative Government's 
stated objective of increasing competition in the port industry by privatising the trust ports 
has to be questioned. According to Baird (1995: 140), if anything, especially in the case of 
the privatised trust ports, by creating such private estuarial monopolies the privatisation of 
these ports could be said to be anti-competitive. 
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The sale policy for the trust ports would also appear to be inconsistent with the stated 
objective of ensuring that the sales should be through fair and open competition, and obtain 
the best open market price. 
The policy of increasing the efficiency of the trusts ports due to the principal-agent effect 
does appear to have been successful,. 
3.6 Post -Privatisation Structure 
3.6.0 The New Structure of the Port Industry. In this section we will examine the changes in 
the structure of the port industry as well as changes in concentration. 
3.6.1 Post-Privatisation Structure of the Port Industr . The structure of the UK port 
industry 
has been radically changed by the privatisation process Table 3.12 shows the change in 
structure by total tonnage going through different ports by type of ownership. The data set 
used in this analysis involves 97.9 per cent of the total tonnage in 1982 and 99.5 per cent of 
the total tonnage in 1998. The privatisation process has changed the private sector from being 
the smallest sector in 1982, to being the largest sector in 1998 in terms of tonnage - Table 
3.12. 
Trust ports now account for only 13.3 per cent of the total tonnage through the UK ports, 
while nationalised ports now only account for 0.1 per cent of the total. The sector which has 
been least affected by the privatisation process has been the local authority owned ports. 
1982 1998 
Type Tonnage per cent Tonnage per cent 
Private 41,296 10.1 416,259 76.3 
Trust Port 209,957 51.3 72,730 13.3 
Nationalised 86,714 21.2 410 0.1 
Local Auth 71,480 17.5 56,180 10.3 
Total 409,447 100.0 545,579 100.0 
TabIe 3.12 Change in Market Structure 1982 - 1998 
1000 Tonnes 
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3.6.2 Change in Market Concentration. However, by using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) we can show that the industry is still diffused in structure - see Table 3.13 - although 
there has been a slight increase in concentration between 1982 and 1998. 
The HHI is a measure of concentration if the market was made up of equivalent size firms 
and the index shows a slight decrease in the equivalent firm size between 1982 and. 1998, 
indicating a slight increase in concentration. 
1965 1982 1998 
HHI 0.119 0.084 0.092 
Number Equivalent 8.4 11.9 10.9 
Table 3.13 HHI of the UK Port Industry 
However, where there may be competition concerns is in the container/unit sector of the 
market - see Table 3.14. 
Port M Tonnes per cent 
Felixstowe 29.5 25.4 
ABP Group 18.4 15.9 
Dover 17.2 14.8 
London 11.2 9.7 
Liverpool 7.8 6.8 
Medway 4.6 3.9 
Harwich 2.6 2.3 
Total 91.3 78.8 
Table 3.14 Container/unit market. 
Source Maritime Statistics 1999 
Container/Unit Market 
HHI 
Equal Sized Finns 
1998 
0.134 
7.5 
Table 3.15 HHI for ContainerfUnit Market 
Source Maritime Statistics 1999 
In 1998 18.9m tonnes in containers/units went through UK ports. Of which 78.8 per cent 
went through 7 ports or port groups. In certain cases there are connections between the ports 
eg Felixstowe, Harwich and Thamesport - included in London. These 3 ports are owned by 
Hutchinson Whampoa and account for about 30 per cent of the UK total container/unit 
market. Creating a HHI shows the degree of concentration in this market. The HHI gives an 
index of 0.134 and a equal firm size of 7.5 - see Table 3.15. 
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3.7 Differences between the Port and Bus and Coach Industries 
3.7.0. Some Differences between the Port and Bus and Coach Industry. In this section we will 
compare and contrast some of the differences between the port and the bus and coach 
industry. 
The port industry has not been subject to the rash of takeovers, which happened in the bus 
and coach industry after privatisation, although there have been some takeovers. The reason 
for takeovers not taking place is not clear, but concerns about reference to the MMC by ABP 
may have been a factor. However, it is likely that the most significant factor was that the 
largest port group, ABP, remained intact when it was privatised, unlike the NBC, which was 
broken up into the smallest possible units. The rash of takeovers in the bus industry, it could 
be argued, is a result of firms in the bus industry returning to its 'natural" structure, which is 
highly concentrated - see Langridge and Sealey 2000. 
The entry into the UK market by Hutchinson Whampoa, the Hong Kong property, container 
terminals and telecommunications conglomerate, by taking control of Flexistowe, 
Thamesport and Harwich, indicates that the UK port industry was perceived as being a 
worthwhile investment. By buying its market share Hutchinson Whampoa was similar in 
certain respects to cases in the bus and coach industry. Both Hutchinson Whampoa [ports] 
and Cowie [bus] became major players by takeover rather than by organic growth. 
Theoretically then, both markets could be assumed to be non-contestable, entry would only 
occur if supranormal profits were being earned. 
In the port industry we could expect supra normalprofits to be earned because of existence of 
high sunk cost which are immovable, unlike the bus and coach industry, where their fixed 
costs are movable, (we have previously described a bus as a fixed cost with wheels). 
3.8 Concluding Comments 
The privatisation programme has changed the ownership structure of the industry from one 
which was predominantly a publicly owned to one, which is predominantly private 
dominated. This is a similar result to the privatisation of the bus and coach industry. 
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However, the port's privatisation programme has created some local private estuarial 
monopolies, which have given some cause for concern. It does nevertheless raise the 
perennial question that if you have a monopoly, is it in the interest of the consumer that it 
should be a public - theoretically accountable - as opposed to a private unaccountable 
monopoly? This would not be problematic to Austrian economists provided entry into the 
market was unconstrained. The overall structure of the market is still diffused, and therefore 
may not raise any competition concerns. 
There would appear to be some evidence of the principal-agent effect taking place in some of 
the ports when they were privatised. The effect would appear to have been more predominant 
in the privatisation of the trust ports rather than in ABP. The reason for this may be that the 
market was already efficient due to the ability of the shipowners to switch cargoes between 
ports. This had the effect of keeping port charges low, and therefore there was little room to 
improve the efficiency of an already efficient industry. However, in the case of the trust ports 
there is evidence that profitability rose after privatisation. But it has to be remembered that 
this took place three years after the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme - see 4.4. - 
which was supposed to have removed labour restrictions within the industry. We may 
therefore have seen two different effects taking place. The first was a distributional effect, 
associated with the abolition of the NDLS, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The 
second is an efficiency effect due to the principal-agent effect of privatisation and the change 
of ethos from a public service orientated to a private sector profit orientated company. 
There are a number of similarities between the privatisation of the bus and coach industry and 
the port industry, but there were differences as well, these were: 
1. The port industry was operating in an expanding market, while the bus industry market 
was declining. 
2. The largest nationalised firm in the port industry ABP was privatised as a whole, while 
the NBC was split up into the smallest possible units. By not splitting up ABP this did not 
create the opportunity for the wave of takeovers which occurred in the bus industry. 
3. The reason why ABP was not split up was most likely due to the Minister involved in the 
relevant Departments of State at the time and the agitation of management of ABP. In the 
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case of the NBC the Minster overrode the views of the management and his desired 
outcome was imposed on the industry. 
It would also be difficult to claim that the privatisation process in the port industry was 
consistent. By the time Sealink was privatised another Minister was involved and a different 
process of privatisation was used, ie a trade auction. In the case of the trust ports, there was 
some element of compulsory privatisation, but the trust ports' management attitude to the 
privatisation process would appear to have been the key element as to whether it was 
privatised. The outcome depended on whether the management were risk neutral, then it 
would be privatised, or if they were risk adverse, it would remain in the public sector. 
A major influence on the performance of the industry was the deregulation of a major part of 
the labour market with the abolition of the NDLS. Some commentators have claimed that this 
had a greater effect on the industry than the privatisation programme - see 3.5.7.3. The effects 
of the privatisation process and deregulation on the labour markets are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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4. Trade Unions, I. nstitutional Change and Rent Sharing 
4.1.0 Introduction. In this chapter we examine whether deregulation, privatisation and the 
introduction of competition into the market has affected the ability of the main trade union in 
these industries to effectively represent its members. The propositions examined in this 
chapter are: 
1. that privatisation and deregulation will result in an increase in inequality; 
2 privatisation and deregulation will result in changes to the bargaining relationship 
between the employers and the union; 
3 there will be a reduction in the main index of trade union power, i. e. union density due to 
the change in the composition of the workforce; 
4 privatisation and deregulation will result in a reduction in average earnings in these 
industries. 
In 4.1.1 we consider briefly the changes that have taken place in inequality during the 1980s 
and 1990s at the aggregated level. We then examine how real earnings have changed between 
1983 and 1994 in the United Kingdom, going on to consider the changes that have taken 
place for those industries which we are examining in this study. 
The underlying objective of this chapter is to see if the changes that have taken place at the 
national level have been replicated in the sectors being studied in this dissertation. If they 
have not been replicated, we will then ask, what are some of the possible reasons for this. 
4.1.1 Changes in Inequality and Institutional Bargaining Arrangements. During the 1980s 
and 1990s internationally there has been an increase in wage inequality. However, the UK 
and the USA were unique among the OECD countries in having a significant rise in wage 
inequality. 'The only country where wages differentials widened by an amount similar to the 
United States was Great Britain' (Freeman and Kazt 1994: 29). 
During the 1980s there was an increased demand for more educated workers and those with 
problem solving skills. Finns are increasing their usage of more educated workers compared 
to less educated workers. Changes in technology have increased the relative productivity of 
skilled workers compared with unskilled workers. For example, this was the situation in the 
docks with the increasing usage of containerisation. The introduction of computerised 
tracking systems required more highly trained operators compared to the more traditional 
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labour intensive methods of loading and unloading certain types of cargo, eg cars. These 
changes in the supply and demand for labour would have influenced the wages and 
employment for the different groups of workers. 'Skilled workers are thus at more of a 
premium than before and there are fewer unskilled jobs at any given wage' (Gosling et al 
1994: p 68) 
Was this change in inequality as Freeman et al (1994: p30) have claimed 'due to a new era in 
modem economic development -a reversal of the broad trend of income inequality falling 
with economic growthT Or as Fortin and Lemieux (1997: 76 ) state that 'most analyses of the 
cause of rising wage inequality have implicated demand factors as the prominent source of 
change .... Since the labor markets of most industrialized countries were exposed to similar 
technological and trade shocks, the experience of the United States [and the UK] requires a 
more comprehensive xplanation. The different sets of institutions in which countries operate 
can be part of the explanation, since labor market institutions can mitigate the impact of 
supply and demand changes on the structure of wages'. During the 1980s in the USA there 
was a 'decline in the unionization rate which, unlike the decline in the real value of the 
minimum wage and deregulation, cannot be traced to legislative actions, since there were no 
explicit changes to the National Labor Relations Act during the 1980s' (Fortin and Lemieux 
1997: 94). The UK, in contrast, had five major changes in trade union legislation. 
During the 1980s and the early 1990s both the UK and the USA had governments which 
followed "supply side" policies, and they had a strong belief in free markets and an enterprise 
culture. 'In the 1980s the United Kingdom led the Vest' in altering economic policies and 
institutions in ways designed to produce a better functioning market system. The Thatcher 
and Major governments sought to limit institutional intervention in the free market and 
unleash the powers of enterprenurship and untrammelled competition" (Blanchflower and 
Freeman 1994: p 51). 'Enterprenurship and the rule of the market were the new mantras of 
business, pushed along by what one commentator has termed a wave of "acquisitive 
individualism". Such a programme required freedom of action, both for individuals and the 
market.... To this end, there was a progressive weakening of the framework of statutory 
employment protection and a gradual tightening of restrictions on the activities of trade 
unions throughout the period covered by our survey [WIRS] series.... The abolition of the 
Wages Councils in 1993 also removed the last vestiges of minimum wage protection (except 
in agriculture)' (Millward et al 2000: 10). Also 'During the 1980s, the countries with the most 
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decentralized labor markets and wage setting systems-the United States and the United 
Kingdom - had exceptional increases in earnings inequality and in wage differentials by skill' 
(Freeman et al 1994: p30). In this chapter we will examine the effects of declining union 
density, economic deregulation, the change in the bargaining structure and the changing 
composition of the workforce. Prior to 1999 there had never been a national minimum wage 
in the UK, however, in certain industries there was some minimum wage protection through 
wages councils or national agreements which set minimum terms and conditions of 
employment. In the 1980s legislative moves to restrict the powers of wages councils were 
introduced by the Conservative Government, beginning with the Wages Act of 1986 (see 
Millward et al 2000: 192). However, in the industries we are concerned with in this study, 
there were no wages councils. 
4.1.2 Three Important Institutional Changes. Fortin and Lemieux (1997: 75) explored what 
they considered 'the impact of three of the most important institutional changes of the 1980s - 
the decline in the real value of the minimum wage, the decline in unionization rate, and the 
movement of economic deregulation - on rising wage inequality in the United States'. For the 
UK, Green (1992: 445) identified three changes that were important. These were: 'the altered 
legal framework for industrial relations [see 4.1.1 above], the macroeconomic environment, 
and the changing composition of the workforce. ' 
Many analysts of labour market institutions concentrate on the degree to which wage setting, 
in a particular country is centralised. They differentiate between countries like the United 
States, which have highly decentralised labour markets and wage setting systems, in which 
large numbers of firms bargain with trade unions or individual workers over pay and working 
conditions, with little or no interference with this bargaining process from the government. 
This is in contrast to the more centralised wage-setting systems of Western Europe, although 
these wage-setting institutions differ between the various European countries. 
4.1.3. Changes in Inequalit . The underlying philosophy of the decentralised Iabour markets 
is that this type of market is more likely to set the market-clearing rate for the job than a 
centralised market system. According to Leslie and Pu (1996: pl2l) The establishment of 
these local labour markets had the unintended consequence of widening earnings 
distributions', however, this may be a rather 'naYve' view of the consequences of the policy. 
The reason for this is that institutional forces like trade unions tend to reduce inequality. 
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Therefore by deliberately implementing policies designed to reduce their ability to negotiate 
'effectively' on behalf of their members we would expect to see an increase in inequality. 
'Since institutional forces such as unions tend to dampen inequality, wage inequality ought to 
be higher in the United States than in most other countries, and it is' (Freeman opt cit 1994: 
p53). Therefore any increase in inequality would appear to have been a direct and anticipated 
outcome of the policy, not an unintended consequence as suggested by Leslie and Pu 
According to Metcalf (1989: 33) 'This greater equality of pay amongst union members, as 
compared with non-union members, reflects two forces. First, it seems likely that union 
members are less heterogeneous than non-members. Second, union goals play an important 
part... "one [trade union regulation] stands out as practically universal, namely, the insistence 
on payment according to the same definite standard, uniform in its application" ie the rate for 
the job'. 
This however is not a universal view and Goodman et al (1997: 169) have argued that 'There 
is no a priori reason that unions should have an equalising rather than a disequalising effect 
on the distribution of wages. 
Year Lowest Lowest Highest 
Decile/ Quartile/ Quartile/ 
Median Median Median 
1984 63.8 80.4 124.8 
1990 61.0 78.8 126.9 
1998 62.3 78.0 128.8 
Percentage Change 
1984/90 -4.4 -2.0 1.7 
1990/98 2.2 -0.9 1.4 
1984/98 -2.3 -2.9 3.2 
Highest Highest 
Decile/ Decile/ 
Median Lowest 
Decile 
154.0 241.5 
158.5 260.0 
162.0 260.1 
2.9 7.7 
2.2 0.1 
5.2 7.7 
Table 4.1 Change in Male Inequality 1984-1998 
Source: New Earning Survey for the relevant years 
Table 4.1 shows the change in male manual inequality between 1984 and 1998. From this we 
can see that the Highest Decile/ Lowest Decile ratio has in creased by 7.7 percent from 241.5 
to 260.1. Almost all of this increase in the ratio came between 1984 and 1990 with only 0.04 
per cent of the increase occurring between 1990 and 1998. The lowest decile/median ratios 
also show an increased inequality between 1984 and 1990, an increase of 4.4 per cent. 
Overall it increased by 2.3 per cent between 1984 and 1998, inequality decreased by 2.2 per 
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cent between 1990 and 1998. 
Examination of all the ratios indicates that inequality increased at a greater rate in the 1980s 
than the 1990s, which coincides with the time period of the main privatisation programme. 
As a direct result of the privatisation programme legislation was also being introduced to 
restrict the ability of the trade unions to undertake industrial action to stop or reduce job 
losses and maintain the earnings of their members. 
The overall effect of unions on inequality depends on their ability to impact on pay 
'However, when the required information is brought together (Metcalf, 1982) unions are 
indeed shown to have an egalitarian effect. Union activity narrows the wage structure by the 
following amounts: 
Per cent 
Female - male I 
Black - white (male) 5 
Unskilled - skilled (male) 2 
Manual - non-manual (male) 9 
Unions cause less inequality in pay. Further, union presence in the workplace tends to reduce 
arbitrary treatment of employees by managers and it ensures proper representation on other 
important non-pay matters like health and safety. But for unions the labour market would 
surely be a more unequal place' (Metcalf 1989: 34). 
4.1.4 Decline in Trade Union Membership Density. 'Trade union membership density may 
play a part in determining the power of the union to extract a share of any surplus from the 
firm. ' (Booth 1995: 72). During the 1980s the unions share of the workforce in UK declined. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the proportion of the work-force belonging to a trade union fell 
from 58 per cent to 42 per cent (Goodman et al 1997: 169). This reduction in union density 
has been assumed to mean a decreasing role for collective bargaining as a force in the wage 
setting process. Weakened unionism and reduced centralization of wage setting contributed 
to the cross-country pattern of wage inequality in the 1980s. In the United Kingdom the fall 
in union density accounts for about one-fourth of the growth of inequality comparable to the 
estimated effect of declining unionism on U. S. inequality' (Freeman et al 1994: p53). In the 
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Fig 4.1 Union Density for Employees (per cent) 1989-1998 
Source: Hicks 2000: 332 
UK 'Thatcherism in the workplace rests on market forces, the legal framework and greater 
employee involvement. This contrasts sharply with the approach of the 1970s which 
emphasised joint regulation of the effort bargain between trade unions and employers. ' 
(Metcalf 1989 : 35) 
Year 1984 1990 1998 
Density % 65 47 36 
1984/90 1990/98 1984/98 
Change -27.7 -23.4 -44.6 
Table 4.2: Change in Trade Union Density 
Source adapted from Millward et al 2000: 87. 
In the UK, data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) shows overall union density decreased 
from 39.0 per cent in 1989 to 29.6 per cent in 1998 for all employees - see Fig. 4.1. 
'Traditional strongholds of trade unionism have suffered some of the greatest reductions. For 
example, manual occupations have seen a reduction of 15 percentage points since 1989; 
density is similar now to that of non-manual occupations.... When looking at figures of this 
sort, it is easy to forget that the estimates of union membership and density presented here are 
stock estimates. Each year will see substantial flows of people joining and leaving trade 
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Fig 4.2 Union Membership (000s) 1989-1998. Source: Hicks 2000: 332. 
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unions' (Mcks 2000: 332). Data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey shows that 
aggregate union membership declining from 65 per cent in 1980 to 36 per cent in 1998 - see 
Table 4.2 - an overall decrease of 44.6 per cent. 
Between 1983 and 1994 total membership of trade unions in the UK fell from 11.2 million to 
8.3 million a reduction of 26 per cent (Labour Market Trends, February 1996: p5l). Later 
data from the Labour Force Survey covering the period 1989-1998, shows union membership 
declining from 8.9 million to 7.1 million (Hicks 2000: 332). The figures from the LFS - see 
Fig 4.2 - are more likely to accurately reflect the number of trade union members who are in 
employment. Questions on trade union membership are asked only of those in employment in 
the survey's 'reference week'. Other figures, which use sources that are based on union total 
membership, are likely to over estimate membership. The reason for this is that these figures 
include unemployed members and those in retired member's sections/branches of the unions. 
4.1.5. Trade Unions and Inequality. The fact that unionization fell in most countries in the 
1980s, when market forces favoured greater inequality, is no accident. ' (Freeman Richard et 
al 1994: p54). In the UK between 1984 and 1990, trade union density decreased and 
inequality increased substantially. Table 4.3 - which is based on tables 4.1 and 4.2 - gives the 
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relevant changes in trade union density and the change in the upper decile/lower decile ratios 
between 1984 and 1998. From this we can see that between 1990 and 1998 although union 
density continued to decline inequality remained virtually the same. However, this has to be 
qualified. The data in the table has to be treated as suggestive and not definitive, as there are 
many forces at work within the economy. 
1984/90 1990/98 1984/98 
Change in Inequality 7.7 0.1 7.7 
Change in Union Density -27.0 -23.4 -44.6 
Table 4.3 Changes in Inequality and Union Density in the 
UK between 1984 and 1998 
The reason union density continued to decline while inequality appeared to be stabilised may 
be due to a number of different factors, one of which may be the lagged effect on union 
membership. When inequality increased and then remained stable this may have resulted in 
people believing it was not worth their while remaining in a trade union. 
4.1.6 Change in Aggregate Union Membership Density. The decline of trade union density in 
the United Kingdom has not been evenly spread across the industrial divisions. Table 4.4 
gives the aggregate union density in relation to workplace characteristics between 1984 and 
1998. 'Aggregate union density is the number of employees summed across the sample of 
workplaces, divided by the number of employees in the same workplaces. ' (Millward et al 
2000: 263) 
Table 4.4 shows that the largest decline in trade union density was in distribution, hotel, 
catering and repairs, which declined by 61 per cent from 31 per cent to 12 per cent. The 
lowest decline was in construction, which declined by 17 per cent from 36 per cent to 30 per 
cent. Transport and communications had the third largest change, 40 per cent from 90 per 
cent to 54 per cent, while the overall density declined by 38 per cent from 58 per cent to 36 
per cent. 
The change in union density between the private and public sector was also uneven. The 
private sector declined by 40 per cent from 43 per cent to 26 per cent. However, we can 
assume that the transfer of highly unionised firms from the public sector (due to the 
privatisation programme) to the private sector would have masked the real decline in the 
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sectors union density. During the same period, the public sector aggregate union density 
declined by 30 per cent from 81 per cent to 57 per cent. 
Industrial Division 1984 1990 1998 % Change 
Energy and Water Supply 88 75 68 23 
Extraction of n-iinerals/ores 64 56 47 27 
Metal goods, engineering & vehicles industries 60 46 45 25 
Other manufacturing industries 53 47 33 38 
Construction 36 46 30 17 
Distribution, hotels & catering, repairs 31 19 12 61 
Transport and communications 90 73 54 40 
Banking, finance, insurance, business services 
and leasing 29 28 15 48 
Other services 68 61 46 32 
All industries 58 47 36 38 
Sector 
Private 43 36 26 40 
Public 81 72 57 30 
Table 4.4 Aggregate Trade Union Density 1984-1998. Source adapted from 
Millward et al. 2000: 87 
If we take union density to be a proxy for union strength 'we find the greater level of union 
density the more likely management were to consult and negotiate over workplace matters. 
Those workplaces where at least some negotiations took place with union representatives had 
a union density of 61 per cent, compared with 56 per cent where there was no negotiation but 
some consultation, and 42 per cent where there was neither' (Cully et al 1999: 105). 
4.1.7 Mean Union Density. The mean union density allows us to identify the average level of 
trade union density in different workplaces. Table 4.5, which is calculated directly from the 
various WIRS surveys, gives the mean union densities for the SIC 1980 nine industrial 
divisions. Between 1984 and 1998 the mean trade union density declined by 44 per cent from 
47 per cent to 27 per cent, this was a slightly larger than aggregate trade union density. 
Possibly unsurprisingly, distribution, hotels & catering and repairs had the largest decline, 74 
per cent from 25 per cent to 7 per cent. The smallest change took place in energy and water 
supply, which had a 16 per cent decline from 87 per cent to 74 per cent. Transport and 
communications had the third largest decline, 51 per cent from 82 per cent to 40 per cent. The 
change in union density between the private and public sector was also uneven. The private 
sector declined by 69 per cent from 42 per cent to 13 per cent. While the public sector 
declined by 25 per cent from 81 per cent to 61 per cent. 
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Industrial Division 
Energy and Water Supply 
Extraction of minerals/ores 
Metal goods, engineering & vehicles 
industries 
Other manufacturing industries 
Construction 
Distribution, hotels & catering, repairs 
Transport and communications 
Banking, finance, insurance, business 
services and leasing 
Other services 
All industries 
Sector 
Private 
Public 
1984 1990 1998 % 
Change 
87 76 74 16 
36 41 26 28 
38 30 14 63 
39 28 22 44 
26 38 16 39 
25 13 7 74 
82 61 40 51 
28 33 18 34 
66 58 44 32 
47 38 27 44 
42 25 13 69 
81 72 61 25 
Table 4.5 Mean Trade Union Densities 1984-1998. 
If we divide aggregate union density by the mean union density this gives us some indication 
as to the size distribution of the establishments 'because union density was generally higher in 
larger workplaces, meaning that aggregate density exceeds average workplace density. ' Cully 
et al 1999: 86 - see Table 4.6. 
Industrial Division 
Energy and Water Supply 
Extraction of minerals/ores 
Metal goods, engineering & vehicles 
industries 
Other manufacturing industries 
Construction 
Distribution, hotels & catering, repairs 
Transport and communications 
Banking, finance, insurance, business 
services and leasing 
Other services 
All industries 
Sector 
Private 
Public 
1984 1990 1998 % 
Change 
1.0 1.0 0.9 -9.2 
1.8 1.4 1.8 1.7 
1.6 1.5 3.2 103.6 
1.4 1.7 1.5 10.4 
1.4 1.2 1.9 35.4 
1.2 1.5 1.7 38.2 
1.1 1.2 1.4 23.0 
1.0 0.8 0.8 -19.5 
1.0 1.1 1.0 1.5 
1.2 1.2 1.3 8.0 
1.0 1.4 2.0 95.3 
1.0 1.0 0.9 -6.6 
Table 4.6 Index of Industry Size Distribution 
Where the result in table 4.6 is greater than one, it indicates larger type establishments exist 
in that sector. Between 1984 and 1998 there would appear to have been an increase in larger 
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sized establishments in the private sector, the ratio increased from I to 2 an increase of 95.3 17 
per cent, while the pubic sector establishments experienced a slight decrease. The largest 
increase was in metal goods, engineering and vehicle industries. While the largest decrease 
occurred in larger sized establishments in banking, finance insurance, business services and 
leasing, which declined by 19.5 per cent. In transport and communications large size 
establishments increased by 23 per cent. Part of which may be explained by the consolidation 
of ownership within the bus and coach industry that took place between 1990 and 1998 - see 
2.7.1. 
4.1.8 Union Coveraize. Collective bargaining normally exists where there is a recognised 
union or staff association within the establishment for the individual to join, which is the 
'determinant of coverage... Coverage itself may well be determined by compositional factors, 
employer recognition and derecognition strategies (in turn affected by macroeconomic 
conditions), and the industrial relations climate' (Disney 1990: 171). But a 'union may 
represent only a small section of the workforce, perhaps bargaining on behalf of a single 
occupation at the workplace. Often collective agreements do not cover managers and senior 
professional staff (Millward et al 2000; 160). 
However, coverage itself does not imply recognition of the union or staff association. It is 
possible that an employer will pay the industry's nationally agreed rate through being a 
member of an employers association, while having no employees who are members of trade 
unions. In this case the nationally agreed rate acts as a minimum wage for that industry. It 
would be difficult for an employer to recruit labour at a wage rate below the nationally agreed 
rate. Individual employees therefore who do not belong to a trade union may still have their 
earnings determined by collective bargaining involving a recognised trade union and an 
employers association, and are then covered by a national union agreement because their 
employer is a member of an employers association. Then there is the question of whether an 
individual chooses to join a union that is recognised. 
Whether a workplace's union or unions can improve the workforce's terms and conditions of 
employment depends, as a starting point, on the proportion of those workers covered by 
collective bargaining. Where a high proportion of workers are covered, the union is likely to 
have greater influence in the workplace as a whole than if it bargains only for a minority of 
17 Does not equal 100 per cent due to rounding errors. 
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workers'(Millward et al 2000; 160). 
In analvsin- chanues in coveracre we will use two Sources. The first is the New Earninos 
Survey for the years 1973,1978 and 1985. The second is the WIRS series for 1984,1990 and 
1998; the WIRS first asked questions about coverage in 1984. This overlap allows us' to 
roughly estimate the change in coverage between 1973 and 1998, a 25-year period. 
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Figure 4.3 Change in Male Manual Coverage 1973-1985 all industries and services. 
Source New Earning Survey for Relevant Year 
Fiaure 4.3 shows the overall change in the composition of full-time men for all industries and C 
services between 1973 and 1985. The two most si,, nificant chanaes are the decline in national 
and supplementary /company etc agreements and the increase in people not being covered by 
any collective agreement. Table 4.7 gives the percentage changes overall within all the SIC 
groups for the three relevant years. We see that national and supple nientary\cornpany 
agreement declined by 40 per cent. The largest decrease was 34 per cent, which took place 
between 1978 and 1985. From this table we can see that there was a move away from 
national and supplernentary/conipany agreements to company, district or local agreements. 
However, the largest change was those not being covered bv any form of collective 
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bargaining, rising from 16.8 per cent to 29.2 per cent an increase of 75.0 per cent. 
In 1984 according to the WIRS survey 'collective agreements fixed pay rates for an average 
of almost nine out of ten workers in unionized workplaces. This fell to three quarters (75 per 
cent) in 1990 and then again to two thirds (67 per cent) in 1998' (Millward et al 2000: 160). 
By 1998 only 31 per cent of all workplaces employing 25 or more employees had any form 
of collective bargaining - see Cully et al 1999: 89. 
National and 
supplementary/ 
Company etc 
Year agreements 
1973-78 -9.0 
1978-85 -34.1 
1973-85 -40.1 
National Company, 
Agreements district or local No collective 
only agreement only agreement 
-10.3 21.2 29.2 
3.3 8.7 35.5 
-7.4 31.7 75.0 
Table 4.7 Percentage change in full-time males on adult rates in all industries 
1973-1985 covered by various types of collective agreement. 
Source: New Earnings Survey for Relevant Years 
4.1.9 Change in Composition of the Workforce. Some of the studies undertaken to explain 
the decline in union density have focused on the changing external environment facing 
unions and firms, and one of these changes has been the changing composition of the 
workforce. In this section we examine the changes that have taken place at the macro level as 
a whole to the composition of the workforce between the private and public sector. In '1984, 
one seventh (14 per cent) of public sector workplaces and one fifth (20 per cent) of public 
sector employees formed part of public sector trading corporations or nationalised industries. 
Across the whole economy, these accounted for one in every twenty workplaces (5 per cent) 
and one in every ten employees (9 per cent) .... The overall impact of the privatisation 
programme was to reduce the proportion of all workplaces that were part of public trading 
corporations or nationalized industries from 5 per cent in 1984 to 2 per cent in 1990. The 
proportion of all employees working in such establishments fell from 9 per cent to 3 per cent 
over the same period' (Millward et al 2000: 2 1). Yet in the economy as a whole during this 
period employment increased by nearly 10 per cent, and union density declined by nearly 38 
per cent. 
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The standard method of quantifying the impact of compositional change uses "shift -share" 
analysis. This method splits the fall in overall union density into three components' (Green 
1992: 45 1). To calculate these components we have used the following formula: 
AU= y, U2 n2 - y, U, nl nl ni ni 
where ui is union density within group i, ni is the proportion of all employees in group i, 
superscripts delineate the year, and the sum is over both groups. We may rewrite this as 
2: (U, n2- nl nl n2 ni ni + 2: n2 nl) ui )ni + 2: (ni - ni )ui _(U, 
n2_ Uinl) (ni - ni 
y( U,, 
2 ni The first term on the right hand side of the expression, __ Ui 
)n, ni, measures the change 
in density that would have occurred if the employee composition had stayed the same as the 
base year nj, but the within-group densities had changed. The second term, E(n, n2_ ni nI A nI, is 
the change that would have occurred due to the change in employee composition if the 
within-group density had stayed at the base year nj level. The third term Y_ (Uin2_ Ui nI ) (n, n2. 
ni nI ), is the interaction of the other two effects and is generally small by comparison. 
Table 4.8 shows the compositional change between the private and public sectors of the 
economy between 1984 and 1998. 
1984-1990 1990-1998 1984-1998 
% of change due to within group changes in union 
density between private and public sector 25 6 15 
% of change due to the change in the composition 
of the workforce between private and public sector 76 95 87 
Note: The percentages do not sum to 100, owing to the interactive term 
Table 4.8 Compositional Change of Workforce Between the Private and Public Sector 
1984-1998. Source: Millward et al. 2000 Tables 2.1 and 4.2 
What is significant is the size of the percentage change due to the changes in the composition 
of the workforce, especially between 1990 and 1998, when 95 per cent of the change is due to 
the change in composition. During 1984 and 1990 25 per cent of the change can be accounted 
for due to the change in union density, and partly to the privatisation programme. However, 
between 1990 and 1998 only 6 per cent of the change can be attributed to the change union 
density. Overall 87 per cent of changes that occurred between 1984 and 1998 can be 
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accounted for by the change in composition of the workforce between the public and the 
private sector, and 15 per cent due to the changing in union density. 
4.1.10 Structure of the Product Market. Wage setting institutions like trade unions are not 
immune to market forces. Any major shift in supply and demand that results in increasing 
relative wage differentials will reduce the strength of centralised collective bargaining and 
lower the unions influence on the wage setting process. Wage setting institutions that go 
strongly against market forces face a difficult task in the long run. 
According to Beaumont (1990: 28) 'Industrial-relations researchers have had a long-standing, 
if somewhat limited, interest in the impact of the nature of the product market environment 
on the structures, processes, and outcomes of collective bargaining. ' He argues that if the 
product market is highly competitive we could observe three effects. These are: 
1. Limits the extent of union organisation, which weres due to the difficulty, and cost to the 
union(s) of effectively organising a relatively large number of small sized firms. 
2. Considerable employer opposition to recognising trade unions for collective bargaining 
purposes, especially if the employer is restricted in their ability to pass on any wage 
increase in the form of higher prices. 
3. If unions do manage to organise such industries, both the employers and the union(s) are 
likely to favour the establishment, and maintenance, of multi-employer, industrial-Ievel 
collective bargaining arrangements in order to try and take wage competition out of the 
industry concerned. That is, at the very least set a minimum wage level to minimise the 
amount of wage competition in the industry. 
It could also be argued that the establishment of a uniform wage rate in an industry would 
create a barrier to entry into the industry or even force small rivals to exit the industry. 
According to Williamson (1987: 195) however, 'The most ambitious objective of an attempt 
at using wage rates to eliminate rivals and bar entry would be one of throughgoing joint profit 
maxim. zation among the favoured members of the industry. ' This he concludes is unlikely to 
be realised in any but the most exceptional circumstances. More to the point is the amount of 
deviation from the joint profit maximisation objectives, which can be expected. In general [he 
concludes], the degree of adherence to a qualified joint profit maximisation agreement will 
depend on the structure of the industry and the conditions of the environment. 
According to Hirsch and Addison (1986: 116) 'Unions in the long run cannot markedly 
increase the wages of union members relative to otherwise similar nonunion workers unless 
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there are monopoly returns, Ricardian rents accruing as a result of special cost advantages, or 
unions are organised across most firms in an industry. ' In a competitive industry, if a union 
raises the wage bill for a minority of the firms in the industry, these firms are not likely to 
survive in the long-term if they continue to have higher costs than the majority of firms in the 
industry. 'However, union wage gains will create an excess supply of workers in covered 
jobs. Because profit-maximizing firms will select the relatively most productive workers 
from this queue, in the (very) long run union-nonunion wage differentials between similar 
workers or labour efficient units may be small' (Hirsch and Addison 1986: 117). The union 
can only maintain wage rates above the competitive rate in the long run where it has 
organised the majority of the firms in the industry. 
But, it can be argued that other factors are also important, some of these are: 
1. if the particular market is regulated - regulation could 'facilitate rent-seeking behaviour 
rather than tapping into the economies of scale as a method for enhancing consumer 
welfare' (Gupta, Barnali 1998: 53); 
2. if the labour in question also face little or no foreign competition; and 
3. have an inelastic demand curve for their products. 
In such a non-competitive market situation, trade unions may redistribute a portion of the 
supra-normal profits from capital to labour (see next section for a more detailed argument 
about non-competitive markets). If supra-normal profits exist due to the structure of the 
market, any lowering of the profits available to a firm due to rent seeking actives of the 
union raises a distribution issue. That is what share, if any, of the supra normal profits should 
be redistributed to labour? The extent to which either party can appropriate this supra-normal 
profit will depend on the relative power of the two sides, and this will depend in part upon 
the prevailing institutional climate eg hostile or favourable to the employers or the unions. 
4.1.11 Trade Unions and Rent Sh jU. There are many theories in economics about trade 
unions and their ability to raise the earnings of their members above the market-clearing rate. 
One of the widely held beliefs is that trade unions through their rent-seeking activities reduce 
the amount of profits available to firms. This could reduce or even eliminate potential supra- 
normal profits available to capital. 
According to Rose (1987: 1147) 'understanding rent sharing is essential to analysing 
government regulation. Regulatory protectionism can create rents over which workers and 
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firms may negotiate, regulatory profit constraints may distort firms' labor inputs or alter 
firms'relative bargaining strengths vis-a-vis unions, regulatory barriers to entry may enhance 
unions' power, and the political nature of regulatory agencies can expand the scope of 
potential games between firms and workers. ' Regulation of an industry 'may have important 
effects on industry wages: failing to account for these effects may lead to underestimates of 
regulatory rents and distortions' (Rose 1987: 1147). 
The relationship between the structure of the market and profitability also raises efficiency 
issues. Market power as we have already demonstrated - see 1.4.5 - may be a function of the 
existence of large sunk costs within the particular industry. These sunk costs could allow the 
existence of supra normal profits, and the union or a group of workers may be able to 
appropriate a share of the profits arising from the existence of those sunk costs. 
However, there is a countervailing argument that firms could use supra-normal profits to 
forestall higher wages by enduring or threatening to endure long strikes - see Freeman and 
Medoff 1984: 52. The existence of these polar opposite theories could be because of the 
problem of measuring the bargaining power of trade unions. 
'To illustrate this problem, [of measuring the bargaining power of trade unions] consider 
trucking, where no one firm has a significant market share, but where the Teamsters wage 
gains have been sizeable, to a large extent because government regulation has worked to both 
employers' and the union's advantage. Next consider the automobile industry, where high 
relative wages won by the United Automobile Workers in the 1970s undoubtedly reflected 
the fact that in that decade the largest four U. S. auto companies dominated auto sales in this 
country' (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 52). 
4.1.12 Non-competitive Product Markets. In an imperfect market a firm faces a downward- 
sloping demand curve for its product. As they hire more labour they face diminishing 
marginal productivity, but also a lower price for their product. This means that the marginal 
revenue is always less than the price, and the marginal revenue product must always be less 
than the value of the marginal product. In the short term this would result in lower labour- 
demand elasticities than in competitive firms that have the same product function. 
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Hamermesh and Rees (1998: 136) question whether real-world price setters are typically 
profit maximisers in the short-run. They may be under a variety of political and public 
relations pressures to stabilise employment, to restrict profits to a reasonable amount, to 
restrain increases in product prices, and not to enlarge their share of the product market 
unduly. They go on to argue that as a result of the possibility of such government 
interference, the management of a firm with some market power - they do not say how much 
- could choose to devote some of the supra normal profits to paying higher wages than the 
labour market required, or use more labour - featherbedding - than a profit maximising firm 
would use. Here the existence of supra normal profits - which could result in government 
intervention - could be used to make the workforce more contented - better paid? - or keep 
unions from organising the workforce. According to Hamermesh and Rees (1998: 137) there 
is some evidence that firms that produce in markets characterised by little competition do pay 
higher wages than equivalent firms in competitive markets. 
In 2.4.6 we demonstrated that the effect of the introduction of competition into the Hereford 
trial area was that the National Bus Company had to renegotiate its agreements locally with 
its trade unions as a direct result of increased competition. This would tend to confirm the 
premise that the more competitive the market the less opportunity there is for a union to gain 
or maintain 'rent' for its members. This is due to the inability of the employer to generate 
supra-normal profits and pay wages significantly above the competitive equilibrium. 
4.1.13 Trade Union Wage Mark-up in the UK. According to Adnet (1989: 18) more 
problematic to the neo-classical theory is how to model a market where the labour force is 
organised. Trade unions must face a downward-sloping demand curve for their members' 
labour. However, if trade unions are able to exert any influence on an employer during wage 
negotiations, then this should be reflected in higher wages for their members compared to 
their non-union colleagues, although there may be some spillover effect to non-organised 
labour. So at least in part the differential between the wages of unionised and non-unionised 
employees can be viewed as the result of trade union power. According to Smith (1994: 122) 
the simple proposition is the more powerful the union the greater the wage mark-up. But if 
this union wage mark-up is dependent upon the firm's product market power, then in a 
competitive market it is assumed that the union mark-up will disappear. If a market or 
industry becomes more competitive we could then expect to see a reduction in the union 
wage mark-up, assuming that one existed in the first place. However, changes in the quality 
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of labour would also have to be taken into account. According to Smith (1994: 122) in the 
UK the 'union mark-up' increased during the 1970s but, contrary to all the other indicators of 
trade union power, their ability to maintain wage differentials in favour of their members has 
not been undermined during the 1980s. So it would seem that it is not just a firm's product 
market power which allows trade unions to obtain rent for its members. Smith (1994: 122) 
goes on to say that 'Empirical studies tend to support the notion that union wage bargaining 
does have a significant impact on the structure of wages in the economy. ' 
It has also been argued that the principal factor determining the union wage effect on 
demographic groups doing similarjobs is the standard rate policies of unions. These policies 
require firms to give "equal pay for equal work" to workers within a firm and across firms, 
denying management the right to set pay on an individual-by-individual basis. By equating 
pay across workers within a market, standard rate policies raise the pay of otherwise lower- 
paid workers more than that of otherwise higher-paid workers - see Freeman and Medoff 
1984: 48. However the union wage effect varies across industries and they argue (p 50) that 
the principal factor determining the magnitude of the union wage effect in different industries 
is the monopoly power held by the union. This power is related to the wage sensitivity of the 
demand for organised labour - that is, to the change in employment induced by a given 
change in wages. The smaller the decline in the level of employment as a result of an increase 
in the wage rate the greater the ability of the union to raise wages without incurring any 
significant loss of membership. In those areas where employment is relatively unresponsive 
to changes in wages we could expect to see sizeable union wage gains. In other sectors of the 
economy where employment is relatively responsive to changes in wages only 'modest" 
union wage gains could be expected. 
4.2. The Effects of Changes in the Bargaining Structure and Union Density in the Bus 
and Coach Industry 
4.2.0 Introduction. In the previous section we have critically examined the changes that have 
taken place in inequality, union density and real wages in the economy as a whole. In this 
section and the following section, we will analyse the changes that have taken place in 
inequality in earnings, union density, and union coverage within the industries concerned in 
this study. This is to see if these are different from the previous result, and if they are, what 
may have been the possible reasons for these differences. Specifically we will be examining 
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the propositions put forward at the start of this chapter. 
We will also examine the bargaining structures that existed in the bus and coach industry and 
try to determine if the outcome is similar to the all manual male real average wage, and if 
they are not, what could be the causes of these differences. We will then go on to consider 
some of the effects of privatisation and deregulation, particularly the case of London Buses, 
and the inability of the T&G to respond effectively to the challenge, especially in regard to 
the introduction of competition through competitive tendering. Problems with staff retention 
due to competitive tendering are considered using CentreWest Ltd as an example. 
4.2.1 Changes in Inequalit . From Table 4.9 we can see that unlike all male inequality, all 
male manual bus and coach drivers inequality decreased between 1984 and 1998 except for 
the Highest Decile/ Medium ratio, this increased by 1.1 per cent. The greatest reduction in 
inequality was in the Lowest Quartile/Medium group, which decreased by 2.5 per cent over 
the same period. 
Inequality overall decreased between 1984 and 1998, with the Lowest Quartile/ Medium ratio 
showing the largest decrease overall of 2.5 per cent. However, between 1984 and 1990 the 
decrease in inequality was 4.9 per cent, while it increased by 2.2 per cent between 1990 and 
1998. Also the variance of the inequality was considerably less for bus and coach drivers than 
for all male manuals. This might suggest that the unions were able to limit the increases in 
inequality, compared to the economy in general by maintaining the principle of the 'rate for 
the job'. 
Year Lowest Lowest Highest Highest Highest 
Decile/ Quartile/ Quartile/ Decile/ Decile/ 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Lowest 
Decile 
1984 70.7 81.5 117.3 133.6 189.0 
1990 71.0 85.5 116.3 134.1 188.8 
1998 72.2 83.6 115.9 135.1 187.1 
Percentage Change 
1984/90 0.4 4.9 -0.8 0.4 -0.1 
1990/98 1.7 -2.2 -0.3 0.7 -0.9 
1984/98 2.1 2.5 -1.2 1.1 -1.1 
Table 4.9. Change in male inequality in the Bus and 
Coach Industry 1984-1998. 
Source New Earnings Survey Relevant Years 
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All male Bus & Coach 
Year Manual Drivers 
1984/90 241.5 189.0 
1990/98 260.0 188.8 
1984/98 260.1 187.1 
% Change 7.7 -1.0 
Table 4.10 Ratio for the highest decilet 
lowest decile for all male manuals, and 
bus and coach drivers. 
Table 4.10 gives the ratio for the Highest Decile/ Lowest Decile for all male manuals and bus 
and coach drivers, from this we can see that the variance increased over the period for all 
male manuals by 7.7 per cent. 
4.2.2 Apmregate Trade Union Dýjýsing data calculated from the 1984,1990 and 1998 
WIRS 18 for the road passenger transport sector, shows a similar picture of declining 
aggregate trade union density - see Table 4.11 - to that of the rest of the UK, albeit from a 
higher starting percentage. 
1984 1990 1998 
Private 92.2 60.2 79.8 
Public 99.3 95.8 60.9 
All 98.2 75.8 74.6 
Table 4.11 Aggregate Trade Union Density for 
Scheduled Road Passenger Transport 1984-1998 
By 1998 the overall aggregate density in the private sector of passenger road transport had 
declined by 13.4 per cent to 79.8 per cent from 92.2 per cent. It reached its lowest level in 
1990 when it declined by 35 per cent from 92.2 per cent to 60.2 per cent. However, the 
publics sector density during this period remained fairly constant at 95.8 per cent, a reduction 
of 3V2 per cent from 99.3 per cent. 
Between 1990 and 1998 only the public sector of road passenger transport emulated what 
happened overall within the UK. The density declined from 95.8 per cent to 60.9 per cent, a 
decline of 36 per cent. During the same period the private sector aggregate union density had 
18 These figures have to be treated with caution as the sample number are below the level of observations needed 
to produce statistically reliable estimates. 
176 
increased by 33 per cent from 60.2 per cent to 79.8 per cent. This increase in aggregate 
density for the private sector may be explained by the increasing concentration of the 
industry, which took place during the 1990s. The large bus groups - of which there are four - 
have recognised the trade unions in all areas of negotiations, except for national wage 
bargaining. 
The bus industry is a service industry, and having a high level of union density means that it 
does not conform to some of the perceived wisdom about union density. According to Green 
(1992: 445) there is a generally agreed broad consensus that 'union density tends to be 
higher ... in manufacturing than 
in service industries'. But the high level of public ownership 
prior to privatisation and deregulation may in part explain the high level of union density. 
11igh union density is normally associated with public ownership - see Green 1992: 445 - it 
also tends to exist in industries where ownership is concentrated. 
4.2.3. Mean Trade Union Density. The mean of private sector union density between 1984 
and 1990 declined to 39.2 per cent from 87.4 per cent a reduction of 55 per cent - see Table 
4.12. The private sector 1990 mean of 39.2 per cent indicates a fragment sector, while the 
mean density of 95.7 per cent for the public sector still reflected a highly concentrated sector. 
1984 1990 1998 
Private 87.4 39.2 77.1 
Public 99.3 95.7 62.1 
All 94.4 46.7 74.7 
Table 4.12 Mean trade union 
density for scheduled road 
passenger transport 1984-1998 
The mean union density of the public sector declined by 4 per cent from 99.3 per cent to 95.7 
per cent between 1984 and 1990. While the mean union density for the whole of road 
passenger transport decline by 51 per cent from 94.4 per cent to 46.7 per cent during this 
period. 
Between 1990 and 1998 the private sector density increased by 98 per cent from 39.2 per cent 
to 77.6 per cent. This increase, like the increase in aggregate density, went against the 
national trend that was still declining. However, the public sector density of passenger road 
transport declined from 95.7 per cent to 62.1 per cent. 
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Figure 4.4 Change in coverage for full-time males in scheduled road passenger 
transport 1973-1985 
4.2.4 Change in Trade Union Coverage. For the Bus and Coach Industry examination of 
Table 4.14 shows that National and Supplernentary/Company and other agreements declined I", 
from 42.8 per cent to 34.6 per cent a decrease of 27.6 per cent between 1973 and 1985. 
Whilst coverage by 'National Agreement only' remained static between 1973 and 1985, 
although there were larae -variations between 1973 and 1978, and 1978 and 1985. Coveraye 1 It, -- -71 
declined during 1973 and 1978 from 37.4 per cent to 25.2 per cent. However, frorn 1978 to 1 
1985 coverage increased to 34.6 per cent, resulting in an decrease of 1.1 per cent between 
1973 and 1985. 
Coverage by Company, district or local agreement increased from 9.8 per cent to 18.2 per 
cent an increase of 86.7 per cent between 1973 and 1985. The main increase was between 
1973 and 1978, from 9.8 per cent to 17.2 per cent an increase of some 75c/-c. This change 
could be in part due the recommendations by the Donovan Commission on the move to 
localised collective bargaining, Also in 1967 a Report by the National Board for Prices and 
incomes resulted in the various Councils setting minimum terrns and conditions of 
or employment. These minimum terms and conditions were enhanced throu-l-, h local productivity 
178 
bargaining conducted within a framework laid down by the NJICs and NJCs. 
Company, 
National and district or 
supplementary National local 
/ company agreement agreement No collective 
Year agreements only only agreement 
1973-1978 42.8 37.4 9.8 5.0 
1978-1985 50.3 25.2 17.2 7.3 
1973-1985 34.6 37.0 18.2 10.1 
Table 4.13 Percentage change in full-time males on adult rates 
in scheduled road passenger transport 1973-1985 covered by 
various types of collective treatment 
The largest increase was in those who were not affected by any form of collective agreement. 
The increase was almost unifon-n between 1973-1978 and 1978-1985 and was the largest for 
any of the groups within transport and communications. 
4.2.5 Change in the Composition of the Workforce in the Bus and Coach IndustuL As in the 
previous sections we will now examine what has happened to the composition of the 
workforce due to the privatisation of the bus industry, and the subsequent consolidation of the 
industry. Table 4.14 gives the results of the shift-share analysis. Consolidation of the industry 
that took place in the 1990s has resulted in large changes between 1990 and 1998, and this 
has resulted in figures that are difficult to explain using shift-share analysis. Therefore we 
will disregard these results and concentrate on the 1984-1990 and 1984-1998 results in this 
instance. 
1984-1990 1990-1998 1984-1998 
% of change due to within-group changes in union 
density between private and public sector 11 405 16 
% of change due to change in the composition of the 
workforce between private and public sector 43 314 144 
Note: The percentages do not sum to 100, owin to the interactive ter7n 
Table 4.14 Compositional change of the Bus and Coach Industry between the public 
and private sectors 
Between 1984 and 1990 there was a 45 per cent increase in union density due to within-group 
changes between private and public sector - see Table 4.14. During the same period there was 
235 per cent change in the composition of the workforce between private and public sector. 
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Overall between 1984 and 1998 there was a 144 per cent change due to the change in the 
composition of the workforce. Unlike other sectors of the economy, trade union density in the 
private sector of the bus and coach industry increased from 42 per cent to 80 per cent. This 
was due to the transfer of highly unionised firms from the public sector to the private sector. 
However, over the same time period, the public sector density declined by 38.3 per cent from 
99 per cent to 61 per cent19. Private sector employment also increased during this period from 
21 per cent to 73 per cent an increase of 347.6 per cent, compared to a 65.8 per cent decline 
in public sector employment from 79 per cent to 27 per cent. 
Table 4.15 surnmarises the results for all manuals, transport, and bus and coach. From the 
table we can see that the change in the composition of the workforce overall has the greatest 
effect for the bus and coach sector and was considerably greater than for the economy as a 
whole. 
1984-1990 1990-1998 1984-1998 
Within Group effect 
All manual 25 6 15 
Bus and Coach 11 405 16 
Compositional Effect 
1984-1990 1990-1998 1984-1998 
All manual 76 95 87 
Bus and Coach 43 314 144 
Table 4.15 Summary of within group and compositional 
effect between 1984 and 1998 
Overall the within group effect due to changes in union had little effect on the bus and coach 
sector. 
4.2.6 Real Average Eamings in the Bus and Coach Induqry. Even though non-unionism was 
increasing between 1973 and 1985, the real average wage for all industries during this period 
rose by 13.1% - see Table 4.16. Also during this period real earnings for Road Passenger 
Transport rose by 17.9 per cent. 
The size of the increase in real wages for-Passenger Transport was even more impressive 
when we remember that it was gained while the product market was declining. From 1973 to 
1986, local bus passenger journeys fell by 2,131 million from 7,866m to 5,635m, a decrease 
19 Due to the small number involved in the WIRS surveys these figures have to be treated with caution. 
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of 27.9 per cent. The increase in real wages, which was above the manufacturing average, did 
not escape the eye of some economists. 'Other businesses to show an increase in real earnings 
over this period in excess of the manufacturing average were Electricity, the National Bus 
Company, British Airways, Postal Services, Telecommunications and the British Steel 
Corporation' (Redwood and Hatch 1982: 15). The ability to increase the real wage of its 
members in the context of a declining product market may be evidence of trade union power, 
indicated by the high level of union density. 
sic 1973-1978 1978-1985 1973-1985 
All 0.3 12.8 13.1 
Road Passenger Transport 5.6 11.6 17.9 
Table 4.16 Percentage Change in Real Average Earnings for 
various SIC Groups between 1973-85 
4.2.7 Negotiating Machinery for the Bus and Coach Industry. There were three main 
negotiating sectors in the Bus and Coach Industry prior to deregulation and privatisation. 
The Private Sector - tours, private hire and contract work which consisted of mostly 
small firms: 'in 1976 almost three-quarters had under six vehicles - many are family 
businesses or partnerships also running road haulage, vehicle repair or car-hire 
services, and they rely heavily on part-time, seasonal or casual drivers' (ACAS 1980: 
p204) 
2. The Municipal Sector - stage carriage service consisted of the Passenger Transport 
Executives (PTE), and some 50 other local authorities that also ran bus services. 
3. London Transport Executive - stage carriage service. 
The agreements were similar - both in coverage, and in actual terms and conditions of 
employment - to those set for local authorities by the NJIC and NJC. According to Heseltine 
and Silcock (1990: 244-245) this cumbersome national machinery made it difficult to change 
structures and working practices, and sustained previously complex working practices in the 
public sector - particularly those governing crew scheduling. These practices proved to be 
costly to administer in terms of both wages and productivity. In contrast, independent 
operators in the private sector had very few codified agreements. 
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National bargaining ended in the private and municipal sectors when the industry was 
deregulated in 1987. London Transport continued area bargaining until 1989 when LBL was 
being prepared for privatisation - see 4.3.3. 
We will now examine the changes that took place due to the introduction of tendering and 
then the privatisation of London Buses. 
4.3. Tendering and Privatisation of London Buses. 
4.3.0 Introduction. This section critically examines the effects of tendering and privatisation 
on the membership of the main trade union representing bus drivers and conductors 
employed by London Buses Limited (LBL), the T&G. A major source of the material for this 
section is an internal report prepared by the then Passenger Services Group National 
Secretary of the union in 1993 for the Union's General Secretary. 
4.3.1 Background to Tendering of London Buses Ltd. The first route contracts were put out to 
tender in 1985 and were tendered on a gross cost basis. This meant that London Transport 
(LT) retained all the income from the fares and awarded contracts on the basis of the lowest 
gross cost the operator was prepared to quote to provide the service. With this system once 
the contract was awarded the operator was insulated from commercial risk, since their income 
from individual route or routes covered by the tendering system were fixed. They were also 
protected from entry competition because once the contract was awarded, they became the 
monopoly provider on that route. This system has been described as the limited competition 
model - see Preston 2001: 41 - based on minimum cost tenders at route level. The importance 
of this model and how it affected the T&G by ending direct wage bargaining with LBL will 
be explained later in this section. 
One of the main stated objectives of deregulation was to promote competition and thereby 
increase the efficiency of the operation and match services more closely to passenger 
demands. Although the tendering of bus services had introduced competition amongst 
operators in London, LBL was still the dominant firm in the market. It was believed that if a 
high level of competition was to be achieved LBL had to be subdivided into a number of 
companies which could be sold off and which could then compete against one another. This 
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process was completely different from what had taken place in the rest of the UK bus 
industry. 
During the financial year 1986/87 contracts for 9 per cent (15 million miles) of the total 
annual bus mileage operated were offered for tender by London Regional Transport (LRT). 
Of the 56 routes tendered, LBL won 40 per cent and other operators 60 per cent. According 
to LRT the average cost per bus mile on an annual basis of the routes operating under 
tendered contracts on 31" March 1987 was fl. 54 per mile. This compared with fl. 99 per 
mile when operated by LBL prior to tendering, a reduction in real terms of 22 per cent (see 
London Transport Report 1986/87: 14). 
Although LBL retained bargaining for the majority of its platform staff, some of its staff were 
transferred to two subsidiary companies, Kingston Buses and Stanwell Buses. These 
companies were set up by LBL to win tenders in their areas. When platform staff were 
transferred to these subsidiary companies, new and less favorable terms and conditions of 
employment were imposed. The T&G challenged the legality of the tendering system in the 
High Court, but failed to win the case. 
The creation of these companies coincided with long-term management plans to restructure 
LBL. This restructuring raised concerns amongst the platform staff that it would result in 
wage cuts and longer hours for the crews. The concern about "Kingston-type pay and 
conditions" resulted in London buses being off the road for two hours while 18,000 drivers 
and conductors attended union meetings in their garages - see Financial Times 1987b. 
4.3.2 The Extension of Tendering. In 1989 the prospect of widespread disruption to public 
transport in London became likely when the leaders of the bus workers rejected a7 per cent 
pay offer. The rise in inflation prompted workers to seek a large settlement. The T&G 
officials' strategy was to ballot its membership on taking a series of 24-hour strikes. When the 
ballot was counted, the bus workers, who had tabled a 14 per cent claim, voted by five-to-one 
to take strike action over the offer. 
As a result of the ballot, London Regional Transport said it would increase its offer on overall 
earnings. At that time a bus conductor earned about E186 pounds a week, and 
driver/operators E220 - see Gapper 1989: 4. The bus pay offer covered all platform staff, 
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except for those on four-tendered route networks where pay and conditions had already been 
varied by LRT. 
After a one-day strike on the 16 th May LBL improved its 7.1 per cent pay offer. But as the 
bus workers had lodged a 14 per cent claim and voted by five-to-one in a ballot to take strike 
action over the offer, they planned to repeat their 24-hour strikes every fortnight. The 
improved offer from London Buses was 7.5 per cent on the basic rate but with other 
improvements was worth 8.1 per cent (Thompson 1989b: 15). 
'In early July the union leaders representing 13,500 London Buses drivers and conductors 
recommended the acceptance of a9 per cent offer. A ballot will be held on the offer, 
comprising 8 per cent on basic pay and I per cent in cash, on July 14' (Financial Times 
1989b). 
From this it can be seen that the union was still undertaking collective bargaining on behalf of 
its members, even though about a quarter of the network had been put out to tender. Where 
tendering was used it restricted competition to the tendering process. Once the contract was 
issued a de facto monopoly was created on the tendered route, unlike the Herefordshire trial 
area where there was freer competition, which was only subject to entry or exit notice along 
with the industry wide quality [safety] conditions. While central negotiations with LBL 
continued and because the majority of the network was not put out to tender, the unions were 
able to obtain substantial wage increases on behalf of their members. However, as we shall 
see, once the network was put out to tender, the unions were no longer able to maintain the 
earnings of its membership working in the London bus companies. 
4.3.3 End of Central Negotiations. LBL negotiated centrally for the last time in 1989. They 
announced its intention to decentralise its bargaining from March 1990, and individual 
companies would become responsible for negotiating their own terms and conditions of 
employment. Later that year LBL was split into a number of subsidiaries in preparation for 
privatisation. 
In October London Transport announced plans to put a further large portion of its bus 
network out to tender. At that time about 23 per cent of the LBL network had already been 
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put out to tender. Private-sector operators ran most of these tendered services, although LBL, 
which operated the rest of the network, had won some tendered routes. 
According to Mr Nick Newton, manager of LRT's tendered bus unit, 'such [tendered] services 
had been proved more reliable and about 15 per cent cheaper than the services they replaced. 
"This has encouraged us to quicken the pace of putting out services to tender"' (Brown 1989: 
12). The routes put out to tender represented about 10 per cent of the LRT network, or about 
18m bus miles. 
LRT was in the process of splitting up LBL into 13 units to prepare for the extension of bus 
deregulation to London when the T&G gave a warning that deregulation and privatisation 
might be leading to the end of 50 years of relative industrial peace on the buses. 'Mr Graham 
Stevenson, the union's passenger services national secretary-designate said that widespread 
discontent was building up among bus workers'... 'Given that it is an extremely labour- 
intensive activity (around three-quarters of operating costs) it is not surprising that wages 
would be the first area where savings would be made... 'Mr Stevenson said 'In effect, the bus 
worker has been forced to subsidise the taxpayer by virtue of a massive reduction in public 
subsidies, alongside the squeezing of wages and conditions' (Brown 1989: 12). 
4.3.4 Company Bargaining in London. Company negotiations began with the LBL 
subsidiary companies when they were established in 1989. At the same time the government 
announced that the block grant would be apportioned on a basis of contracts awarded to the 
subsidiary. This announcement had a dramatic effect on wages and conditions of employment 
for those employed in the subsidiary companies. LBL drew up a timetable giving the date by 
which agreement had to be made, between 4th- 19'h January 1993. It also set a ceiling of ; E250 
per week on average earnings - see Stevenson 1993: 120 . This effectively meant a reduction 
in 
weekly earnings of between E30 and E60, and an increase of the working week of between 
three and five hours to 42V2 hours. According to the T&G adding these two factors together 
meant a reduction in earnings of some 30 per cent in real ten-ns 
20 This raises questions about the previous earnings of LBL employees; did their earnings include an element of 
rent? Also what would be the effect if the new rate were below the market equilibrium rate? These issues will be 
discussed in a following section. 
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According to London Regional Transport (1993: 15) 'Towards the end of the year, staff on all 
routes which had not previously been tendered were paid substantial compensation in 
exchange for reduced rostered earnings and increased working hours. 99 per cent 
unconditionally accepted the revised conditions which are necessary if the subsidiary 
companies are to compete successfully with the private sector. Staff turnover was very low 
reflecting market conditions ... Reduced pay and more competitive conditions were 
introduced 
on block grant routes, bringing pay and conditions more in line with those offered by the 
private sector' (London Regional Transport 1993: 16). - 
In February 1993 about 12,000 LBL staff were balloted by the T&G on taking industrial 
action over the changes to pay and conditions, including pay cuts of between E30 and E60 a 
week. The union said that any action would probably be a series of one-day stoppages. 
However, LBL did offer a "sweetener" to its employees to accept this reduction of earnings. 
This caused the union to accuse the 10 subsidiaries of LBL of 'blackmail', saying the 
companies had threatened to withdraw compensation for loss of earnings if staff did not 
accept the package within varying periods of time. Some of the companies had told their staff 
they would have to waive their right to take action, including legal action, as a condition of 
receiving compensation. According to a T&G internal report 'Members were told that if they 
did not sign the acceptance forins by a certain date they would not receive a compensation 
payment and that refusal to sign at all would mean that they would be out of a job. Some of 
the letters even went as far as to say that staff dismissed in this fashion would be unable to 
claim Unemployment Benefit and that, by signing to accept, they were waiving any right to 
take legal action against the company! ' (Stevenson 1993: 2). 
The compensation was worth about two years lost earnings, on average about E3,000. Driver- 
operators earned about E280 a week before overtime. In the case of London United they 
offered a one-off payment of E3,800 to buy out current working practices in return for a 
longer working week and lower wages. There were also concerns about the company's refusal 
to give assurances on the future of staff pensions. The cost of the 'buyout' would have been 
between E37m and E47m, but there is no identifiable cost within the 1992/93 annual report 
and accounts. The total cost of the cost reduction schemes to LBL that year was E65. Om - see 
London Regional Transport 1993: 40. 
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The initial advice of the union to its members was that nobody should sign new contracts. If 
this position had been held, it could have aborted, or at least delayed, the whole process, 
unless the employers had been willing to give notice to all the staff concerned. However, the 
membership did begin to sign new contracts in sufficient numbers to raise concern within the 
union. After taking internal legal advice, the union encouraged members to sign the new 
contract, but at the same time hand in a disclaimer letter and vote "Yes" in the industrial 
action ballot - see Stevenson 1993: 2. 
Company 
CentreWest 
East London 
Leasidel 
London Northern 
London United 
London CentraI2 
London General 
Metroline 
Selkent 
South London 
Total 
Fore Against Percentage Fore 
Rejected industrial action 
Action short of strike only 
366 274 57.2 
309 297 51.0 
544 163 76.9 
394 344 53.4 
912 285 76.2 
354 183 65.9 
377 229 62.2 
364 216 62.8 
3,620 1,991 64.5 
Table 4.17 Voting Returns of London Garages: Source Stevenson 1993 p4 1 Clapton Garage was ruled out due to irregularities 2 The fact that the Peckham Garage was to close effected this result 
Table 4.17 gives the voting figures for the LBL subsidiaries that voted in favour of taking 
industrial action. The overall average voting in favour of industrial action was 63.2 per cent. 
Of the 5,611 people who voted, 64.5 per cent voted for full industrial action. The lowest 
percentage in favour was 51 per cent at London Northern, while the highest percentage in 
favour of action was London United at 76.9 per cent. 
What is somewhat surprising is that the one-day stoppage still took place in protest over the 
introduction of the new terms and conditions of employment. Yet according to London Buses 
99 per cent of employees affected had signed new contracts. In their 1993/94 Annual report 
they described the industrial action thus 'At the beginning of the year there was some 
industrial unrest following the introduction of revised operating staff rates and conditions of 
service' (London Regional Transport 1994: 14). Also Mr Ollie Jackson, a T&G union official, 
said his members had signed new contracts and indicated that a prolonged dispute was 
unlikely. They were also unlikely to attract much public sympathy for their cause. The action 
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was being taken against a background of declining labour militancy. '... the number of strikes 
in January was even lower than last year, a record for the time' (Financial Times 1993a: 15). 
'About two thirds of red London buses are expected to be off the roads... ' (Summers 1993: 
16). So why did the strikes go ahead? Certainly it would appear to go against some of the 
conventional thinking about why strikes happen - see for example Bosworth et al 1996: 354 - 
who has argued that the conceptual framework that tends to be favoured by modem 
economists is the asymmetric information approach. It is difficult to believe that there was 
asymmetry of information in this particular case. The most likely explanation is that although 
the members may have felt that they had no alternative but to accept the imposition of the 
new structure, it was not accepted willingly, and they wanted to express their displeasure at 
the imposition, supporting the call for limited strike action. 
Another reason why the ballot for strike action was supported was that the union had linked 
the change in the terms and conditions of employment with the pension issue. The union had 
recognized that this was the one issue which would unite all of the LBL bus workers. Garages 
like Potters Bar, who were not affected by the block grant removal, supported the ballot for 
industrial action simply because of the pensions issue. It was an attractive strategy for the 
union to be able to link the pay and pensions issues. As it unified the membership across LBL 
with a common cause, a situation they had not been able to create for four years. Previously 
the problem for the union had been that wage bargaining had been carried out at a local level, 
while pensions was still the responsibility of LBL. 
4.3.5 An analysis of the Labour Supply and Tendering System in London. A neo-classical 
analysis would indicate that a level of wages above the equilibrium level would tend to 
indicate some form of market failure. In the case of LBL we would have expected that the 
trade unions had raised the level of earnings above the market equilibrium i. e. rent sharing. 
The effect of tendering was to reduce the bargaining wage, and this was due to the market 
having only one customer, London Transport, who in the first round of tendering had set the 
wage level. This was not an 'oligopsonist (i. e. a firm that buys a substantial proportion of the 
labour supplied in the market, but which exists alongside a few other comparable firms in the 
market) facing a kinked supply curve' (Bosworth et al 1996: 15) in the true sense. In the first 
instance, London Transport set the maximum average wage under the tendering process at 
E250 per week. The question is, at what level was the wage set compared to the equilibrium 
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wage? The empirical evidence suggests that the level of wages was below the equilibrium 
wage level due to the continuing high turnover of labour. For example CentreWest reduced 
the rate of pay for all but three grades of employees in 1993 - see Table 4.18. 
Grade 
OPO 
OPO to midi 
OPO nights 
Standard midi 
Tendered midi 
Crew driver 
Conductor (old) 
Conductor (new) 
Average weekly pay 
f prior to tendering 
276.01 
276.01 
298.54 
236.6 
208.54 
250.61 
245.46 
202.51 
Average weekly pay Gain (loss) Percentage 
f after tendering f per week Change 
246.88 (29.13) -10.6 
236.67 (39.34) -14.3 
279.85 (18.69) -6.3 
236.67 0.07 0.0 
208.96 0.42 0.2 
230.82 (19.79) -7.9 
204.97 (40.49) -16.5 
205.62 3.11 1.5 
Table 4.18 Pay rates at CentreWest in 1993. Source TGWU 1999: 11 
If the hypothesis that we have put forward is correct, this would have increased the pressure 
on the LBL privatised subsidiaries to retain labour. According to the NES in 1989, the 
average weekly wage for a male manual employed by LBL was E239.9. If we update that 
figure for inflation in 1993 it would have been E305.55. 
Grade 1989 1993 1993 Difference Percentage 
Basic Real Actual Change 
Driver\operator 179.74 230.43 212.74 -17.69 -7.7 
Driver 158.52 203.22 192.00 -11.22 -5.5 
Midibus 143.15 183.52 170.44 -13.08 -7.1 
Conductor 155.09 198.83 188.01 -10.82 -5.4 
Table 4.19 Change in Pay Rates at CentreWest 1989-1993 
Table 4.19 shows the change in basic rates between four groups of employees. The 1989 
figures relate to weekly pay rates at London Bus and the 1993 figures relate to basic pay rates 
at CentreWest. From this table we can see that the range of the percentage decrease in real 
terms is between 7.7 per cent and 5.4 per cent and the mean is 6.4 per cent. 
4.3.6 CentreWest. To analyse the effects the tendering has had on the earnings of former 
employers of LBL we examine briefly the case of CentreWest, where there was an ACAS 
independent arbitration settlement for the 1999 pay agreement. In his comments on this the 
arbitrator highlighted the effects of the tendering process on wage determination. The 
arbitration process came about due to continued industrial action and a strike that took place 
on the 17th November 1999. Also it must be remembered that CentreWest was the only group 
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which rejected the call for industrial action in 1993 in opposition to the introduction of new 
rates of pay and working practices. 
The T&G's original claim stated that the union's goal was to achieve a rate of E9 an hour for 
London bus drivers and a rate of E7.50 for London bus conductors. This T&G policy was 
passed by the Union's National Passenger Services Conference in 1998. In its evidence to the 
independent arbitrator - Professor William Brown - the union used data from the 1989 NES 
to show that the average earnings of drivers and conductors for LBL was E239.90 - T&G 
1999: 14 - 10.1% above the national average for male manual earnings. If that differential 
were to be maintained in 1999, the average earnings for London bus drivers and conductors 
would be E368.80, far above the rates found at CentreWest. For average earnings at 
CentreWest to regain the 1989 position relative to the national average, a 26% pay rise would 
be required. 
The union also identified the grading structure as another problem area. Prior to privatisation 
there were 6 grades for drivers and two for conductors. By 1999 there were 14 grades for 
drivers and two for conductors. This increase in grades resulted in the union commenting that 
'CentreWest currently operates a grading structure that can only be described as highly 
complex, difficult to understand and unfair in its operation (TGWU 1999: 5). The Union was 
also concerned at the unfairness of the current system, which did not allow all drivers to 
progress to the highest grades (TGWU 1999: 6). In effect there was a, glass ceiling' for 
drivers employed by the company after privatisation. Only drivers who were employed by the 
company prior to privatisation could be on the highest-grade rate. 
The combination of low pay and the complex grading structure resulted in major problems 
for the company in recruiting and retaining staff. In Fig 4.5 we show the turnover for drivers 
at CentreWest garages in 1999. This was between 46 per cent at Uxbridge while 16 per cent 
at Acton Tram, with an average of 31 per cent. In the Arbitrator's Report and Award it 
identified that: 
'The roots of this dispute lie in the short-term perspective of the tendering 
system operated by London Transport. The need to manage within tight 
financial and operational constraints, and with relatively short contracts, 
militates against a stable industrial relations policy. Bus operators are offered 
little scope to compete other than by worsening the terms and conditions of 
employment. This will have serious long-term implications for the quality, 
attitudes and skills of the workforce. A failure to address this underlying 
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problem of market regulation is likely to lead to increasing numbers of 
disputes arising from disorderly pay structures and a declining sense of 
employee commitment to public transport as a service' (Brown 2000: 5). 
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Figure 4.5 Driver turnover at CentreWest garages in 1999. 
Source TGWU 1999: 6 
4.3.7 Summqa of Tendering in London. The tendering system in London ended the 
traditional bargaining model where a union negotiated with individual companies. 
The level of wages is to all intents and purposes set by the tendering regime put in 
place by LRT, and the union had little or no influence over this process. The former 
LBL subsidiaries could only compete with private sector operators by reducing the 
terms and conditions of employment of their employees. Even with the introduction 
of this limited competition, as with Hereford, it was fatal for area collective 
bargaining, as wanted by the architects of the liberalisation programme. 
Given the economic climate in 1992, the union's members either had to accept the revised 
terms or face the prospect of losing their jobs. Some 15 members did lose their jobs because 
they refused to accept the new terms and conditions of employment offered by LBL. 
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However, it would appear that the tendering process has reduced the wages of London bus 
driver and conductors below the equilibrium level, and this has caused serious problems over 
recruitment and retention of staff, especially when the labour market is tight in London. 
4.3.8 Changing Earnings in the Bus Indqqry. We will now examine critically what has 
happened to earnings for bus and coach drivers between 1974 and 1998 - see Fig 4.13. Real 
average earnings reached their second highest level in 1986, the year prior to the start of 
privatisation and deregulation in 1987. In 1987 there was a steep decline in earnings from 
which they have never recovered. 
The data used in Figure 4.10 would appear to support the hypothesis that the average wage 
will be lower after privatisation. Unfortunately the NES data does not distinguish between 
different types of ownership, but a large proportion of the industry was transferred to the 
private sector, so it would appear reasonable to conclude that privatisation has had some 
effect on reducing the level of average wages. These effects will be reinforced by those 
emanating from competition, as firms attempt to match the cost structure of lower- 
cost .... This outcome n-dght be secured by a range of measures including compositional 
changes in the workforce in favour of low-wage employees, and relatively smaller increases 
in earnings over time.... At the level of the industry, restructuring has clearly had an adverse 
effect on wages. New Earnings Survey data indicates that bus drivers' adverse2l wages have 
fallen in the period since deregulation from about 5 per cent above male average male manual 
earnings to nearly 15 per cent below' (Pendleton 1999: 782). The data used for Fig 4.10 
shows that the real wage fell by 12.7 per cent between 1986 and 1998. 
Pendleton (1999: 783) has suggested 'that the impact of privatisation on wage levels may be 
experienced mainly in the early stages of private ownership (i. e. before our observations). 
Thereafter a process of "catching up" occurs'. However, the data output for Figure 4.10 does 
not suggest any 'catching up' occurring. From 1986 to 1991, apart from 1988 a consistent 
decline in real earnings occurred. From 1992 onwards there have been both increases and 
decreases in the real wage, although in the last four years. 
21 We assume this is a typographical error and should read average 
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However, Pendleton's analysis may be more relevant when he later argues 'that the possibility 
of product market competition may be instrumental in bringing about lower wage levels in 
privatized firms, even though variation in the actual degree of competition between firms 
does not appear to be a powerful determinant of relative wage levels. Privatised firms 
operating in a contestable market may be under more pressure to secure economies in the 
wage bill than public sector firms, and we would therefore expect these firms to make more 
use of the various innovations to reduce labour costs that appeared in the industry from the 
mid-1980s.... However, privatised firms are more likely to make use of a combination of 
lower pay rates for minibus and lower "starter" rates of pay' (Pendleton 1999: 783). He would 
appear to be suggesting that it is the threat of introducing competition into the market, rather 
than the existing competition, that puts greater downward pressure on wages. 'In short, 
privatised [bus] firms appear to secure higher levels of profitability from a lower level of 
sales per employee by squeezing wages. Looking at it from the other direction, public sector 
firms have a lower level of profitability for a higher level of sales' (Pendleton 1999: 785). 
This may indicate that it is the type of ownership that is important in the distribution of 'rent'. 
In a privatised firm the 'majority' of the rent may be distributed as profit to satisfy the 'capital 
markets'. While in a public sector bus firm, the workforce through their union and with the 
agreement of the owner, a larger degree of the rent goes to the workforce in the form of 
higher wages. Also the publicly owned firm does not have to satisfy the demands of the 
capital markets by making the same level of profits, it can make less profit and still meet the 
requirements of capital replacement, at the same time still meeting the wage demand of the 
trade unions. 
The higher level of average wages found in these [public sector] firms suggests that the 
benefits of higher sales activity per employee are in part being captured by the workforce and 
their unions. As we saw earlier, pay determination and related issues were significantly more 
likely to be settled jointly with unions in the public sector firms' (Pendleton 1999: 785). 
The worst case outcome for both capital and labour would appear to be the London tendering 
situation, where through the tendering system the ability for the firm to satisfy the 
requirements of the capital markets is limited. The conventional wisdom in the industry is 
that firms need to make a profit of 15 per cent, and this has proved difficult to achieve in 
London under the tendering system, and this rate of profitability is considered to be excessive 
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by London Buses. It is also recognised by the major companies in the capital that wages are 
below the competitive equilibrium, with one senior manager saying that the rate for a bus 
driver should be EIO per hour - see Transit Nov 2000: 1. '[Leon] Danicls, managing director 
of London bus operator First Capital and First CentreWest said there had been a "complete 
meltdown" in the staffing in the city. He blamed the cost-conscious tendering system for 
putting pressure on operators to suppress driver's wage claim in order to win contracts' 
(Transit Nov 2000: 1). 
However, if the firm is dominant in a market outside of London, according to Pendleton 
(1999: 785) they 'are able to achieve a higher level of sales per employee, with the benefits of 
this shared between owners and workers. This rather different set of results for competition 
suggests that active competition does not always reinforce the effects of privatization in the 
way that it is often predicted in the literature'. 
4.3.9 Overview of Effects of Privatisation and Deregulation on Wages. In 4.3.8 we suggested 
that the privatisation and deregulation of the bus and coach industry has had an adverse effect 
on the wages of bus and coach drivers. If privatisation and deregulation and/or competition 
was responsible for this adverse effect, 'we would expect average wages to be lower in 
privatized firms and /or those experiencing high levels of competition' (Pendleton 1999: 783). 
Privatized/high 
Year Privatisation Competition competition 
I Y** Y Y* 
2 Y*** Y Y*** 
3 Y*** Y Y** 
4 Y*** Y* Y** 
5Y Y** Y 
Notes: Y=relationship is as predicted by the main hypotheses 
t-value significant at 0.05; **= t-value significant at 0.01; 
***= t-value significant at 0.001 
Table 4.20 Average remuneration per employee. 
Source: Pendleton 1999: 783. 
As Table 4.20 shows, 'average levels of remuneration are consistently lower in privatized 
firms throughout the period, and significantly so in four out of the five years. Competition is 
also associated with lower average levels of remuneration but the differences are significant 
in just two years. The measure of the combined privatization/competition effect suggests that 
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competition does not have any additional effects to those of ownership' (Pendleton 1999: 
783). These results are in line with the prediction that remuneration will be lower in 
privatised firms. 
4.3.10 Review of Bus and Coach Industry Section. At the start of this chapter we set out the 
four main propositions we were going to critically examine. In this section on the bus and 
coach industry we have identified the changes that have taken place in regard to these 
propositions. We can summarise these results as: 
1. In the case of the bus and coach industry we cannot support the proposition that 
privatisation and deregulation will result in an increase in inequality, although this is 
qualified. 
2. We agree that privatisation and deregulation has resulted in changes to the bargaining 
structure, especially in London due to the tendering process. Changes have occurred 
outside London but national bargaining occurs with all the 'Big 4' bus groups, except for 
wage bargaining, and the reason for this not taking place nationally is in part due to the 
unions own agenda. 
3. The proposition that there will be a reduction in the main index of trade union power, 
union density, is not supported. Although there has been a reduction in this it has not been 
to the same extent as other sectors. Exceptionally, trade union density actually increased 
in the private sector due to the transfer of a highly unionised workforce to the private 
sector. 
4. The proposition that privatisation and deregulation will result in a reduction in average 
earnings in the bus and coach industry is supported. 
The reasons why not all of the propositions are supported may be in part due to the factor that 
unlike a number of other privatisations the bus and coach industry was not a natural 
monopoly, and this may have had a bearing on the results. Because there was no natural 
monopoly, and as there was already competition in the market albeit limited, we would not 
see the whole of the market being exposed to market forces for the first time. Also not all the 
market was put into the private sector. Some of the municipal companies still remained de 
facto owned by local authorities. These factors may have diluted the affects of privatisation 
and deregulation. 
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In the next section we will use the same tools of analyses to examine what happened in the 
port industry and see if the results are similar. If they are not we will try to identify what may 
have produced these different results. 
4.4 The Effect of Changes in the Bargaining Structure and Union Density in the Port 
Industry 
4.4.0 Introduction. In the previous section on the bus and coach industry we critically 
examined the changes that have taken place in inequality, trade union density, bargaining 
structures and the composition of employment. We will use similar techniques for this section 
as we did in the previous sections when examining the changes that have taken place in the 
port industry. The same hypothesis will also be tested, however, in the section when dealing 
with changes in employment. We will briefly discuss the Walton Economic Forecasting 
Associates (WEFA) report, which predicted an increased in employment if the NDLS was 
abolished. We will then go on and examine whether the predicted increase in employment 
occurred and if it did not, why not. 
4.4.1 Change in IneqiLality. As in the previous sections we will now examine the changes that 
have taken place in equality between 1984 and 1998 and compare the results to the changes 
that have taken place in the other sectors of the economy examined in this chapter. 
Highest 
Lowest Lowest Highest Highest Decile/ 
Decile/ Quartile/ Quartile/ Decile/ Lowest 
Year Median Median Median Median Decile 
1984 67.8 78.2 125.6 167.0 246.5 
1990 64.2 77.9 126.2 161.3 251.3 
1998 66.6 81.3 127.7 154.1 231.5 
Percentage Change 
1984/90 -5.3 -0.4 0.5 -3.4 2.0 
1990/98 3.7 4.4 1.2 -4.5 -7.9 
1984/98 -1.7 4.0 1.7 -7.7 -6.1 
Table 4.21 Change in Inequality in Male Manual Earnings 
Between 1984- 1998 in the Port Industry 
As with the bus and coach industry, we have a dominant union in a highly unionised industry, 
suggesting that inequality should be lower than the national average, due in part to the 'rate 
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for the job' principle. With the privatisation and deregulation programme we would expect 
that inequality would increase and especially at the lower end of the earnings distribution. 
Overall there is evidence that inequality increased slightly - Table 4.21- between 1984 and 
1998. 
Years All male Port 
manual Industry 
1984/90 241.5 246.5 
1990/98 260.0 251.3 
1984/98 260.1 231.5 
% Change 7.7 -6.1 
Table 4.22 Change in Highest 
DecileALowest Decile Ratio 
However, between 1984 and 1990 there was a 6.1 per cent decrease in inequality in the 
Highest Decile/ Lowest Decile ratio - see table 4.22 - while all male manual inequality 
increased by 7.7 per cent. 
During this time inequality increased in all but one of the ratios, the Highest Decile/Median. 
The overall decline in inequality, except for the Highest Quartile/ Median ratio, would appear 
to indicate that the unions may have been able to apply the 'rate for the job' principle. 
However, this at best can only be a generalization, as many other external factors in the wider 
economy could be effecting these ratios. 
4.4.2 Aggregate Trade Union Density. As in the previous sections we have calculated the 
aggregate trade union density using data from the 1984,1990 and 1998 WIRS - see Table 
4.23. This shows a similar picture of declining aggregate trade union density to that of the 
scheduled road passenger transport. 
1984 1990 1998 
Private 91.3 88.4 N/A 
Public 100.0 54.8 44.3 
All 91.1 79.3 44.3 
Table 4.23 Aggregate Trade 
Union Density for the Port Industry 
By 1990 overall aggregate union density had declined to 79.3 per cent from 91.1 per cent a 
decline of 13 per cent - compared with 22 per cent for scheduled road passenger transport. 
The change in the private sector was considerably less, declining by 3.2 per cent to 88.4 per 
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cent. There was however a major decline in overall density from 79.3 per cent to 44.3 per 
cent between 1990 and 1998, this would coincide with the abolition of the NDLS and the 
increasing number of small stevedoring firms in the industry. 
4.4.3 Average Trade Union Denaity. From table 4.24 we can see that the decline in average 
trade union density overall had been more dramatic, falling by 80 per cent to 18.9 per cent in 
1998 from 92.4 per cent in 1994. In the public sector it fell by 81.1 per cent to 18.9 per cent 
in 1998 from being a 100 per cent in 1984. 
1984 1990 1998 
Private 89.4 83.6 N/A 
Public 100.0 53.0 18.9 
All 92.4 75.9 18.9 
Table 4.24 Mean Trade Union Density 
for the Port Industry 
The reason for this decline in the mean trade union density may be explained again by the 
increase in the number of small finns within the port industry, especially those providing 
stevedoring services, after the abolition of the NDLS. 
4.4.4 ChanRe in Trade Union Coverage. The port transport industry is concerned with the 
loading and unloading of cargo discharged from sea transport, and with associated work such 
as storage and warehousing. By 1980 the port transport industry employed about 56,000 
people of whom just half were dock workers, and the great majority of these were registered 
dock workers. 
National 
and 
supplementary/ National 
company etc agreement 
Year agreements only 
1973-78 5.2 -32.6 
1978-85 -31.2 46.8 
1973-85 -27.6 -1.1 
Company, 
district Noý 
or local collective 
agreement only agreement 
75.5 46.0 
6.4 38.4 
86.7 102.0 
Table 4.25 Percentage change in full-time males on adult rates in 
the Port Industry 1973-1985 covered by various types of collective 
agreement 
From Figure 4.6 we can see that the number of people who were not covered by a collective 
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agreement was considerably less than a11V Otl1C1- 01' the SeCtol'S that WC 11,1%'C I)I'CVI()LISIV 
examined. However, the percentage growth between 1973 and 1985 ofpcople not covered by 
any form of bargaining agreement was oreater than the bus and COaCh 11)(ILIStl-V. It inCI-Ca"ed 1- 11 -- -- - 
102.0 per cent over the whole period, the largest increase occurrim, between 1973 and 1978, I" Z71 
the same as the bus and coach industry - see Table 4.25. 
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Figure 4.6 Change in coverage of full-time male manuals in port industr% 
Figure 4.6 shows the change that had taken place in coverage between 1973 and 1985. 
During these years the number of people who were covered by a national plus supplementary 
agreement declined by 27.6 per cent. Those covered by the national agreement only declined 
frorn 37.4 per cent to 25.2 per cent in 1978. By 1985 coverage had increased to 37.0 per cent, 
an increase of 46.8 per cent. Overall coverage by national agreement declined by 1.1 per cent 
to 37.0 per cent. 
Further examination of Table 4.25 shows that there was a considerable decline in those 
covered by National and supplementary/Company agreements between 1978 and 1985. 
National and supplementary/Company agreements declined by 27.6 per cent between 1973 
and 1985 from 47.8 per cent to 34.6 per cent. During the same period those covered only by a 
company, district or local agreement increased by 86.7 per cent from 9.8 per cent to 18.3 per 
cent. The growth in local agreements in the port sector was greater than that of the bus and 
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coach industry. This increase in local agreements is paradoxical when put alongside the 
instability of earnings, which may have been one of the causes of the multitude of strikes in 
the port industry - see 4.4.9 below. 
4.4.5 Compositional Effect. Due to the lack of data it is only possible to calculate the 
compositional effect for the port industry between 1984 and 1990. From Table 4.26 we can 
see that the 80 per cent of the change in union density was due to the fall in the composition 
of the workforce between the private and public sector, while 30 per cent was due to the 
within-group changes in union density between the private and public sector. 
1984-1990 
% of change due to within-group changes in union 
density between the private and public sector 82 
% of change due to change in the composition of the 
workforce between the private and public sector 5 
Table 4.26 Compositional Change in Port Industry Workforce 
1984-1990. Source WIRS 1984 and 1990 
If we compare these results to those for the bus and coach industry - Table 4.14 - the 
percentage change due to the composition of the workforce between the private and public 
sector is considerably greater, 82 per cent compared to 13 per cent for the bus and coach 
industry. This could be explained in part by the anti trade union attitude adopted by ABP and 
other major employers, evidenced by the abolition of the NDLS in 1989. 
4.4.6 Earnings. Although the port industry had the lowest level of people not covered by any 
form of collective agreement, the growth in real earnings was less than for transport as a 
whole, as well as all industries and services - see Table 4.27. Unlike road passenger transport, 
which grew consistently between 1973 and 1985 - see Table 4.16 - there was considerable 
variation in the growth of real earnings for people employed in the ports. 
sic 1973-1978 1978-1985 1973-1985 
All 0.3 12.8 13.1 
Transport -1.4 19.3 17.6 
Ports -6.4 19.4 11.8 
Table 4.27 Percentage Change in Real Average 
Earnings for various SIC Groups between 1973-85 
Between 1973 and 1978 there was a decline of 6.4 per cent in real terms of average earnings,. 
while the passenger oad transport group had a real increase of 5.6 per cent. However, 
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between 1978 and 1985 the port sector had a real increase of 19.4 per cent. While the 
passenger road transport sector over the same period had a real increase of 11.6 per cent. 
Overall the ports had the lowest increase in real earnings of all the groups. The increase was 
11.8 per cent compared to 17.9 per cent for road passenger transport and 13.1 per cent for all 
industries and services. This substantial variation of earnings may have been the cause of 
some of the labour problems within the port industry and this is discussed in more detail in 
4.4.9. 
This variation in earnings also has to be set against the background of steadily increasing 
non-oil tonnage going through the ports - see Fig 4.7 -, unlike, as we pointed out earlier, road 
passenger transport which had a declining product market. 
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Figure 4.7 Non-oil tonnage through UK Ports 1973-85 
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4.4.7 Negotiating Machingy in the Ports. National joint negotiations in the port industry was 
first established in 1920, when the National Council of Port Employers and the National 
Transport Workers' Federation reached an agreement that established the National Joint 
Council for Dock Labour. Subsequent amendments of the functions and scope of the body 
culminated in an agreement in 1944 under which a written constitution was adopted and the 
title changed to the National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry. The NJC consisted 
of representatives of the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE), the T&G, National 
Union of General and Municipal Workers, the Scottish Transport and General Workers' 
Union, and the Watermen, Lightermen, Tug and Bargemen's Union 
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Rates of pay and conditions of service of the dock workers were determined by the JNC 
while the NDLS provided for guaranteed payments, at rates determined by the NJC, to be 
made to registered dock workers in respect to periods of under-employment. To receive the 
guaranteed payment for under-employment a dock worker had to prove their attendance at 
one of the Board's call stand or control point for each shift when no work was available. 
The JNC principal responsibilities were: 
a) the settlement of national terms and conditions of employment, including minimum 
wage and guaranteed week, grade differential rates, attendance money, overtime 
rates, holiday pay 
b) the functioning of the industry's conciliation machinery 
C) the expression of collective views on matters affecting the industry 
d) the nomination of eight members of the NDLB 
Type of employer Number 
Port Authorities 31 
BTDB 15 
British Steel Corporation 4 
British Waterways Board 3 
Sealink (UK) Ltd I 
National Coal Board I 
% Registered Workers % 
16.4 11,133 48.2 
8.0 4,834 21.0 
2.0 210 0.9 
1.6 147 0.6 
0.5 37 0.2 
0.5 24 0.1 
Other Employers 134 71.0 6,684 29.0 
Total 189 100.0 23,069 100.0 
Table 4.28 Employers of full-time registered dock workers in 1980. 
Source National Dock Labour Board Report and Accounts 1980 p2 
The 1960s and 1970s saw considerable rationalisation in the number of private cargo 
handling companies and registered employers. In 1964 there were 1,514 registered employers 
in the 82 ports included in the NDLS and most of these were small companies with no 
investment in port facilities and little commitment to the industry. By 1980 the number of 
licensed employers had declined to 189, of which 46 were port authorities who employed 
over 70% of the total registered labour force (Thompson 1994: 137) - see Table 4.28. 
By the mid 1970s port level collective bargaining had become the most significant level of 
negotiations in respect of pay rates for registered dock workers. These negotiations were 
conducted through Port Joint Committees (PJC) which had different tiles in different ports. 
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Port agreements covered such matters as rates of pay, overtime and bonus or piecework rates. 
They also had established machinery for settling disputes within the individual ports. This 
machinery often included a board or panel to arbitrate over a particular disputed cargo and 
usually had a final stage involving the PJC or its executive body, with reference to the NJC as 
a last resort. 'By 1975 the only wage issue dealt with by the National Joint Council for the 
Port Transport Industry was the weekly guarantee, which was finally abandoned in favour of 
a port-based guarantee in 1980-81' (Turnbull 1993: 202). The abandonment of the national 
minima in January 981 'reflected a further din-iinution of the union's national bargaining role' 
(Turnbull et al 1992: 106). According to Finney (1990: 12) 'Curiously, the power of the 
TGV., rU began to wane in the early 1980s, not so much because of the present government's 
trade union laws, but because the union lost the initiative in national bargaining. Pay, even 
the minimum rate, was devolved to each port in 1981 and attempts to bring about national 
trade policies - such as control of shipping - were never supported by the men themselves. 
The scheme was growing old and tired, and with it the men (average age 46 in 1983) and the 
union movement behind it. ' 
In addition to port-level agreements, some ports or employers had special arrangements 
covering shift work and pay on terminals handling containerised cargo or employing other 
methods of mechanised cargo handling. Disputes, which were not settled in an individual port 
or at employer level, could be referred to the relevant PJC. 
It is important to remember that the NDLS regulated the number of people who worked in the 
ports covered by the scheme. It had nothing to do with the collective bargaining 
arrangements. However, we could not deny that it must have had a substantial effect on those 
ports covered by the scheme, if the management's many comments about it are to be believed. 
Wage bargaining took place at the local level, although the National Dock Labour Board 
reported on the average earnings of people employed under the scheme. 
As a direct result of the Governments removal of the NDLS from the statute book in 1989, 
the employers completely dismantled 'all the national bargaining and port bargaining 
agreements in the docks industry' (Finney 1990: 10). 
For dockworkers in non-scheme ports, there was no national negotiating structure. The T&G 
had some company-level agreements with the larger port authorities and employers. 
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4.4.8 The Problem of Casualisation. The port industry before 1940 had the problem of the 
casual nature of the employment available, for more detailed discussion on this see Phillips 
and Whiteside 1985. For many years endeavours were made to decasualise dock employment 
as much as possible by the introduction of voluntary registration schemes designed to control 
entry into this work. However well meaning these schemes it still resulted in an era of 
underemployment for those employed in the ports. 'Underemployment [casualisation] was 
certainly an enduring feature of the port transport industry' (Phillips and Whiteside 1985: 20). 
According to Phillips and Whiteside (1985: 235) 'The Second World War witnessed 14rge and 
lasting changes in the condition of the dock labourer.... It saw the end of endemic poverty on 
the waterfront.... These improvements in living conditions were, in part at least, the result of 
Government policies designed to raise the efficiency of the docks.... The economic demands 
of the war effort and the appointment of Ernest Bevin 22 as Minister of labour and National 
Service in 1940 reawakened political interest' in ending casualisation in the docks. The 
compulsory registration and maintenance of dock labour was first introduced on a local basis 
in 1940. 
After the war the ports faced serious problems which needed to be tackled quickly if Britain's 
overseas trade were not to suffer. Investment was needed to repair war damage and to 
modernise handling equipment and transit sheds, as well as road and rail access. The process 
of decasualising dock labour needed to be accelerated and completed. It was not until 1947 
that the statutory National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) was established. An essential but 
controversial feature of the scheme - especially for employers - was dual control. The 
management of the labour force in the whole industry, with minor exceptions was entrusted 
to one body - the National Dock Labour Board - on which both sides of industry were equally 
represented. The introduction of the NDSL coincided with the establishment of the BTDB. 
The NDLS was intended to give the dock worker financial security and regular employment. 
By the 1960s the dock worker was amongst the highest paid of all wage earners. 'In terms of 
his economic status the port labourer had become part of the 61ite of the British working 
22 Ernest Bevin was the General Secretary of the Transport & General Workers Unions, which represented the 
majority of manual workers, employed in the port industry. 
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class. As entry to his occupation became more difficult for outsiders, its privileged aspect was 
accentuated' Phillips and Whiteside 1985: 235. 
Analytically, the function of trade unions is to reduce the dependence of the employees on 
their employer and thereby increasing their bargaining power. For a trade union the ideal 
situation would be where they had ownership rights over available jobs, i. e. a monopoly trade 
union. In this situation 'the union would enjoy the power to "invest the labour" of the 
membership. This is comparable to the owners of capital to invest their resource but by no 
means equivalent, for capital remains a far more flexible and transformable resources than 
labour. In practice, however, this dream of what is usually called "job property rights" has 
only rarely come true' (Keenoy 1985: 238). For many Conservative MPs the belief was that 
NDLS gave the dock worker these job property rights. By the 1980s the Scheme had become 
unpopular with Conservative MPs and questions were asked of the Secretary of State for 
Employment about its future. In a written answer the then Employment Secretary - John 
Gummer --replied that 'The government have no present plans for altering the national dock 
labour scheme but I shall continue to remind those concerned with its management that it 
must be seen to work effectively and to serve the wider interest of the port industry' (Hansard 
6 December 1983: 119). The scheme had to be seen to work in the interests of the industry as 
a whole and not the narrow interest of a section of the workforce (Groom 1984: 10). 
However, the writing was on the wall for the NDLS when in April 1984, Nicholas Ridley, 
made the Government's first comprehensive statement of its policy on the ports industry. 'Mr 
Ridley said the ports were no longer seen as part of the country's infrastructure, requiring 
central planning and control. Instead, like any other industry, they should and could compete 
amon -g themselves' (Brindle 1984a: 44). But the real pressure for the abolition of the scheme 
and national bargaining was from the National Association of Port Employers, (NAPE) 
although they referred to it as being superseded. Previously NAPE had only talked of 
reforming the scheme, but its chainnan, Mr Donald Stringer, said: "Prolonging its existence 
can only increasingly inhibit the competitiveness of the UK ports" (Brindle 1984b: 44). 
Ridley was careful not to pose an immediate threat to the dock labour scheme, which was 
seen as the basis of the dockers' special employment rights, and which was commonly but 
incorrectly described as a job for life guarantee. The scheme gave the dock unions joint 
representation with employers on the national and local labour boards that controlled the size 
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of the workforce. It was perceived at the time that the last thing the Government wanted was 
a major industrial confrontation on a second industrial front. The other front referred to was 
the miners. 
On the 2 July 1984 in another written reply John Gummer replied to a request to bring 
forward proposals to abolish the scheme. His reply was ' Whilst the operation of the dock 
labour scheme continues to be questioned, there are no plans to abolish it at present. We shall 
continue to keep a careful watch on developments (Hansard 2 July 1984: 42). Later that 
month there was a national dock strike over a breach of the scheme by the British Steel 
Confederation at Immingharn and the use of non-registered labour. The T&G wanted a 
guarantee that there would be no future breaches of Clause 10 of the scheme, which allowed 
employers to use non-registered labour only if they got prior approval from the National 
Dock Labour Board. 
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Figure 4.8 Average earnings of NDLS permanent and supplementary workers 
and employment in Scheme Ports 1974-1988 
Contrary to the popular myth of the time the scheme did not give job property rights because 
it did not stop compulsory redundancies, although it had been a major factor in preventing 
them. Also, the 1972 Aldington-Jones report brought about another crucial but non-statutory 
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factor in the 'jobs for life' myth 23 . The agreement introduced the system where if a port 
employer went out of business, the redundant dockers were transferred to other employers in 
the port. 'Among the many other points were a commitment that there would be no 
compulsory redundancy and the provision of a voluntary severance scheme offering up to 
E4,000 to older dockers who wished to leave the industry. It was the best voluntary 
redundancy scheme in any industry at the time' (Jones 1986: 252). 
In Figure 4.8 we show the natural log real wage for people employed under the NDLS from 
1974 until 1988, the last year this data was reported. Against this we show the level of 
employment again in natural logs for the same period, and this is to show the relative change 
between the two data sets. Examination of the graphs tends to suggest that there was a trade- 
off between earnings and employment. Using SPSS we have calculated the Pearson 
Correlation for the data set. The results are given in Table 4.29 and this shows a significant 
negative correlation between earnings and employment in ports covered by the NDLS. 
EMPLOY 
WAGE Pearson Correlation -. 809** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 
N 15 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 4.29 Correlation between wages and employment 
In figure 4.9 we show the employment in scheme and non-scheme ports between 1983 and 
1992. 
According to Keenoy (1985: 238) 'This scheme has provided an orderly means of running 
down the labour force at a time when due, amongst other things, the containerisation of 
cargo, there has been a continued reduction in the demand for dock labour. The dockers'job 
property right lapses on retirement or if it has been bought out with a redundancy payment. 
As a negotiated economic resource the Dock Labour Scheme - which does not cover all 
dockers - has functioned primarily as a means of securing continuous income during a period 
of falling demand for labour'. 
23 According to Bradley et al. (2000: 2) 'the word "myth" in its standard usage has a deeper meaning: it goes 
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Fig 4.9 Employment in scheme and non-scheme ports 1983-1992. 
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According to Evans et al (1993: 18) over the period, the number of dock workers more than 
halved but, within this total picture, the pre- and post-abolition periods show quite different 
behaviour. In the period before abolition, employment reductions were confined to the 
scheme ports, where the number of dock workers fell by almost one-third. Over the same 
period, employment in the non-scheme ports increased by 13 per cent. By contrast, post- 
abolition the rate of employment decline increased for scheme ports, and non-scheme ports 
also experienced a loss of employment. 
As previously stated the effects of the abolition of the scheme were not limited to the ex- 
scheme ports, 'there were also consequential impacts on the non-scheme ports. These were 
faced with more effective competition from the ex-scheme ports and, in consequence, had to 
cut back their labour force to improve efficiency and protect their market share' (Evans et al 
1993: 19). This would appear to imply that management in ports not covered by the NDLS, 
despite their apparent success in gaining market share by breaking the stranglehold exercised 
in the post-war height by the scheme ports, were not as efficient as they could have been. In 
1965,92 per cent of all Britain's non-oil trade passed through scheme ports, measured by 
beyond mere description to explanation: not just how things are changing but why they are changing. ' 
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volume, the proportion was down to 70 per cent in 1989. In value terms, trade through 
scheme ports was less than 50 per cent in that year. 
4.4.9 Strike Prone Industry. Even with its sophisticated negotiating machinery the industry 
was perceived to be strike prone - see Table 4.30. and there have been many attempts to 
explain why this was so. Some ascribed it to the influence of a small number of politically 
inspired trade unionists. But the explanation that has tended to be viewed as the most credible 
was the one in which the docker was seen as rootless and lacking permanent employment - 
see for example Phillips and Whiteside 1985: 238. Although the legislation of 1947 had given 
the docker a measure of economic security it had not strengthened the relationship between 
the employer and the employed. 
Number of Strikes per 100,000 Number of Days Lost per 1000,000 
Employees in the Docks Employees in the Docks 
1970-75 1976-1980 1970-75 1976-1980 
168.4 115.9 4,187 1,065 
Table 4.30 Strike in the docks 1970-1980 Source: Bain 1983: 222 
According to Bain it is better to concentrate on 'specific features of the four most strike prone 
industries of the late 1950s and 1960s, namely coal, docks, cars and shipbuilding. These 
industries shared two characteristics fragmented bargaining and fluctuating earnings, which 
marked them off from other industries.... Fragmented bargaining for Clegg creates the 
possibility of frequent bargaining pressure, while uncertainty of earnings provides the 
impetus to exploit this possibility: "there can be few more frustrating experiences for wage- 
earners than to suffer wide fluctuations in their earnings" (Edwards 1983: 223). 
4.4.10 Chanping Earnings in the Port Industry. In the previous section we argued that a wide 
fluctuation in earnings could impact on the level of strike activity in an industry. We will now 
look in detail at the average earnings for the port industry between 1974 and 1998. 
From figure 4.10 we can see that real average wages remained fairly stable from 1974 until 
1981, when they started to rise and peaked in 1988, the year prior to the abolition of the 
NDLS. It may be purely coincidental, but if we look at Figure 4.10, which also shows the real 
wage for bus and coach drivers, we see that their earnings peaked in real terms the year prior 
to privatisation and deregulation in 1987. Also during this period ABP was privatised. 
Therefore it might be reasonable to assume that the privatisation process itself had little or no 
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effect on earnings. However, between 1984 and 1985 there was a decline in earnings, which 
in part may be explained by the coal industry dispute and the associated national dock strike. 
In 1989 there was a the start of a trend in decreasing earnings, the largest decrease occurring 
between 1994 and 1995, when they declined by 21.7 per cent from E254.6 to 199.4. By 1998 
the real wage was almost at the same level as it was in 1974. 
4.4.11 WEFA Report. One of the reasons why the NDLS was abolished was the claim that it 
restricted the growth of employment both within the docks and associated areas. One report 
(WEFA 1987) claimed that an additional increase of employment of 48,918 
24 would take 
place in the scheme ports travel to work areas if the scheme was abolished. This report 
[WEFA 1987] was comn-dssioned by NAPE, and was to examine the impact of the abolition 
of the NDLS, with particular reference to the effect on UK employment levels. The report 
compared the growth rate in non-scheme travel-to-work areas (TTWA) to those in scheme 
TrWA. The report claimed that employment growth had been higher in the non-scheme 
TWA than in scheme TIFWA between 1984 and 1987. 
VV'EFA Forecast WEFA Normal Rate Actual Employment 
1987 Employment 3,481,024 3,481,024 3,481,024 
Employment Growth 206,773 157,690 72,697 
1993 Employment 3,687,797 3,638,714 3,553,721 
Table 4.31 Employment Growth in Scheme Port Travel-to-Work Areas 1987-93 
The WEFA report used a standardising formula where they forecast that if the scheme ports 
TWA grew at the same rate as the non-scheme ports between 1987 and 1993 then a further 
48,918 jobs would be created. From Table 4.31 we can see that the actual employment 
increase was below that predicted by the WEFA report. This was due in part to the growth in 
UK employment not reaching their prediction of 3.4 per cent between 1987 and 1993. In fact 
UK employment growth was effectively static between these two dates. However, if we 
adjust the 1987 employment figures by removing the overall UK employment growth 
element and multiply it by the revised non-scheme forecast rate of 0.014125, this gives a 
forecast of non-scheme employment of 3,530,106 in 1993, resulting in an increase in 
employment of 23,615 or 0.7 per cent in scheme port TTWA employment. Of the 72,697 
" Page 31 of the report gave the increase of employment 48,919 this along with a number of other errors in the 
report brings the conclusions of the report into question. For a detailed discussion of some of the other errors in 
the report see Sealey 1991. 
25 Of the 0.06 increase forecasted at the non-scheme rate 0.05 was due UK employment growth and 0.01 or 23.7 
per cent due to the effects of the scheme see Appendix V of the WEFA report. 
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increase in employment, the model would calculate that 32.5 per cent was due to the abolition 
of the scheme. However, the remaining 67.5 per cent was unexplained by the model. 
The report also claimed that 'In addition, the Scheme port areas tend to have higher 
unemployment, so that the potential for growth may be somewhat higher' (WEFA 1988: 33). 
They calculated the unemployment rate by dividing the total unemployed in the relevant 
TTWA area by the total employment in the relevant TWA - see Table 4.32. 
Scheme Port TTWA Non-Scheme Port TWA 
No of Areas 37 27 
Total Unemployed 501,177 113,060 
Total Employment 3,481,024 926,099 
U 14.4% 12.2% 
Table 4.32 Unemployment rates in scheme and non-scheme TTWA 
Rather than use this calculation, we will compare the means of the unemployment rates using 
the output from the independent t-Test using SPSS. The SPSS output contains two tables, the 
first table gives the summary statistics for the two TTWA. From this table (Table 4.33) we 
can see that the mean unemployment percentage rate for the scheme TMA was 12.3 per 
cent, compared with 13.5 per cent for the non-scheme TTWA. This would indicate that 
unemployment was actually less than the non-scheme TWA. But we have to ask the 
question whether there was a significant difference between the two means, to do this we use 
the Levene test, which is calculated by SPSS. 
ITWA N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Scheme 37 12.265 3.719 0.611 
Non-scheme 27 13.496 4.179 0.804 
Table 4.33 T-Test for TTWA Unemployment Rate Means 1987 
The second SPSS output table - see table 4.34 - contains the main test statistics, including the 
Levene's Test for equality of variances which shows whether the variance between the means 
are different enough to cause concern. This test 'is similar to a Nest in that it tests the 
hypothesis that the variances in the two groups are equal (i. e. the difference between the 
variances are zero. Therefore if the Levene's test is significant at p :50.05 then we can 
conclude that the null hypothesis is incorrect and that the variances are significant different - 
therefore, the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated). If, however, 
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Levene's test is non-significant (i. e. p ý- 0.05) then we must accept the null hypothesis that 
the differences between the variances is zero - the variances are roughly equal and the 
assumption is tenable'(Field 2000: 238). 
Levene's Test for t-test for equality of Means 
Equality of Variances 
F Sig t Sig (2-tailed) 
Equal Variance 0.318 0.575 -1.242 0.219 
Table 4.34 Leven's and t-Test for Equality of 1987 TTWA Means 
For the 1987 TTWA data, Levene's test is non-significant (because p= 0.575, which is greater 
than 0.05). Because of this we assume equal variance. Having established that the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance has been met, we can now look at the results of the t-test itself. 
Table 4.50 gives both the Leven's and t-Test for Equality of 1987 TIVA means. SPSS 
produces the exact significance value of t, and we are interested in whether this value is less 
than or greater than 0.05. In this case the two-tailed value of p is 0.219, which is greater than 
0.05, and so we would have to conclude that there was no significant difference between the 
means of the scheme and non-scheme TTWA means. 
If, as the results of the independent t-Test indicate, there was no significant difference 
between the TTWA unemployment rates, this means that a main assumption of the WEFA 
report i. e., that employment growth was greater in the non-scheme TrWA than the scheme 
port TrWA is open to challenged. Also the question could be asked as to why such a 
standard statistical test was not used by the report's authors? 
4.4.12 Conclusion of Port Section. At the start of this chapter we set out the four main 
propositions we were going to critically examine. In this section on the port industry we have 
examined these propositions. We can summarise these results as: 
1. In the case of the port industry we cannot support the proposition that privatisation and 
deregulation will result in an increase in inequality. The overall decline in inequality, 
except for the Highest Quartile/ Median ratio, would appear to indicate that the unions 
have been able to apply the 'rate for the job' principle in these industries. However, many 
other factors could have influenced this outcome. 
2. We agree that privatisation and deregulation has resulted in changes to the bargaining 
structure. All national bargaining in the ports officially ended with the abolition of the 
212 
NDLS in 1989, although it had been effectively ended as early as 1981, due to the 
increasing importance of port bargaining. As well as this the abolition of the NDLS ended 
the unique situation of codetermination in the industry. 
3. The proposition that there will be a reduction in the main index of trade union power, 
union density, due to the changing composition of the work-force, is supported. 
4. The proposition that privatisation and deregulation will result in a reduction in average 
earnings in the port industry is not proven. The reason for this is that the major 
privatisation of the port industry (i. e. ABP took place in 1983) and it did not appear to 
have any significant downward effect on the real average wage. However, it would 
appear that the abolition of the NDLS, which was both a deregulatory and institutional 
change, had a significant impact on the reduction in the real average wage. 
In the next and final section of this chapter we will attempt to draw some tentative 
conclusions from the evidence previously produced. 
4.5. Conclusion of Chapter 
4.5.0 Introduction. In this chapter we have examined at various levels within the UK 
economy how these four propositions may have impacted on the wage setting mechanism. It 
is now possible to bring these various analyses together and to examine them to see if it is 
possible to draw any general hypothesis from them. 
Year 
1984 
1990 
1998 
Bus 
All Male Transport and And 
Manuals Communications Coach Ports 
241.5 206.9 189.0 246.5 
260.0 220.8 188.8 251.3 
260.1 232.8 187.1 231.5 
Percentage Change 
1984/90 7.7 6.7 -0.1 1.9 
1990/98 0.1 5.4 -0.9 -7.9 
1984/98 7.7 12.5 -1.1 -6.1 
Table 4.35 Change in 11ighest Decile/ Lowest Decile 
Ratios 
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4.5.1 Inequalit . Will privatisation and deregulation result in an increase in inequality? 
During the 1980s and 1990s inequality increased in the UK as it did in the USA. It is possible 
that this increase may be associated with the policies of deregulation, especially those relating 
to labour market institutions such as trade unions. But we have to recognise that many other 
factors may also be at play here. There was a decrease in the Highest Decile/ Lowest Decile 
ratios in both the bus and coach industry and the port industry, although in 1984 inequality 
was at its greatest in the ports - see Table 4.35. 
4.5.2 Changes in Bargaining Structures. Will privatisation and deregulation result in changes 
to the bargaining relationship between the employers and the union? In both the bus and 
coach industry and the port industry wide national negotiations have ended. In the case of the 
bus and coach industry the end of national negotiations coincided with the privatisation of the 
major firm within the industry. So it is possible to directly link these changes to both the 
privatisation and deregulation of the product market. 
For the port industry the major firm was privatised first and then, sometime afterwards the 
virtually defunct national bargaining structure was ended, along with the abolition of the 
controversial NDLS. 
4.5.3 Change in Workforce Composition and Union Densit . To what extent will the change 
in the composition of the workforce due to privatisation and deregulation will result in the 
reduction in union density that is considered by many to be the main index of trade union 
power? 
Between 1984 and 1998 all the sectors had declining trade union density. The sector that had 
the largest decline was the port industry. The group that managed to maintain the highest 
level of union density was the bus and coach sector. Traditionally both the bus and coach 
sector, especially NBC and local authority owned companies had high levels of density, as 
well as the port industry. So why was the T&G able to maintain such a high level of density 
in the bus and coach industry compared to the port industry? Part of the answer may lie in the 
consolidation of the industry, as we pointed out in 4.2.2 aggregate trade union density in the 
private sector increased between 1990 and 1998 at the same time that the consolidation of 
ownership was taking place. 
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4.5.4 Reduction in Average Earnings. Will privatisation and deregulation result in a reduction 
of real average earnings? From Figure 4.10 we see that all male manual real average earnings 
have increased, but there has been a real decline in average earnings for both the bus and 
coach industry and the port industry 26 . By 1998 real average earnings in the port 
industry had 
declined to the all-manual average. In the case of the bus and coach industry the reduction in 
earnings has taken them below the manual average. This decline in real average earnings is 
closely associated with both privatisation and deregulation. While in the port industry the 
decline in the real wage is only associated with the deregulation of the labour market. 
44 
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Figure 4.10 Real Male Manual Average Earnings All Sectors 1974-1998 
4.5.5 The Product Market. In the case of the product market we have opposite outcomes. For 
the bus and coach industry the market was in decline and has continued to decline since 
privatisation and deregulation. While the port industry product market was increasing at the 
time of deregulation and it continued to increase, so the product market effect would appear 
to be ambiguous. 
26 Originally we used a regression analysis with a dummy variable to assess the privatisation effect. Howver, 
due to the small number of observations the results were not statistically significant. 
215 
4.5.6 Conclusion. None of the propositions considered in this chapter would appear to match 
all the individual circumstances of the sectors considered in this chapter. This may be 
because the policy itself [privatisation and deregulation] was not consistent policy and had 
different objectives at different times. This will be considered in the next and final chapter 
of this study. 
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5 Objectives, Tools of Analysis, Main Conclusions, Problems Encountered and 
Future Research 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.0 Introduction. In this concluding chapter we will restate the objectives of this 
dissertation, undertake a review of the main findings, and discuss the appropriateness of the 
original objectives and the tools of analysis used. We will then go on to describe some of the 
problems encountered while undertaking the research, and then suggest some further areas of 
research, before making a final comment. 
5.2. Objectives 
5.2.1 Objectives. In Chapter I we set out the key objectives of this dissertation, and these 
were: 
(1) That privatisation and deregulation will result in changes in the structure, conduct and 
performance of those industries. 
(2) To analyse the earnings and employment in these industries prior to deregulation and/or 
privatisation, and to examine what has happened to them after these changes. 
(3) To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in these industries 
and to compare these with what has happened in the rest of the economy. 
(4) To assess the existence of rent sharing and non-competitive wage determination prior to 
privatisation and deregulation. If there was rent sharing, did it continue after privatisation 
and deregulation, or was it substantially reduced or eliminated? 
53 A Review of the Findings. 
5.3.1 Objectives. In this section we will undertake a critical review of some of the main 
findings of this dissertation. 
5.3.1.1 Objective 1. To show that privatisation and deregulation will result in changes in the 
structure, conduct and perfonnance of these industries. 
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In order to review the finding of this objective we will first have to discuss the privatisation 
and deregulation. Once completed, any changes that have taken place in the structure, 
conduct and performance of these industries will be discussed. 
5.3.1.1.1 Privatisation. It has been argued that the most important elements expected in a 
change of ownership type from public to private sector concerns are: 
1a shift to profit seeking behaviour by the industries' management; and 
2 changes in the scope to pursue profit, having been relieved of political objectives, and 
explicit changes in the rules concerning what the industry could do. 
The argument has been put forward that there is a universal effect of privatisation, 
associated with the superiority of private over public ownership, has been advanced from 
the perspective of the principal-agent theory. 
The proponents of privatisation and deregulation claimed that it would increase the efficiency 
of the industries concerned, and make them more responsive to consumer demand. This 
increase in efficiency would also be achieved by exposing previously publicly owned 
companies to the discipline of the capital markets, rather than the perceived 'cosy' 
relationships between those companies or councils and the trade unions. This cosy 
relationship, it was claimed, resulted in inefficient working practices and higher wages that 
were paid for by the taxpayer. 
5.3.1.1.2 Profit Seeking Behaviour. In regard to 5.3.1.1.1 above, whether there was initially 
a shift to profit seeking behaviour by both of the industries management is questioned by 
this dissertation. 
As we pointed out in 3.3.3.4 the paradox of privatisation is the view that its contribution to 
economic effi6ency is derived from the belief that private sector managers are subject to 
incentives and disciplines different from, and more demanding than those which apply to 
their public sector counterparts. However, as Nove (Thatcher 1998: 145) has pointed out, 
there are limitations to the principal-agent model in the case of the shareholder and the 
manager. It is not the shareholder who writes the contract defineing the managerial 
compensation, and they do not hire and fire managers. To a large degree managers -select 
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themselves, designing their own contracts. The control of the 'contract' linking shareholders 
to managers lies with the managers, and not the shareholders, and this will be the case 
especially when there is diffused share ownership. This is particularly relevant to the case of 
ABP. 
5.3.1.1.3 The Impetus to Privatise. In the early days of privatisation of these industries the 
impetus to 'privatise" had come from the mangers. But without the consent, or at least the 
acquiescence, of some managers, privatisation of any sort would have been a difficult and 
protracted business - see 3.3.3.4. The clear theme to emerge from this study is that by far the 
most effective and influential of the various interest groups in the privatisation process was 
the senior management, but their commitment to privatisation would appear to be qualified. 
Their positive interest in privatisation was, in part their wish to be rid of what was seen as the 
burdensome Treasury control. 
Kay and Thompson in 1986 described privatisation as a policy in search of a rationale. This 
was in part based on the suggestion that 'measures of liberalisation, or deconcentration, 
associated with privatisation - those which offer most in terms of potential gains in efficiency 
are also those on which major concessions have been made to win management support for 
the political process of privatisation' (Kay and Thompson 1986: 18). 
5.3.1.1.4 Scope to Make Profits. As a result of privatisation there is clear evidence that in 
both industries privatised firms have had scope to pursue profit, due to being relieved of 
political, and in some cases social objectives, and also having been freed from rules about 
what they could do. There was also a concurrent interest, which we discuss further in 
5.3.1.1.10. 
Firms have expanded in their own industries, both in the UK and abroad. However, 
expansion in the UK may have been limited by concerns of competition issues. They have 
also diversified vertically into new markets e. g. ABP into logistics, or contiguously into 
related markets, e. g. buses into railways and airports. 
As we pointed out there is a certain irony in that, prior to nationalisation, the buses were 
owned by the railway companies. Now, after privatisation, the railway companies are owned 
by the bus companies. 
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5.3.1.1.5 The Privatisation Process. The privatisation processes in these industries have been 
very similar, but in neither was there a statutory monopoly involved, although they were large 
public corporations who were dominant firms in their markets. 
The first stage was to privatise the large public corporation set up by the post war 
nationalisation programme, this was followed by the privatisation of smaller units in the 
industry, often owned by local authorities. 
In both cases the privatisation process has changed the structure of these industries from 
those dominated by large publicly owned corporations to those dominated by large privately 
owned companies. The major difference being that one was transferred as a single entity, 
while the other was broken up in to smaller units. 
As we pointed out in 2.5.1 Fisher (1986) argued that there was no particular reason to split 
up the NBC if other organisations were not to have the same treatment. This may indicate 
that privatisation was not as coherent a policy as has been claimed, but a process which was 
subject to Ministerial whim -see 2.5.1. 
5.3.1.1.6 Change in Labour Market Policy. In the UK Thatcherism in the workplace was 
based on market forces, changes in the legal framework and greater employee involvement. 
This contrasted with the approach in the 1970s which emphasized joint regulation of the 
effort bargain between trade unions and employers. 
In both the bus and coach industry and the ports the inflexibility of the labour market was 
believed to be due to the presence of strong trade unions who were perceived as an 
impediment to achieving efficient industries. 
5.3.1.1.7 Deregulation an Overview. In this dissertation we have examined two types of 
deregulation., the first being the product market, specifically the bus and coach industry, and 
the second the labour market. However, as we have demonstrated, the two came together to 
bring about a weakening of a trade union's ability to obtain rent for its members in the bus 
and coach industry. 
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However, the specific labour market deregulation for the port industry, the abolition of the 
National Dock Labour Scheme, was over and above the reforms that had already taken place 
in the rest of the UK labour market by the then Conservative Government. 
5.3.1.1.8 Product Market Deregulation in the Bus Industr . What this dissertation has 
illustrated is perhaps the most striking aspect of the deregulation of the bus market, in 
particular how quickly and pervasively it impacted on the ability of the trade unions to claim 
rent for their members. In 2.4.6 we established that even in the limited Hereford trial area the 
introduction of competition impacted on Midland Red West's collective bargaining 
arrangements. As a result the Company improved its productivity by some 25 per cent, some 
of which came from the break-up of the old Midland Red West Company rather than the 
introduction of competition. 
5.3.1.1.9 A Final Comment on Privatisation and Deregulation. As we have demonstrated in 
this dissertation the underlying success for the Conservative Government of the policy of 
deregulation and privatisation was in reducing what Hayek described as the coercive power 
of trade unions, for they are rent seekers. The 'classic role [of the unions], after all, is to raise 
their members' income' (Richardson 1996: 224). 
Privatisation in the UK has come in many forms, but a contemporary description by John Kay 
briefly describes some of its tenets and might appropriately end this critical discussion of the 
outcomes of privatisation and deregulation: 
'Privatisation is often seen as an ideologically based programme, devised and 
driven by a powerful leader, motivated by a combination of intellectual 
conviction of the benefit of free markets and hatred of the power of organised 
labour' (Kay 2002: 22). 
5.3.1.1.10. Changes-in Structure, Conduct and Performance. Having discussed privatisation 
and deregulation we will now critically discuss the changes that took place in the structure, 
conduct and perfonnance of these industries. 
5.3.1 -I- 10.1 Change in the Bus Industry Structure. The change in the structure of the bus and 
coach industry has in the main been one of ownership. Prior to privatisation and deregulation 
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it was dominated by large public sector firms, accounting for 75 per cent of the market's 
turnover in 1985, changing to a market dominated by three privately owned groups, 
accounting for 52.2 per cent of the markets turnover by 1998 - see Table 2.17. 
So why did the industry consolidate so quickly after the privatisation of the NBC? The 
answer may be part due to the nature of the industry. Was it, as was claimed by the T&G, a 
natural monopoly? By definition a natural monopoly is a situation where economies of scale 
are so significant that cost are only minimised when the entire output of an industry is 
supplied by a single producer, supply costs being lower under a monopoly than under the 
conditions of perfect competition and oligopoly. But we have argued in 2.2.1 that the pre- 
privatised bus industry was not a natural monopoly. Although the NBC was an oligopolist, it 
was regulated, and operating a form of franchising system. Prior to deregulation, quantity 
regulation was the source of exclusive ownership. Therefor, with the dissipation of this 
exclusive ownership, was there a need to break-up the NBC? 
Given the amount of market activity, it would appear that "market forces" have dictated that 
the privatised bus firms possess a degree of market power. This then raises the question 
whether that market power should be publicly or privately owned and controlled. The answer 
to this is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
5.3.1.1.10.2 Change in the Structure of the Port Indust . As with the bus and coach industry, 
the port industry has had a major change in its structure, from being predominately publicly 
owned, to predominately privately owned - see Table 3.12. When ABP was privatised in 
1983, it owned and operated 19 ports and had a market share of 19.6 per cent. By 1991 its 
market share had reached 22.9 per cent - see 3.3.3.1. But in contrast to the bus and coach 
industry, the port industry was still defused in structure - see Table 3.13 - although there has 
been a slight increase in concentration - see Table 3.14. 
5.3.1.1.10.3 Maintaining the Status Quo or Self Interest? What would appear to be more 
important was the management's concurrent interest, which was to ensure that privatisation 
was achieved without changes to the existing organisational structures, and without creating a 
more competitive environment. In the case of ABP, the management achieved these 
objectives. * 
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The question is why did then they want this change of ownership? Being rid of Treasury 
control, as we stated earlier, must have been welcome, but we cannot also rule out that they 
[ABP management] saw the opportunity to make large personal financial gains for 
themselves. In the end it may be that the 'self-interest' of management was the overriding 
driving force for the privatisation of ABP. 
This would also explain the management's interest in ensuring that existing organisational 
structures were maintained without making the environment more competitive. 'In the case of 
the UK ports at least, it is extremely difficult to conclude that ownership constitutes a 
significant factor in port performance and efficiency. Instead, factors such as geographical 
and [labour market] deregulation seem to have a greater influence on efficiency' (Cullinane 
and Song 2002: 72). 
The initial situation for the NBC was similar to that of ABP. A management led buy out of 
the company was being canvassed, particularly by its chief executive, Robert Brook. But the 
situation changed with the new Secretary of State, Nicholas Ridley. He believed that the 
proposal for privatising the NBC en bloc, which might have been acceptable in a regulated 
environment, was not consistent with deregulation. This would appear to be at odds with 
the situation for ABP, where it was privatised en bloc in a deregulated environment. 
The company [NBC] was however perceived to be at the time too large and would start 
from too strong a financial base in the new deregulated environment. However, as we 
pointed out in 2.5.1 Fisher (1986) had argued that there was no particular reason to split up 
the NBC if other organisations were not to have the same treatment. 
5.3.1.1.11 A Modification in Polio? So this may be evidence of modification in policy, by 
people like Littlechild, who originally argued for the introduction of Austrian theories, to 
one which focused on the starting structure for the private company. They argued that the 
starting structure of the privatised bus industry was considered to be important because, in 
the absence of competition, it was not possible to know in advance precisely which industry 
structure wouldl prove most efficient. But this new policy was a polar opposite position to 
the Austrian view which was that where there is a high level of market concentration this 
would not be a cause for concern, unless there was exclusive ownership of the resource. But 
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as we pointed out in 5.3.1.1.9.1 exclusive ownership in the bus industry ended with 
deregulation. 
However, the new views of Beesley and Littlechild and others had won the day. But, these 
views ignored the history of this particular industry - see 2.5.8. The privatisation process 
was not supposed to fix the pattern of the future growth of the industry, so the NBC was 
atomised. This atomisation went against the historic nature of the industry - see 2.5.3. Also 
coinciding with privatisation the deregulation of the industry created an unstable economic 
environment - see 2.5.2. 
There is a certain paradox in that the return of the industry to its historic structure had begun 
even before the privatisation of the NBC had been completed - see 2.5.2. So the final 
pattern of ownership of the industry has been determined by market forces, subject to 
competition rules. 'In the newly competitive period following deregulation and privatization 
of the British bus industry, the major firms emerged almost solely through external rather 
than organic growth' (Cowie 2002: 156), and this went against the aims of the 1984 White 
Paper, which wanted to reverse or at least halt the decline in passenger numbers. 
As a result of this analysis we then have to answer two questions posed by Beesley and 
Littlechild - see 5.3.1.1.4. The first is whether splitting up the NBC involved sacrificing 
economies of scale or scope. The answer to this would appear to be no. In the bus industry 
economies of scale are limited - see 2.6.3, therefore confirming it was not a natural 
monopoly. The second question is whether the increase in fares offset the gains from 
increased competition? Again the answer to this would appear to be no. Since the mid 1990s 
the industry had consolidated and become oligopolistic, and as a result of this road 
competition has declined, and since privatisation the real fare indice has increased by 28.7 
per cent - see 2.7.2 - and ridership has continued to fall - see 2.7.3.1. 
5.3.1.1.12 Conduct. Having discussed changes in the structure of the industries we now 
discuss changes in their conduct. 
5.3.1.1.12.1 Peak loading on Buses. In Chapter 2 we described the pricing policy in the bus 
industry at that time as being fairly conservative in its attitude. There was uniform pricing 
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structure throughout large sectors of an operator's network, and any variation would normally 
come about with the distance the consumer travelled. 
However, the industry has a peak loading problem being that the demand levels vary over 
time, and output cannot be stored, therefore capacity should be enough to meet the peak 
periods. But the problem for a firm under the discipline of the capital market is that the cost 
of providing a bus service varies according to demand as well as the physical characteristics 
of the routes and the relevant population densities, and the cost of producing peak period bus 
services are greater than they are for off-peak services. 
According to Hibbs - see 2.4.10 - all forms of transport are characterised by the extreme 
perishability of the product. Seat miles produced and not sold perish in the moment of 
production; they cannot be stored, and it is this that makes the problem of peak demand so 
difficult to handle. It is also complicated by the fact that peak demand is almost always in one 
direction. 
We argued in 2.4.10 that there have been few attempts made by the bus industry to reflect the 
higher marginal costs of peak travel in higher prices, with the aim of covering the long-run 
marginal cost of meeting peak demand from peak revenue. 
Another unanswered question is why the bus companies have not introduced pricing 
structures like the railway companies, who operate peak pricing policies, especially on 
commuter routes into London. 
However, The answer to the question may be that to meet demand at these periods, and in the 
absence of part-time manning, the level of peak operations will determine the number of full- 
time crews employed. Given the overall shortage of labour in the industry, it would be 
reasonable to assume that we would have seen an increase in part-time working, but this has 
not occurred. In part, this has been due to the reluctance of full-time employees to accept 
working along side part-time employees who would be perceived as having more family- 
friendly-shifts. Full-time employees would have to work elements of the very early morning 
shifts, non-peak-day shifts, night shifts and weekend shifts. By their very nature part-time 
staff employed to cover peak periods would not be involved in these more anti-social shift 
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patterns. Also it may be indicative that the trade unions still have the ability to influence the 
management's agenda. 
5.3.1.1.12.2 Ports and Peak Loaý ýn. In the ports there has been a major change in the way 
the port owner conduct their business, due in part to the their problem of peak loading caused 
by tidal patterns. Very few of the UK ports had quays that can take large sea going vessels 24 
hours a day. 
This resulted in two types of labour strategy, the first being core labour, which is well trained 
and works with high value capital equipment, found mainly in container area of ports. They 
have full-time employment, although they can work long shift patterns. 
The second, more flexible group, is low skilled, mainly agency labour used in loading and 
off- loading goods such as cars, only being called in when required. 
In both cases the main objective is to get the ship loaded or off-loaded as quickly as possible 
and this also has to coincide with the tidal pattern in the particular port. If the ship fails to 
meet the required tide, it may have to wait another 8 to 10 hours before it can leave the 
harbour, and while it is waiting for the next tide it is costing it owner money. 
5.3.1.1.13 Performance. Having discussed some of the issues surrounding the conduct of the 
industries concerned we will now discuss the performance of these industries. 
5.3.1.1.13.1 Perfon-nance of Bus Industry. In 2.4.10 we pointed out that Nash (1993: 1043) 
also believed that the use of cross subsidies had hastened the decline of the industry because 
of these higher fares, and low service levels on the densely used routes that formed the core 
business of the industry. He believed that this favoured the better off rural and suburban 
dweller at the expense of the poorer inner city dweller. Yet the empirical evidence since 
privatisation indicates that the only growth area has been London, and only since 1994 when 
fares started to be subsidised. 
In 2.7.3.2 we undertook a review of the financial ratios of 12 former NBC subsidiaries 
between 1984 and 1998. This analysis revealed that the major impact on these ratios occurred 
between 1984 and 1990. Average employment declined by nearly 25 per cent, wages as a 
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percentage of total costs declined by 2.7 per cent. Profitability increased by 33.1 per cent and 
pre-tax profit per employee by 130 per cent - see Table 2.24. The only ratio whose change 
was less than the 1990/98 performance was the real average wage. This declined by 4.8 per 
cent compared with a decline of 6.6 per cent between 1990 and 1998. But Pendleton also 
suggests 'that the possibility of product market competition may be instrumental in bringing 
about lower wage levels in privatised firms... ' 
Although the type of ownership in the bus industry may an have impact on profitability there 
is little or no evidence that the structure has a similar impact. In this dissertation the change in 
performance of the 12 former NBC subsidiaries between 1990 and 1998 was analysed. This 
was the period when the main re-oligopolisation of the industry took place. Between 1990 
and 1998 pre-tax profits declined from 33.1 per cent to 18.3 per cent, while pre-tax profit per 
employee remained constant at E2,200. The rate in the reduction of employment was also 
reduced from nearly 25 per cent between 1984 and 1990 to 10.6 per cent between 1990 and 
1998. The only exception was that real average wages declined by 6.6 per cent between 1990 
and 1998, compared with 4.8 per cent between 1984 and 1990. 
5.3.1.1.13.2 Performance of Port Industry. In assessing the performance of the port industry 
we have critically examined the individual sectors. 
In this dissertation we argued that the post-privatisation performance of ABP could be judged 
in a number of ways, e. g. how it performed in relation to its tonnage compared with the UK 
as a whole. As we can see from Figure 3.3 the tonnage that went through ABPs ports has not 
mirrored the overall growth of that through the UK ports. Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that ABP acquired a number of ports after privatisation and if those ports' 
tonnage were deducted from the ABP total, the performance results would be even lower. 
Another way of assessing ABP performance is to look at its real revenue. As we pointed out 
in 3.3.3.3, since the port markets in the UK are fairly competitive, it is reasonable to assume 
that port charges are more or less in line with costs, and therefore reflect the true level of 
output. 
The poor post-privatisation performance of ABP can be confirmed by examination of Figure 
3.4, which shows the logs of the real GDP and ABP's real revenue from 1963 to 1998. From 
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Figure 3.4 we can see that the period of greatest growth occurred when it was in public 
ownership, the largest occurring between 1963 and 1978. Real revenue peaked in 1976 at 
E415m. Since it was privatised in 1983 the real revenue has declined from L306m to L254m, 
a decrease of 17 per cent. 
These results would appear to go against one of the main tenets of privatisation, that fin-ris 
would be better managed under private sector management. However, we have to accept that 
part of the erratic nature of the data can be explained by the changes in the UK economy, and 
the fortunes of the port sector mirror the changes in gross domestic product. 
But it was not until 1992 that ABP came under pressure from financial analysts in the City of 
London because of its under-performance. This pressure resulted in a management shake-up, 
and, it would be reasonable to ask why it took so long for the market to put pressure on 
ABP's performance. This may link up to the problems of the principal-agent model discussed 
in 5.3.1.1.2. We have argued that it is not in the interests of individuals to invest large 
resources in monitoring management, especially if they possess too few votes to effect the 
decision. This is known as the collective action problem. Therefore management may not be 
effectively monitored and disciplined by the capital markets, as is claimed by the proponents 
of privatisation, especially in a situation where share ownership is highly diffused. 
Since privatisation, the former trust ports have experienced improvements in their financial 
position rather than marked increases in their non-oil market share. In this dissertation we 
have argued that this may indicate that there have been two different effects happening at 
different times within the industry. The first was the abolition of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme. If supernormal profits were being made before abolition, and abolition reduced the 
relative share going to labour, this is an issue of distribution. But as we have demonstrated, 
profitability increased after privatisation, some three years after the abolition of the NDLS. 
The second effect, efficiency, would appear to have come into effect after the privatisation of 
the trust ports. This, it could be argued, is evidence of the principal-agent effect. If this were 
the case it would appear that the efficiency effect has a greater influence on the performance 
of the privatised trust ports than the distribution effect of the change in rent sharing with the 
trade unions. 
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Having critically discussed the finding of Objective I we will discuss Objective 2 in the 
same manner. 
5.3.2 Objective 2. To analyse the earnings and employment in these industries prior to 
deregulation and/or privatisation, and to examine what has happened to them after these 
changes. 
5.3.2.1 Reduction in Real Average Earnings. The underlying assumption of the second 
proposition was that privatisation and deregulation would result in a reduction of real average 
earnings in these industries. As we established in 4.5.4 between 1974 and 1998 all male 
manual real average earnings increased, and it is against this background that we have to 
examine what happened to real wages in the bus and coach industry and the ports. 
5.3.2.1.1 Change in Real Wages in the Bus Indust . One of the main conclusions of this 
dissertation confirms the view that 'On bus costs, the straightforward implication of 
deregulation is a demise of union influence in many import areas. That deregulation is fatal to 
labour constraints is quite clear not only from analogy abroad, but from experience in 
London's own backyard - as witness the remarkable decline of union influence in the taxi 
trade in the last thirty years' (Beesley 1997: 169). 
This is confirmed later in the dissertation - see 4.3.8 - where Pendleton (1999: 78) suggested 
'that the impact of privatisation on wage levels [in the bus industry] may be experienced 
mainly in the early stages of private ownership. However our findings do not support his 
suggestion that thereafter a process of "catching up" occurs. Only in the period between 1995 
and 1998 has there been any sign of a rising trend - see Figure 4.10 - in real earnings of bus 
drivers. 
5.3.2.1.2 Tendering in London. The tendering system in London was then examined in detail 
showing that it ended the traditional bargaining model where a union negotiates with 
individual companies. The level of wages is now effectively set by the tendering regime put 
in place by LRT, and the union had little or no influence over this process. We have argued 
that the tendering process has reduced the wages of London bus drivers and conductors below 
the equilibrium level, and this has caused serious problems over recruitment and retention of 
staff, especially when the labour market is tight. 
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5.3.2.1.3 Change in Real Wages in the Port Indust . From figure 4.10 we can see that real 
average wages in the port industry remained fairly stable from 1974 until 1981 when they 
started to rise, peaking in 1988, the year prior to the abolition of the NDLS. As we pointed 
out in 3.5.12 it may be purely coincidental, but if we look at Figure 4.10, which also shows 
the real wage for bus and coach drivers, we see that their earnings peaked in real terms the 
year prior to privatisation and deregulation in 1987. Also during this period ABP was 
privatised. 
Therefore we have argued that it might be reasonable to assume that the privatisation process 
itself had little or no effect on earnings in the port industry. However, between 1984 and 1985 
there was a decline in earnings, which in part may be explained by the coal industry dispute 
and the associated national dock strike. In 1989, which coincided with the abolition of the 
NDLS, there was the start of a trend in decreasing earnings, the largest occurring between 
1994 and 1995, when they declined by 21.7 per cent from E254.6 to E199.4. By 1998 the real 
wage was almost at the same level as it was in 1974. 
So, in the case of the port industry it was labour market deregulation rather than privatisation 
which would appear to have affected the real wages in this industry. 
We will now discuss Objective 3 in a similar manner. 
5.3.3 Obiective 3. To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in 
these industries and to compare these with what has happened in the rest of the economy. 
5.3.3.1 Changes in Union Density in the Bus IndustEy. It may be coincidental, but the re- 
oligopilisation of the bus industry may have actually prevented the decline of trade union 
density in this industry. If the industry had remained atomised it is likely that union 
membership would most likely have continued to decline. 
However, another reason for union density not declining might be explained by the decrease 
in the real wage. In the wider economy the rising real wage had been found to discourage 
union membership. Therefore the decrease in the real wage may have resulted in people 
rejoining or retaining their membership of the union in an attempt to protect their wages as 
much as possible from being eroded even more. 
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If like other sectors of the economy the real wage had increased, then union density may have 
decreased. Evidence of this decline may occur if and when the real wage returns nearer to the 
equilibrium level, and at this point we may see a decline of density in the industry. Oddly 
enough, this may mean that in certain circumstances, for privatisation to be effective in 
reducing trade union density, the real wage may have to be increased or at least maintained. 
5.3-3.2 Changes in Union Density in-the Port Industr In contrast the port industry had a 
decline in trade union density over the period. In 4.4.10 we pointed out that real earnings in 
the ports remained fairly stable from 1974 until 198 1, when they started to rise and peaked in 
1988, the year prior to the abolition of the NDLS. It may, as we said, be purely coincidental, 
but the real wage for bus and coach drivers peaked the year prior to privatisation and 
deregulation in 1987. In 1989 there was the start of a trend in decreasing real earnings, and by 
1998 the real wage was almost at the same level as it was in 1974 - see Figure 4.13 - but it 
had also declined to the all-manual average wage level. 
A clear pattern emerges from this part of the study that difficulties arise for trade unions to 
organise effectively in an industry which is atomised. So privatisation by itself will not 
necessarily be effective in reducing the trade union density. It is more likely to be effective 
if accompanied with the atomising of the particular industry. If the industry remains 
oligopolistic it is likely that the union density will continue to be higher than the national 
average, albeit at a lower level than pre-privatisation. 
We will go on to discuss the final Objective in a sin-dlar vein to the other objectives. 
5.3.4 Objective 4. To assess the existence of rent sharing and non-competitive wage 
determination prior to privatisation and deregulation. If there was rent sharing, did it 
continue after privatisation and deregulation, or was it substantially reduced or eliminated? 
5.3.4.1 Rent Sharing,. In 4.1.11 we argued that there are many theories in economics about 
trade unions and their ability to raise the earnings of their members above the market-clearing 
rate. One of the widely held beliefs is that trade unions through their rent-seeking activities 
reduce the amount of profits available to firms. This could reduce or even eliminate potential 
supra-normal profits available to capital. 
231 
We went on to argue that understanding rent sharing is essential to analysing government 
regulation. Regulatory protectionism can create rents over which workers and firms may 
negotiate, regulatory profit constraints may distort firms' labour inputs or alter firms' relative 
bargaining strengths vis-h-vis unions, regulatory barriers to entry may enhance unions' power, 
and the political nature of regulatory agencies can expand the scope of potential games 
between firms and workers. Regulation of an industry may have important effects on industry 
wages: failing to account for these effects may lead to underestimates of regulatory rents and 
distortions. 
5.3.4.2 Non-competitive Product Markets. In 4.1.12 we argued that an imperfect market 
would result in lower labour-demand elasticities than in competitive firms that have the same 
product function. But we pointed out that firms may be under a variety of political and public 
relations pressures to stabilise employment, to restrict profits to a reasonable amount, to 
restrain increases in product prices, and not to enlarge their share of the product market 
unduly. There is some evidence that firms that produce in markets characterised by little 
competition do pay higher wages than equivalent firms in competitive markets. 
5.3.4.3 Rent Sharing and Non-competitive Product Markets in the Bus IndusLry. In 2.4.6 we 
demonstrated that the effect of the introduction of competition into the Hereford trial area 
resulted in the National Bus Company renegotiating its agreements locally with its trade 
unions as a direct result of increased competition. This would tend to confirm the premise 
that the more competitive the market the less opportunity there is for a union to gain or 
maintain 'rent' for its members. This is due to the inability of the employer to generate supra- 
normal profits and pay wages significantly above the competitive equilibrium. 
5.3.4.3 Rent Sharing and Non-competitive Product Markets in the Port Industry, In 3.3.2.5 we 
stated that the market conditions prior to privatisation of ABP differed from the bus market . 
The market in which ABP operated was competitive and expanding. While the bus market at 
that time was non-competitive and declining. 
In the case of the port industry, the ability to claim rent came in part from the political and 
public pressures to stabilise employment through the NDLB, even though it was a 
competitive product market. 
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5.4 Appropriateness of Objectives 
5.4.1 Appropriateness of Objectives. In this section we will critically discuss the 
appropriateness of the main objectives of this dissertation. This is in order to establish if our 
findings substantiate these objectives, and if they do to what degree. 
5.4.1.1 Objective 1. That privatisation and deregulation will result in changes in the structure, 
conduct and performance of those industries. 
5.4.1.1.1 Structure. Prior to the privatisation and deregulation of both industries examined in 
this dissertation had dominate firms Le ABP and the NBC. As a result of the privatisation 
programme ABP market share has risen, in 1982 this was 19.6 per cent - see 3.3.3.1 - and by 
1998 it was around 23 per cent. 
In 1983 the NBC accounted for 23.6 per cent of all passenger journeys, although the 
Passenger Transport Executives had a greater total market share of 28.3 - see table 2.11. By 
1998 the 4 major groups accounted for 46.2 per cent of the market by turnover - see Table 
2.17. 
In regard to structure Objective I has not occurred. There has been no real change in the 
structure of these industries, only the ownership type has changed. They have changed from 
being predominately publicly owned industries, to predominately privately owned. 
5.4.1.1.2 Conduct. In 3.5.12.2 we argued that the UK port industry was already competitive, 
and because of this we have not seen any major changes in the conduct of the industry. Also 
the disciplining effect of a market which is dominated by the consumer has resulted in a 
stable market. This stability was been assisted by the fact that the market was expanding and 
was profitable. 
In the case of the bus industry the main emphasis of a change in conduct was the lowering of 
fares. In the 1984 White Paper the Government argued that one of the factors that had 
contributed to the decline in public transport use had been the upward trend in real fares. 
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In Table 2.19 we showed the percentage change in real operating costs pence per kilometre 
between 1986/87 and 1997/98. From that table we can see that there has been a wide 
difference in the reduction of costs. This reduction in costs, it might be reasonable to assume, 
should have been beneficial to the consumer. However, since deregulation the result of cost 
savings have been wholly swallowed up by subsidy cuts and mileage increases with nothing 
left over for reductions in fares. Indeed, as we have shown, real fares increased substantially 
- see Table 2.18. 
In regard to conduct we can see that there has been no change in the port industry, and in the 
case of the bus and coach industry no improvement in conduct has been observed. Given that 
the main emphasis of a change in conduct was the lowering of fares, we can conclude in this 
objective that it has failed. Therefore we have to conclude that as a result of privatisation and 
deregulation there has been no change in conduct. 
5.4.1.1.3 Performance. In this dissertation we have argued that the post-privatisation 
performance of ABP has been poor. From Figure 3.4 we can see that the period of greatest 
growth occurred when it was in public ownership, between 1963 and 1978, with real revenue 
peaking in 1976 at E415m. Since it was privatised in 1983 the real revenue has declined from 
E306m to; E254m, a decrease of 17 per cent. This would appear to go against one of the main 
tenets of privatisation, that firms would be better managed under private sector management. 
Since privatisation the former trust ports have experienced improvements in their financial 
position, rather than marked increases in their non-oil market share. But, as we have 
demonstrated, profitability increased after privatisation, and some three years after the 
abolition of the NDLS. 
The second effect, efficiency, would appear to have come into effect after the privatisation of 
the trust ports. This, it could be argued, is evidence of the principal-agent effect. If this were 
the case it would appear that the efficiency effect has a greater influence on the performance 
of the former trust ports rather than privatisation per se. 
In regard to the bus industry the thinking behind the 1985 White Paper and the desired 
outcome of all the measures proposed by the Government would be to slow or halt the 
seemingly inevitable decline in service to the travelling public. They believed that the total 
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market for public transport should expand. Table 2.22 gives the changes in passenger 
journeys by area between 1985/86 and 1996/97. From this table we can see that overall in 
Great Britain local bus passenger journeys declined by 22.8 per cent. Given that preventing 
this was one of the main objectives of privatisation and deregulation we have to conclude that 
the performance of the bus industry has not improved. 
Therefore, in regard to conduct we have to conclude that the results are ambiguous. With the 
port industry having mixed results, while in the case of the bus industry we can conclude 
there has been no improvement in conduct. 
5.4.2 Objective 2. To analyse the earnings and employment in these industries prior to 
deregulation and/or privatisation, and to examine what has happened to them after these 
changes. 
The underlying assumption of Objective 2 is that there would be a reduction both in the 
earnings and employment after deregulation and/or privatisation. 
In regard to the port industry there is no evidence that privatisation had an effect on eaming. 
However, there is clear evidence that earning declined after the abolition of the NDLS. 
Employment was affected by privatisation in regard to ABP as the company changed and 
became a landlord only, and did not offer any of the traditional port services. There was also 
a major shakeout of labour when the NDLS was abolished. In the non-core employment areas 
casual or agency working has become the norm. 
In the bus industry the deregulation and/or privatisation affect has been quite clear. Both a 
reduction in wages and employment happened with deregulation and privatisation. Although 
most of the labour reductions came from either administration or maintenance areas, between 
1987 and 1998 the number of platform staff has actually increased. 
Therefore we can conclude that the goals of Objective 2 have been achieved. 
5.4.3 Objective 3. To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in 
these industries and to compare these with what has happened in the rest of the economy. 
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The underlying assumption of Objective 3 is that deregulation and privatisation would 
weaken the power of the trade unions in these industries, and as a result the trade union 
density would decline. 
Trade union density in the port industry has declined at a comparable rate to the rest of the 
economy. While in the bus industry it has declined marginally, and in the large bus 
companies it is still well over 90 per cent. 
From this analysis we can conclude that in the case of the port industry Objective 3 has been 
achieved, but in the case of the bus industry Objective 3 has not been achieved. 
5.4.4 Objective 4. To assess the existence of rent sharing and non-competitive wage 
determination prior to privatisation and deregulation. If there was rent sharing, did it 
continue after privatisation and deregulation, or was it substantially reduced or eliminated? 
In both industries there was evidence of rent sharing and non-competitive wage determination 
prior to privatisation and deregulation. In the port industry since privatisation and 
deregulation in the main both rent sharing and non-competitive wage determination appear to 
have been eliminated. However, the one exception to this would be the containerisation areas 
where there is some evidence of both sharing and non-competitive wage determination 
continuing. 
In the bus industry both sharing and non-competitive wage determination have been 
eliminated, and to such an extent that wages are now below the equilibrium level. 
From this analysis we can conclude that in both cases Objective 4 has been achieved. 
5.4.5 Summary of Objective Results. To summarise the results of the objectives we can 
conclude that overall the port industry has met the majority of the objectives. Conversely the 
bus and coach industry has failed to meet the majority of the objectives. These results are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
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OBJECTIVE BUS & COACH PORT INDUSTRY 
Objective 1 
Structure No No 
Conduct No Ambiguous 
Performance Yes Yes 
Objective 2 No Yes 
Objective 3 No Yes 
Objective 4 Yes Yes 
Table 5.1 Summary of Objective Results 
5.5 Tools of Analysis 
5.5.1.0 Introduction. In this section we critically question the use and relevance of the tools 
of analysis used in this dissertation. 
5.5.1.1 Obiective I Structure, Conduct and Performance. In our analysis of the aims of 
Objective I the main tools of analysis were the SCP paradigm and the theory of contestable 
markets. 
5.5.1.1.1 Use of the SCP ParadiM. In part, one of the underlying justifications for using the 
elements of the SCP paradigm in this dissertation is that the more closely an economic theory 
comes to neoclassical theory or practice, the more easily it manages to conforin to credible 
institutions and rhetorical conventions of mainstream economics. 
If a given paradigm, as with the SCP paradigm, is applied to the interpretation of a particular 
situation, especially in the social sciences - the following conditions should be fulfilled: 
the laws, theories and methodology used command the support of a significant group 
of scholars 
2. have generated further theoretical developments following their preliminary 
articulation 
3. and have in some form or another been applied to practical activity eg policy 
formulation 
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and the SCP paradigm fulfils these criteria e. g . Lipczynski and Wilson 2001; Martin 1993; 
Tirole 1993. 
5.5.1.1.2 Problems with the SCP Approach. According to Lipczynski and Wilson (2001: 17 1) 
'The empirical work that has tested the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach 
tends to find that there is a positive relationship between the three dimensions. However, this 
relationship is often very weak. Much of the research reviewed examined the relationship 
between industry structure and performance, while assuming that a certain type of firm 
behaviour is given. For example, in industries where only a few large firms dominate, 
collusion was assumed to take place. ' 
The SCP approach draws on n-dcroeconon-dc theory from which to examine the empirical 
behaviour of the firm(s) and/or industries. But, economic theory does not always give us the 
exact relationship between structure, conduct and performance. The SCP approach is rooted 
in oligopoly theory, but this theory can be seen as largely indeterminate, and not generating 
any clear, unambiguous deductions. 
The SCP approach has also been criticised for being for being too concerned with static 
short-run equilibrium. No explanation is offered as to the evolution of the structural variables, 
or how conduct and performance influences any future change. At best the SCP approach 
gives us a snapshot of the current state of the industry. 
When using the SCP approach we have to recognise the limitations of the measurements 
used. Structure can be measured by a variety of indicators, but mainly tends to be 
concentration. This is primarily because the data is easy to find, but there is a danger of 
overemphasising the importance of concentration. There are also difficulties in measuring 
many of the other variables. 'For example, how would one measure profitability, entry 
barriers or the rate of entry? How do we measure the extent of vertical integration? 
(Lipczynski and Wilson 2001: 172) 
It is also often difficult to decide which variable belongs to which element of the paradigm. 
Lipczynski and Wilson (2001: 172) use the 'extent of advertising, vertical integration 
diversification gives us useful information as to the structure of the industry; however, these 
are also strategies which firms can choose to follow .... What exactly do we mean by 
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performance? Perfon-nance is some measure of the degree of success in achieving desired 
goals. Is it possible to have a set of uniform performance indicators? Differences in firm 
objectives may make the SCP relationship tenuous. ' 
In 1.4.10 we also discussed the conceptual problem of endogeneity and we argued that the 
assumed chain of causation, which runs from structure to conduct to performance, is too 
simple, in the long run, almost all, if not all structural variables are external. 
5.5.1.1.3 Market Structures. The neo-classical approach is based the assumption that a perfect 
market would result in economic efficiency, and. inferior performance is expected in markets 
that do not match the model of perfect competition. According to Sturt (1984: 240) 'Great 
importance is attached to the theoretical "perfect" market on which the whole edifice 
[classical economics] is founded, and much effort has been expended on trying to determine 
how close to "perfection" particular markets are'. Yet Lydall 1998: 52 has articulated ... 'it is 
necessary to point out that at no time in the history of capitalism has perfect competition been 
the dominant market pattern. Indeed, it is arguable whether it has ever existed at all. ' 
5.5.2.1. Obiective 2 Average Earnings. To understand the changes in average earnings we 
need to look at what has happened to real earnings. This is because of the erosion of money 
income brought about by rising prices. However, any analysis based average incomes will 
underestimate the impact of rising prices on low income earners, and visa-versa for higher 
income groups. 
The data source used for the changes in average earnings is the New Earnings Survey, 
which covers a random sample of employees in employment on the date of the survey. The 
data refers to pay in a particular pay period and may not represent the annual earnings of the 
employees concerned. No attempt is made to 'normalise' earnings i. e. to smooth out 
temporary fluctuations by comparing them with their previous earnings. Therefore, although 
the results appear as weekly equivalents of earnings, it is not advisable to gross up these 
weekly earnings to give an annual figure. 
5.5.3.1 Objective 3 Union Densit . Union density is assumed to be a more reliable indicator 
of union power than simply its total membership. Yet perhaps the power of a union to 
influence labour market outcomes, depends more on its willingness to back up demands for 
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better pay and working conditions with industrial action. Therefore strikes, which are 
perceived to be the ultimate form of industrial action by organised labour, may be a better 
proxy indicator of union power than union density. 
5.5.4.1 Objective 4 Rent Sharing and -Non 
Competitive Wage Determination. The 
assumption behind 'rent sharing' is that trade unions will exert their influence on employers 
during wage negotiations, and this is reflected in higher wages for union members than non- 
union members. 
However, the claims about union mark-up have to be counterbalanced against the quality of 
labour. A higher quality of local labour is likely to inflate the differences in earnings 
between local and national collective bargaining. Therefore the estimates of the size of 
6 union rent' are likely to be exaggerated. 
In theory if non-competitive wage bargaining existed in its purest form, then we would have 
to question the profit maximising theory of the firm, and in the absence of external market 
forces, there would be no external influences that would directly affect wages, hiring, 
training or labour deployment within a firm. 
Therefore the consequences of pure non-competitive markets would be: 
1. Imperfect information 
2. The complexity of the internal wage structure which would reduce the f inn's ability 
to respond to market forces 
3. Exchange relationships between the employer and the employee would become 
lopsided. By this we mean if both sides have the ability to deviate from the labour 
contract with impunity, and if despite this the other party has limited opportunity to 
cancel the contract. 
If a lopsided situation existed it would tend to favour the employer. The employer could alter 
the terms of the contract unilaterally, and the workers' ability to prevent this through 
individual or collective bargaining would be limited. The power relationship would be biased 
in favour of the employer. This would allow the employer to shape both the labour contract 
and the wage structure to improve his positioning in the exchange relationship and to 
strengthen his power base. 'The firm uses wages to devalue lower skilled grades and to 
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divide workers; it institutionalises promotion by seniority to create an internal hicrarchy 
whose occupants are sympathetic to its leadership; uses access to training to favour 
sympathetic and amenable workers; and uses relativities to undermine union solidarity' (Joll 
et al 1983: 120). This implies that the allocation of labour, without market forces, would 
reflect the power structure within the firm, and in particular, the firm's strategy to maintain 
dominance. 
From this discussion it can be seen that non-competitive wage bargaining in its pure form is 
a theoretical concept, and any application of it to the real world would be a matter of 
degrees. It would be more relevant in some firms to a greater extent than others. But we 
believe it would be of greater importance in firms with little or no trade union membership. 
5.6 Problems Encountered 
5.6.0 Introduction. In this section we will discuss some of the problems encountered while 
undertaking the research for this dissertation. Two main areas are discussed, these are time 
series data, and the use of generic large scale surveys. 
5.6.1 Time Series Data. It became increasingly clear that because of the short time period 
covered by this dissertation - 1987 to 1998, the use of time series would have to be 
accompanied with a 'health warning'. This was due to the normal number of observations 
required for any robust regression analysis. 
5.6.2 Generic Large Scale Surveys. The NES and WIRS hold the same problem for 
researchers operating at the micro level of the economy. This means that as soon as you start 
disaggregating these data sets you come up against the problem of sample sizes that are so 
small they are either not reported, as is the case for the NES, or you cannot use them because 
they are not statistically robust, as is the case for the WIRS series. 
Major problems were also encountered when trying to analyse the 1984 WIRS data, as this 
was supplied in machine code language, and considerable time was expended in converting it 
into a work-able format. At the end of this process there was little reward because of the small 
numbers involved, when the data was broken down into its various SIC classifications. 
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Originally it had been intended to compare research which had already been undertaken in 
the USA with results obtained in the UK using the available data sets. In the USA much of 
the research around union rent sharing has been based on data from the micro data sets of 
Current Population Surveys - see Rose 1987: 1140. Data sets like this in tile UK did not 
become available until the mid 1990s, when the Labour Force Survey started asking 
questions about trade union membership. A better understanding of availability and non- 
availability of data sets would have been of assistance in the early stages of the research. 
5.7 Future Research 
5.7.0 Introduction. This section will indicate future areas of possible research around the 
issues raised in this dissertation. This dissertation covers, in the main, the period when the 
Conservative Party came in to office in 1979 until replaced in May 1997 by a New Labour 
administration. 
5.7.1 The Bus and Coach Indugry. The UK bus industry has undergone considerable change 
since deregulation and privatisation. Further research could be undertaken as to the 
effectiveness of the new Labour Government's policy towards increasing bus use, including 
the use of quality contracts. 
5.7.2 The Port Indqstry. In view of the performance of ABP, further research could be 
undertaken to test the hypothesis that the capital markets will obtain better performance from 
managers. Another area that could be examined, when dissipated share ownership exists, is 
whether shareholders can effectively monitor the performance of managers. 
5.7.3 Transport Generall . Other privatised transport industries 
in the UK could also be 
studied. But possibly the most rewarding at present would be the airline industry. This 
industry has also been affected by European Union deregulation policies and a comparative 
study of their pre and post privatisation performances would be of interest. Also the industry 
is undergoing significant change due to the emergence of the low cost carriers. 
5.7.4 The Role of Think-Tanks. A final suggestion for future research is the role of think- 
tanks in the process of economic policy formation, especially in regard to transport. In the 
UK there are many think-tanks both on the left and right of the political spectrum. During the 
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1980s and 1990s the right-wing think-tanks had the ear of the Conservative Government. 
Since 1997 their influence may have waned somewhat, but they are still influential, if only in 
the wider economic debate. 
An example of their influence was the intellectual economic challenges taken up by the new 
right, which resulted in the dominance of the idea about the distortionary effect of either 
'natural' or 'generated' monopoly. In the UK the most enthusiastic reaction to this thesis 
came from those trying to develop a regulatory framework for the privatised industries. 
Transport, especially the bus industry, was one obvious area. Ian Savage, who reviewed the 
Hereford trial area experiment - see Foster 1992: 121 - believed that there was a far greater 
role for academics in advising on bus deregulation than on other areas of deregulation and 
privatization. This 'reflects the establishment over many years of a strong academic tradition 
in transport economics - in Britain stronger than in any other brand of microeconomics, 
except labour economics' (Foster 1992: 139 ). 
Any research in this area should take into account that during the 1990s the effectiveness of 
the market - through the General Competitive Equilibrium (GCE) theory - had started to be 
challenged by leading economists, some of whom were originally supporters of the market 
theory - see Arrow 1994: 13 - and who have now questioned the effectiveness of market 
mechanism, especially in non-competitive situations. 
However, Paul Ormerod (1994: 12) has argued that 'The more intelligent free marketers 
recognise that the game is up with this central model of economic theory. An imaginative 
response is to claim that the fashionable concept of non-linear systems and chaos theory can 
be used to re-establish the primacy of free markets, as in a recent IEA pamphlet by David 
Parker and Ralph Stacey. '
5.8 Concluding Comment 
5.8.0 A ConcludinR Comment. In all the productive economies, except the USA, 
Governments have taken the commanding heights of the economy under their control. 
However, according to Kay (2003: 360): 'It was never clear what constitutes the commanding 
heights but similar instincts seem to have prevailed in most countries. Utilities - gas, 
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electricity, water and telecommunications - are almost always commanding heights. Sonic 
industries - such as airlines - are thought to have special importance... '
Yet, Parker and Stacey (1994: 83) argue that 'the long-terrn future cannot be reliably 
planned. ' The economy therefore cannot be controlled in any meaningful way by 
governments. Free and competitive markets should therefore be left to their own devices. 
But Kay (2003: 360) goes on to argue that 'There is not much evidence that privately owned 
firms are more efficient than public if competition is not possible or achieved. Popular 
discussion frequently conflates the introduction of competition with change of ownership'. 
So the debate between various schools of thought carries on, but we can be sure of one thing, 
no matter what economic theory is in ascendancy 'Transport will remain a crucial 
battleground in the years to come between those who want more private enterprise and those 
who want more nationalisation' Redwood 2002: 178. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Year Municipal NBC SBC Private Total 
1974 1 16 0 41 58 
1975 0 18 1 39 58 
1976 0 15 1 41 58 
1977 1 12 1 36 50 
1978 1 10 0 33 44 
1979 191 33 44 
1980 190 29 39 
1981 0816 15 
1982 0 12 15 18 
1983 1 12 14 17 
1984 0 12 24 17 
Table 1 Express Coach Passenger Journeys by Operator 
1974-1984 Millions 
Source: Transport Statistics for various years. 
*From 6 October 1980 the definition of the types of service changed. As a result of these 
changes many services previously classified as express and some previously classified as 
contract became licensed as stage services. 
Metropolitan Areas Shire Great 
Year London Counties Scotland Wales Britain 
85/86 74.1 65.7 90.2 94.2 N/A 81.7 
86/87 76.2 80.6 91.9 94.5 N/A 87.0 
87/88 76.8 84.2 92.9 94.5 N/A 88.4 
88/89 80.4 84.5 92.1 92.7 N/A 88.4 
89/90 82.2 84.8 92.6 90.4 NIA 88.6 
90/91 82.7 85.9 93.1 88.7 NIA 88.9 
91/92 86.4 91.6 95.7 91.2 N/A 92.4 
92/93 90.2 94.9 96.9 94.5 96.9 94.7 
93/94 95.8 97.9 98.1 96.2 98.8 97.3 
94/95 98.7 98.9 99.5 99.4 99.9 99.2 
95/96 100.4 100.8 100.4 100.1 100.0 100.5 
96/97 102.2 103.7 102.8 104.7 101.2 103.4 
97/98 102.6 106.3 104.6 109.3 103.3 105.9 
% Change 38.5 61.8 16.0 16.1 6.6 28.7 
Table 2 Local Bus Services: Real Fare Indices by Area 1985/86-97/98 
Source: Focus on Public Transport: 1999 page 59 - 1995=100 
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Year 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
95/96 
96/97 
97/98 
% Change 
Local Bus Fares 
81.7 
87.0 
88.4 
88.4 
88.6 
88.9 
92.4 
94.7 
97.3 
99.2 
100.5 
103.1 
105.1 
30.7 
Rail Fares 
80.4 
82.7 
84.1 
85.4 
85.7 
86.3 
89.9 
93.5 
97.6 
99.2 
100.4 
101.1 
100.6 
32.7 
Motoring Costs 
101.7 
97.4 
99.5 
98.4 
95.9 
93.3 
96.4 
98.3 
101.6 
101.3 
99.7 
101.4 
102.7 
-5.2 
Other travel costs 
105.7 
104.2 
104.0 
102.5 
100.0 
98.5 
99.7 
101.2 
103.9 
101.9 
99.3 
100.1 
N/a 
-28.9 
Table 3 Passenger Transport Price Indices at Constant Prices 1995=100 
Source: Focus on Public Transport 1999: 58 
Year 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
95/96 
96/97 
% Change 
London Metropolitan Shire Scotland 
Areas Counties 
355 523 847 
358 525 821 
348 544 816 
359 535 806 
361 513 791 
359 484 750 
358 497 727 
368 490 716 
389 499 742 
402 491 750 
432 477 731 
460 480 767 
29.5 -8.3 -9.5 
294 
284 
273 
264 
249 
236 
244 
244 
250 
256 
247 
233 
-20.9 
Wales Great 
Britain 
92 2,113 
83 2,070 
81 2,062 
85 2,050 
80 1,993 
72 1,901 
69 1,895 
66 1,884 
72 1,951 
72 1,971 
72 1,959 
72 2,011 
-21.9 -4.8 
Table 4 Local Bus Services: real passenger receipts J: million by area, 
excluding concessionary fares 
Source: Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain: 1995/96 Table 4.2 - 1995=100 
247 
Year London 
85/86 103 
86/87 100 
87/88 103 
88/89 97 
89/90 107 
90/91 104 
91/92 101 
92/93 95 
93/94 99 
94/95 103 
95/96 102 
96/97 103 
% Change 0.0 
Metropolitan Shire Great 
Areas Counties Scotland Wales Britain 
165 100 58 9 434 
167 94 57 9 427 
180 96 61 9 448 
181 99 52 8 437 
193 99 51 8 457 
193 102 51 8 458 
183 101 44 8 437 
181 102 42 9 429 
178 101 44 8 431 
182 102 46 8 440 
176 101 44 9 432 
172 99 48 9 431 
4.0 -0.8 -15.9 -4.0 -0.9 
Table 5 Local Bus Services: real concessionary fares reimbursement scheme I million 
by area 
Source: Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain: 1996/97 Table 5.3 - 1995=100 
Year 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
95/96 
96/97 
97/98 
% Change 
London Metro Shire Scotland Wales GB 
262 170 116 132 114 150 
247 138 105 118 102 131 
244 128 99 112 89 124 
229 123 96 101 87 118 
218 120 91 99 79 115 
210 115 93 90 75 112 
196 106 91 88 72 107 
180 101 84 86 71 101 
161 97 83 86 73 97 
149 97 80 85 75 94 
159 97 76 74 71 89 
152 90 76 74 71 89 
-42.0 -47.9 -34.5 -43.9 -37.7 -40.7 
Table 6 Percentage change in Real Operating Costs Pence Per Vehicle 
Kilometre by Area 1986/87-1997/98 - Including Depreciation 
Source: Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain: 1995/96 
Table 6.2 - 1995=100 
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Year London Metropolitan Areas Shire Scotland Wales Great 
Counties Britain 
85/86 235 363 152 44 20 814 
86/87 183 294 128 52 15 671 
87/88 164 194 109 33 12 513 
88/89 165 162 113 30 10 480 
89/90 113 135 114 22 12 395 
90/91 141 123 114 15 12 405 
91/92 187 129 116 23 12 467 
92/93 189 123 105 23 11 452 
93/94 65 111 95 24 10 305 
94/95 60 108 94 24 9 295 
95/96 32 106 92 26 10 264 
96/97 12 109 85 30 10 246 
97/98 1 98 86 28 9 222 
% Change -99.6 -73.0 43.4 -36.4 -55.0 -72.7 
Table 7 Local Bus Services: real public transport support I million by area at 1997/98 
prices. Source: Focus on Public Transport 1999: 70 
Metropolitan Shire Great 
Year London Areas Counties Scotland Wales Britain 
85/86 1,152 2,068 1,588 671 163 5,641 
86/87 1,164 1,810 1,571 644 152 5,341 
87/88 1,207 1,732 1,550 647 156 5,292 
88/89 1,211 1,695 1,501 647 161 5,215 
89/90 1,188 1,648 1,474 613 151 5,074 
90/91 1,178 1,547 1,396 585 145 4,850 
91/92 1,149 1,478 1,333 571 133 4,665 
92/93 1,129 1,383 1,307 532 129 4,480 
93/94 1,117 1,337 1,274 525 133 4,385 
94/95 1,167 1,331 1,277 513 132 4,420 
95/96 1,205 1,292 1,265 494 127 4,383 
96/97 1,242 1,247 1,269 467 130 4,355 
% Change 7.8 -39.7 -20.1 -30.4 -20.2 -22.8 
Table 8 Local Bus Services: passenger journeys by area - millions Source: Table 2.1 Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain 1996/97 
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Year 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
95/96 
96/97 
97/98 
% Change 
Metropolitan Shire Great 
London Areas Counties Scotland Wales Britain 
273 574 849 285 95 2,077 
278 557 929 302 94 2,160 
276 616 1,015 329 105 2,342 
285 634 1,027 325 118 2,390 
292 654 1,041 336 119 2,442 
304 650 1,035 336 123 2,448 
316 662 1,035 355 122 2,448 
330 679 1,040 347 119 2,515 
343 693 1,058 361 130 2,585 
356 720 1,080 368 125 2,649 
353 695 1,102 350 123 2,623 
342 692 1,169 368 120 2,638 
362 700 1,085 368 117 2,632 
32.6 21.9 22 7.8 29.1 23.2 26.7 
Table 9 Local Bus Services: vehicle kilometres by area - millions 
Source: Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain: 1995/96 Table 1.1 
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APPENDIX 2 Ownership of BTDB and ABP ports 1982 and 1997 
British Transport Docks Board ports as of 
I" March 1982 
BTDB Port Category 
Ayr & Troon Small 
Barrow & Silloth Small 
Barry Large 
Cardiff Large 
Fleetwood Small 
Associated British Ports Holding ports in 
1997 
ABP Category 
Ayr & Troon Small 
Barrow & Silloth Small 
Barry Large 
Cardiff Large 
Colchester Dock Transit Small 
Company Purchased in 1988* 
Garston Small 
Grimsby and Immingham Large 
Goole Large 
Hull Large 
Kings Lynn Small 
Lowestoft Small 
Newport Large 
Plymouth Small 
Southampton Large 
Swansea & Port Talbot Large 
Source British Transport Docks Board 1982 
Fleetwood Small 
Garston Small 
Grimsby and Immingharn Large 
Goole Large 
Hull Large 
Ipswich Port Ltd Small 
Purchased in 1997* 
Kings Lynn Small 
Lowestoft Small 
Newport Large 
Plymouth Small 
Southampton Large 
Swansea & Port Talbot Large 
Teignmouth Quay Small 
Company Purchased in 1988* 
Whitby Port Services Small 
purchased in 1989* 
*Source APB 1998 pp 17-18 
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APPENDIX 3 List of the Port Authorities of Great Britain by Type of Ownership. 
Authorities making statistical returns to the National Ports Council arranged geographically 
within each type. 
1. NATIONALISM PORTS 
(i) British Transport Docks Board 
Southampton 
Plymouth (Millbay) 
Lydney 
Newport 
Cardiff 
Penarth 
Barry 
Port Talbot 
Swansea 
Garston 
Fleetwood 
Barrow-in-Furness 
Silloth 
Ayr 
Troon 
Methil 
Burntisland 
Grangemouth 
Hartlepools 
Middlesbrough 
Hull 
Goole 
Immingham. 
Grimsby 
King's Lynn 
Lowestoft 
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British Railways Board 
Folkestone 
Newhaven 
Fishguard 
Holyhead 
Heysham 
Stranraer 
Harwich (Parkeston Quay and Train Ferry Terminal) 
(iii) British Waterways Board 
Sharpness 
Weston Point 
(iv) The Admiralty 
Invergordon 
2. PUBLIC TRUST PORTS 
Port of London Authority 
Medway Conservancy Board 
Faversharn Navigation Commissioners 
Sandwich Port and Haven Commissioners 
Dover Harbour Board 
Shoreharn Harbour Trustees 
Littlehampton Harbour Board 
Southampton Harbour Board 
Poole Harbour Commissioners 
Dartmouth Harbour Commissioners 
Cattewater Harbour Commissioners, Plymouth 
Fowey Harbour Commissioners 
Falmouth Harbour Commissioners 
Newlyn Pier & Harbour Commissioners 
Padstow Harbour Commissioners 
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Newport (Mon. ) Harbour Commissioners 
Milford Haven Conservancy Board 
Caernarvon Harbour Trust 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
Lancaster Port Commissioners 
Whitehaven Harbour Commissioners 
Clyde Port Authority 
Stornoway Pier and Harbour Commission 
Trustees of the Harbour of Inverness 
Fraserburgh Harbour Commissioners 
Peterhead Harbour Trustees 
Aberdeen Harbour Commissioners 
Dundee Harbour Trust 
Leith Harbour & Dock Commissioners 
Warkworth Harbour Commissioners 
Blyth Harbour Commission 
Tyne Improvement Commission 
River Wear Commissioners 
Tees Conservancy Commissioners 
Bridlington Harbour Commissioners 
King's Lynn Conservancy Board 
Great Yarmouth Port & Haven Commissioners 
Ipswich Dock Commission 
3. LOCAL AUTHORITY PORTS 
Ramsgate Corporation 
Portsmouth City Council 
Newport Isle of Wight Borough Council 
Corporation of Weymouth & Melcombe Regis 
Exeter City Council 
Truro City Council 
Penzance Corporation 
Bideford Corporation 
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Bridgwater Port & Navigation 
Port of Bristol Authority 
Port of Preston Authority 
Paisley (Cart Navigation) 
Perth Town Council 
Council of the Royal Burgh of Kirkcaldy 
Corporation of Newcastle- upon-Tyne 
The Port of Whitby 
Scarborough Corporation 
Port of Boston Authority 
Port of Wisbech Authority 
Colchester Borough Council 
4. PRIVATE AND OTHER PORTS 
Sheerness Harbour Co. 
Ridharn Dock [Bowaters United Kingdom Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. (Kernsley Mill)] 
Exmouth Dock Co. 
Teignmouth Quay Co Ltd. 
Sutton Harbour Improvement Co., Plymouth 
Port of Par Ltd. 
Charlestown Estate Ltd. 
Falmouth Dock & Engineering Co. 
Hayle (Messrs. Harvey & Co. Ltd. ) 
Milford Docks Co. 
Penmaenmawr (Kingston Minerals Ltd. ) 
Mostyn Docks & Trading Co. 
Bromborough Dock (Unilever Merseyside Ltd. ) 
Manchester Ship Canal Co. 
The Millom Hematite Iron Co. Ltd. 
The Workington Harbour & Dock Co. Ltd. 
Irvine Harbour Co. 
Ardrossan Harbour Co. 
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Finnart [B. P. Refinery (Grangemouth) Ltd. ] 
Lossiemouth (Elgin & Lossiemouth Harbour Company) 
Newburgh (Fife) [Bell Bros. (Newburgh) Ltd. ] 
Granton Harbour Ltd. 
Seaham. Harbour Dock Co. 
Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. 
Source: Digest of Port Statistics 1966 pp2-3 
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APPENDIX 4 Financial Statistics for British Transports Docks Board 1963-1981 
Year Revenue 
000 
Net Surplus 
000 
Tonnage Personnel Remuneration 
fm 
1963 22,620 710 66,117 12,101 10.3 
1964 23,316 715 67,948 11,576 10.7 
1965 24,552 682 67,490 11,123 12.0 
1966 
1 
26,629 886 69,896 10,183 12.7 
1967 28,568 914 72,343 13,0? 8 14.4 
1968 28,329 830 75,486 12,132 13.2 
1969 
1 
29,611 (440) 78,733 11,394 14.4 
1970 33 , 536 (1,630) 
86,159 11,075 16.4 
1971 40,415 409 79,422 10,874 18.3 
1972 48,843 1,399 83,606 12,178 28.1 
1973 155,648 1,693 89,742 11,658 30.7 
1974 63,214 702 84,785 11,941 35.6 
1975 77,028 814 77,252 11,353 42.7 
1976 97,951 6,193 83,489 11,656 48.1 
1977 108,813 7,285 77,170 11,544 52.0 
1978 117,694 6,981 78,908 11,609 57.3 
1979 131,152 6,806 82,242 11,533 68.7 
1980 136,913 8,006 71,672 11,272 80.4 
1981 128,245 (8,784) 175,235 19,977 
1 
81.8 
ource: British Transport Docks Board Report and Accounts 1963-1981 
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APPENDIX 5 ABP real Port Turnover and Real GDP in Ln 
LN Real Ln Real 
Port GDP 
Year Revenue 
1963 5.7004 12.9275 
1964 5.6849 12.9684 
1965 5.6880 12.9899 
1966 5.7286 13.0072 
1967 5.7699 13.0355 
1968 5.7135 13.0695 
1969 5.7061 13.0881 
1970 5.7516 13.1136 
1971 5.8446 13.1384 
1972 5.9613 13.1877 
1973 6.0230 13.2253 
1974 5.9705 13.2227 
1975 5.9435 13.2178 
1976 6.0565 13.2457 
1977 6.0335 13.2693 
1978 6.0076 13.2993 
1979 5.9606 13.3276 
1980 5.8360 13.2903 
1981 5.6798 13.2922 
1982 5.7801 13.3134 
1983 5.7534 13.3528 
1984 5.5918 13.3723 
1985 5.5387 13.4119 
1986 5.5943 13.4473 
1987 5.5888 13.4998 
1988 5.5221 13.5409 
1989 5.4699 13.5619 
1990 5.4881 13.5577 
1991 5.4743 13.5525 
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1992 5.3833 13.5543 
1993 5.3244 13.5901 
1994 5.3388 13.632 
1995 5.3713 13.658 
1996 5.3875 13.6852 
1997 5.5463 13.7191 
1998 5.6720 13.7445 
Sources 
Real GDP (EM) from http: //www. hm- 
treasury. gov. uk/Economic Data and Tools/GDP Deflators/data-gdI2-riR. cfm? 
BTDB and ABP port revenue from Annual Reports and Accounts 
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Appendix 6 Financial Statistics of the Major Trust Ports 1992-1998 
Year Tees Clydeport Forth Medway Tilbury 
1992 10585 32423 26025 33553 
1993 39097 11847 33092 27345 38646 
1994 41140 15886 35734 26514 40263 
1995 42466 18177 47305 25226 38735 
1996 44364 17445 84727 6114 39407 
1997 47785 20551 95060 6619 39483 
1998 84926 26042 108043 6678 39810 
Table 1 Turnover LOOO Source: Fame database 
Profit fOOO 
Year Tees Clydeport Forth Medway Tilbury 
1992 1,633 10,899 26025 33553 
1993 39,097 2,454 9,616 27345 38646 
1994 41,140 5,617 13,744 26514 40263 
1995 17,846 5,324 15,348 25226 38735 
1996 20,377 5,311 22,167 6114 39407 
1997 22,705 7,852 24,434 6619 39483 
1998 29,582 11,023 30,959 6678 39810 
Source: Fame database 
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